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Abstract
In this thesis, we study linear type-theories and their semantics. We present a
general framework for such type-theories, and prove certain decidability properties
of its equality. We also present intuitionistic linear logic and Milner’s action calculi
as instances of the framework, and use our results to show decidability of their
respective equality judgements.
Firstly, we motivate our development by giving a split-context logic and type-
theory, called dual intuitionistic linear logic (DILL), which is equivalent at the
level of term equality to the familiar type-theory derived from intuitionistic linear
logic (ILL). We give a semantics for the type-theory DILL, and prove soundness
and completeness for it; we can then deduce these results for the type-theory ILL
by virtue of our translation.
Secondly, we generalise DILL to obtain a general logic, type-theory and se-
mantics based on an arbitrary set of operators, or general natural deduction rules.
We again prove soundness and completeness results, augmented in this case by
an initiality result. We introduce Milner’s action calculi, and present example
instances of our framework which are isomorphic to them. We extend this iso-
morphism to three significant higher-order variants of the action calculi, having
functional properties, and compare the induced semantics for these action calculi
with those given previously.
Thirdly, motivated by these functional extensions, we define higher-order in-
stances of our general framework, which are equipped with functional structure,
proceeding as before to give logic, type-theory and semantics. We show that the
logic and type-theory DILL arise as a higher-order instance of our general frame-
work. We then define the higher-order extension of any instance of our framework,
and use a Yoneda lemma argument to show that the obvious embedding from an
instance into its higher-order extension is conservative. This has the corollary
that the embeddings from the action calculi into the higher-order action calculi
are all conservative, extending a result of Milner.
Finally, we introduce relations, a syntax derived from proof-nets, for our gen-
eral framework, and use them to show that certain instances of our framework,
including some higher-order instances, have decidable equality judgements. This
immediately shows that the equalities of DILL, ILL, the action calculi and the
higher-order action calculi are decidable.
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The central concept in this thesis is that of linearity. We can say that linearity
is an attribute of systems in which unrestricted duplication of computations or
information is not allowed. There are many practical situations in which this is
the case—computations with side effects, where duplicating the computation also
duplicates the side-effect, manipulating large data-structures, where a duplication
may bear an unacceptable computational cost, or simply efficient implementations
where duplicating computation is to be avoided except where necessary. Areas as
diverse as optimal λ-calculus implementations, the study of process calculi and
denotational semantics can all utilise linearity in this broad sense.
Although such systems have been studied for many years, a new and striking
development occurred when Girard introduced linear logic [Gir87]. Unlike con-
ventional intuitionistic and classical logics, linear logic is built on the underlying
idea that assumptions should be treated linearly, which is to say that an assump-
tion should not be used twice in a deduction. Starting from this basis, Girard
built a complete classical linear logic, which, just as in the conventional case, has
both minimal and intuitionistic fragments.
Since the introduction of linear logic, many researchers have used it as an un-
derlying logic for systems which exhibit linearity in our general sense, for example
in the study of optimal λ-calculus reductions [GAL92a], in the analysis of imple-
mentation issues such as garbage collection, references and others [Wad90, GH90]
and to control interference in imperative languages [OTPT95]. It has become the
logic of choice for such applications in much the same way as conventional logic
underpins a huge range of theory in computer science. In the case of conventional
logics, one large section of applications are those which are based on conventional
intuitionistic logic as a typing system for a syntax of some sort. A variety of sys-
tems can be typed in this way, and the general principles underlying such typings
are well understood.
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In this thesis, we present a first step towards a similar unifying programme for
systems with linearity. We give a general operator theory, logic, and type-theory
over a linear underlying structure, and show how it can be used to present a
number of typing systems exhibiting linearity. We also give a semantics for our
theory, and prove some general results about it.
As an introduction, we give a motivating summary in a simple setting, provide
brief tutorials and summaries of related work on the concepts we work with, and
then outline the work contained in the thesis. A chapter summary can be found
in section 1.4.
We assume a basic understanding of elementary intuitionistic logic, its type
theory, simple category theory, and the various relationships of a familiar triangle,













Consider the typed λ-calculus. Although it forms the basis of many developments
in computer science, from functional programming languages to foundational se-
mantics, it is very frequently augmented with additional constructs, for example
those for pairing, sums, or other data types, or that for recursion. In the case
of each such extension the definition of terms must be extended, and new typing
rules given, and as a result of these extensions, many simple definitions and res-
ults must be at least rechecked. Such a procedure not only repeats work, but also
guarantees that many slightly differing presentations of each alternative calculus
exist, each with its own development. We might try to avoid this by using a
general theory of operators, due to Aczel [Acz80, Acz78].
Minimal Intuitionistic Logic
We start by considering minimal intuitionistic logic over a given set of formulae or
proposition letters (ranged over by A,B . . . ) and given by the abstract grammar:
A ::= p ∈ P | A→ A
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with the rules:
Γ, A ` A (Ax)
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B (Abs)
Γ ` A→ B Γ ` A
Γ ` B (App)
where the turnstile ` is a relation holding between sets of formulae (denoted
Γ,∆ . . . ) and formulae. We call the axiom rule, along with the (admissible) cut
and weakening rules:
Γ ` A Γ, A ` B
Γ ` B (Cut)
Γ ` B
Γ, A ` B (Weak)
the structural rules of the logic. Note that the rules for the arrow connective occur
as an introduction-elimination pair (or I/E-pair); the abstraction introduces the
→ and the application rule eliminates it. Such I/E-pairs are characteristic of
natural deduction.
Now there are many possible ways to strengthen this logic, by adding new
connectives and rules for those connectives. Let us try to give a general schema for
such natural deduction rules. As a first attempt, we might say that an arbitrary
rule, given a number of deductions Γ ` Ai for i = 1 . . . r, gives us a deduction
Γ ` B for some new conclusion B:
Γ ` A1 . . . Γ ` Ar
Γ ` B
This is a reasonable attempt, as all but one of the rules of minimal intuitionistic
logic are instances of this schema, as are the rules for pairing amongst others.
However, the abstraction rule is not; this is because an assumption is discharged
in this rule. Given a deduction Γ, A ` B, we end up with a deduction in which A
is no longer an assumption. Hence we could refine our schema; given a number of
deductions Γ,∆i ` Ai for i = 1 . . . r, we have a deduction Γ ` B in which all the
assumptions ∆i for each i = 1 . . . r have been discharged. This gives a general
rule:
Γ,∆1 ` A1 . . . Γ,∆r ` Ar
Γ ` B
Now all the rules of minimal intuitionistic logic and many others arise as instances
of this schema.
It is important to note, however, that some do not, because of implicit or ex-
plicit side-conditions. One common situation in which a side-condition is imposed
is when a modality is used; for example in the presence of a unary connective ,
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we might have an introduction rule:
Γ ` A
Γ ` A
only where each formula in Γ has the form B for some B.
Another (apparent!) possible behaviour which is not captured by our rule
schema is that where an assumption is introduced in a deduction, as for example
in an alternative formulation of the →-elimination rule:
Γ ` A→ B
Γ, A ` B
Although rules of this form are not instances of our rule schema, in the presence
of the structural rules we can show that they are interderivable with the instances
of our rule schema. In the case of this alternative rule for →, the appropriate
instance is exactly the normal →-elimination rule.
Given our general description of a natural deduction rule, we can see that
any particular instance is characterised by the number r, the sets of formulae ∆i
which are discharged, the conclusions Ai and the final conclusion B′. We might
then write all this information as the arity of the rule:
( ~A1)B1 . . . ( ~Ar)Br
B′
where the set of elements in the sequence ~Ai is ∆i for each i = 1 . . . r. As an
example, consider the sequent-style presentation of the natural deduction rule for
choice:
Γ ` A ∨ B Γ, A ` C Γ, B ` C
Γ ` C (∨E)
where formulae A and B are discharged from the assumptions. This would then
have the arity:
()A ∨B (A)C (B)C
C
We can characterise any extension of minimal intuitionistic logic with rules of
this general form by giving just the basic formulae, and the arities of the rules.
Together, we call these two bits of information a signature for the logic. In fact,
as we shall see, the most important feature of minimal intuitionistic logic is not
the rules for the connective →, but rather the admissible structural rules. Given
these structural rules, we can express the underlying behaviour of any connective
such as → in the arity of its rules.
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Using the definition of proofs in a logic with general rules, we can also define
a sensible notion of equivalence between proofs based on eliminating certain re-
dundant proof sequences. For example, in minimal logic, any proof which ends:
Γ ` A
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B
Γ ` B
should be equivalent to the proof obtained from the admissible cut rule applied
to the deductions Γ ` A and Γ, A ` B. We could extend such a notion of proof-
equivalence to the extensions of minimal logic with instances of our rule schema
by allowing arbitrary equivalences over proofs of the extended logic. However,
this is more easily done in the framework of the type-theory we will present in
the next subsection.
The Typed λ-calculus
We now recall that via the Curry-Howard correspondence, proofs of minimal logic
can be represented by the typed λ-calculus, using the annotations:
Γ, x:A ` x:A (Ax)
Γ, x:A ` t:B
Γ ` λx:A.t:A→ B (Abs)
Γ ` t:A→ B Γ ` u:A
Γ ` tu:B (App)
Moreover, in the example of the previous subsection, the (∨ − E) rule is often
annotated with a casesA,B,C-construct
Γ ` t:A∨B Γ, x:A ` u:C Γ, y :B ` v :B
Γ ` casesA,B,C t of x in u or y in v :C
which acts as a choice operator. In general, we can give an annotation for an
instance of our rule schema having arity
( ~A1)B1 . . . ( ~Ar)Br
B′
in an extension of the typed λ-calculus by adding a term constructO((~x)t, . . . , (~x)t)
with the introduction rule
Γ, ~x1 : ~A1 ` t1 :B1 . . .Γ, ~xr : ~Ar ` tr :Br
Γ ` O((~x1)t1, . . . , (~xr)tr):B′
In this way we can build a typed λ-calculus over a signature of formulae and
rules with associated arities. Many common extensions of typed λ-calculus arise
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as instances of this, including pairing constructs, choice constructs and recursion
operators.
Having defined a typing system based on the logic having as rules arbitrary
instances of our rule schema, we can give a notion of equality judgement over
such a typing system. An equality judgement takes the form Γ ` t = u :A for
terms Γ ` t :A and Γ ` u :A, and asserts that the proofs denoted by the terms
t and u are equivalent. Equality judgements are commonly built inductively as
congruences over axiomatic equalities which arise from proof equivalences. These









where the I and E denote the introduction and elimination rules for a particular
connective. We shall call these respectively the β- and η-equivalences for a given
connective. They give rise respectively to β- and η-equalities on the proof terms.
In minimal logic, the β- and η-equivalences for the → connective are:
Γ, x:A ` t:B
Γ ` λx:A.t:A→ B (→ I) Γ ` u:A
Γ ` (λx:A.t)u:B (→ E)
Γ, x:A ` t:B Γ, x:A ` x:A
Γ, x:A ` tx:B (→ E)
Γ ` λx:A.(tx):A→ B (→ I)
||| |||
Γ, x:A ` t:B Γ ` u:A
Γ ` t{u/x}:B (Cut) Γ ` t:A→ B
under the condition on the second of these that x does not occur free in t (and
where t{u/x} stands for the substitution of u for x in t).
The equivalences then yield the familiar βη-equalities of the → type:
(β) Γ ` (λx:A.t)u= t{u/x}:B (η) Γ ` λx:A.(tx) = t:A→ B (x not free in t)
We can extend the equality judgement in the case of logics built on general
instances of our rule schema by allowing arbitrary axiomatic equality judgements
over terms of the general term calculus over the logics.
Cartesian Closed Categories
We turn to the question of semantics. It is well-known that minimal intuitionistic
logic has models which are cartesian closed categories. In these, a proof Γ ` A
is modelled as a morphism [[Γ]]→ [[A]], with a suitable interpretation of the basic
types. We can see that any rule of the logic takes a certain number of morphisms
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from the appropriate hom-sets, and returns another. Being more precise, given a
rule having arity
( ~A1)B1 . . . ( ~Ar)Br
B′




C([[Γ]]× [[ ~Ai]], [[Bi]])→ C([[Γ]], [[B′]])
This is sufficient to give a sound interpretation of the operator theory we have
described. However, when we extend this interpretation to the type theory, a
complication arises. Consider the choice operator casesA,B,C we have already
introduced:
Γ ` casesA,B,C t of x in u or y in v :C
If Γ contains just the typing x′ :A′, and we have a proof ` t′ :A′, we would
expect the typing
` (casesA,B,C t of x in u or y in v){t′/x′}:C
to be modelled by the composition
[[ ` t′ :A′]];αx′:A′([[x′:A′ ` t:A ∨B]], [[x′:A′, x:A ` u:C]], [[x′:A′, y :B ` v :C]])
where αx′:A′ is the function interpreting the choice construct. However, the term
(casesA,B,C t of x in u or y in v){t′/x′} is precisely
casesA,B,C (t{t′/x′}) of x in (u{t′/x′}) or y in (v{t′/x′})
and so we would expect this term to be interpreted as
α (f ; [[x′:A′ ` t:A ∨B]], f ; [[x′:A′, x:A ` u:C]], f ; [[x′:A′, y :B ` v :C]])
where f = [[ ` t′ :A′]]. Clearly, though, we would wish these two interpretations
to be equal. This is achieved by imposing the condition that αA′ be the instance
at [[A′]] of a natural transformation
C( , [[A∨ B]])× C( × [[A]], [[C]])× C( × [[B]], [[C]])→ C( , [[C]])
Further, we can then model an equality judgement over general axiomatic
equalities as a c.c.c. such that the interpretation of the terms is sound with
respect to the axiomatic equalities.















We aim to extend the account of the previous section by starting with a linear lo-
gic, λ-calculus and semantics. First, however, we need to recall some background
material in a number of different areas touched on in the previous section.
Linear Logic
Linear logic was introduced by Girard in 1987 [Gir87], and is a resource logic
in which contraction and weakening are allowed only on certain formulae, those
labelled with the connective !.
Consider what we might call minimal intuitionistic linear logic, which is the
simple logic with formulae
A ::= p ∈ P | A( A
and rules
A ` A (Ax)
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A( B (Abs)
Γ ` A ∆ ` A( B
Γ,∆ ` B (App)
where the turnstile ` is now a relation holding between multisets of formulae and
formulae. We call the axiom rule, together with the admissible cut rule
Γ ` A ∆, A ` B
Γ,∆ ` B (Cut)
the structural rules of this logic. Note that weakening is no longer admissible.
In fact, there are two obvious differences between this minimal intuitionistic
linear logic and our presentation of minimal intuitionistic logic in the previous
section. The first of these occurs in the (Ax) rules; in the linear logic, we are only
allowed to assume the one formula which is deduced, whereas in minimal logic we
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can also make any number of other assumptions. The second is more pervasive,
but is seen particularly in comparing the rules for application in the two logics.
In the linear logic, each proof uses a separate multiset of assumptions and the
multiset union of these proves the conclusion. Hence we are able to measure the
number of uses of an assumption in a derivation by the number of times it appears
in the multiset of assumptions. On the other hand, in minimal logic the same
assumptions are used to prove both premises and the conclusion, and therefore
we have no information about how the assumptions are used, if at all. However,
this new way of handling contexts also has more wide-ranging effects. One could
present minimal logic equivalently with the elimination rule for the arrow given
in the linear logic. Hence the differences between these two logic are all implicit
in those between the structural rules. The importance of such rules in logics has
been studied: for a general overview, see [Avr94], and in the particular case of
those considered here, see [Lam89, Lam90a, Sza75].
We now add to this minimal linear logic rules for the exponential, as presented
for example in [Abr93]. Now the formulae are given by:
A ::= p ∈ P | A( A | !A
where given a multiset of formulae Γ = {A1, . . . , Ar}, we write !Γ as shorthand
for the multiset of formulae {!A1, . . . , !Ar}, and the rules are augmented with the




Γ ` A (Der)
Γ `!A ∆, !A, !A ` B
Γ,∆ ` B (Copy)
Γ `!A ∆ ` B
Γ,∆ ` B (Disc)
Of these, the copy and discard rules allow us to duplicate or discard assump-
tions of the form !A for some A. Although these rules complicate the situation, the
promotion and dereliction rules can be seen as an I/E-pair for the !-connective.
Altogether, these connectives and rules allow us to encode minimal logic into
intuitionistic linear logic using the translation given by (A→ B) 7→ (!A( B).
Other connectives in the intuitionistic fragment of linear logic are the binary
tensor, ⊗, the nullary unit, I (which acts as a unit for the tensor), the binary
product, & (sometimes written ×) and the binary coproduct, ⊕. In this thesis, we
will focus on the multiplicative fragment of intuitionistic linear logic, which has
all these connectives except the product and coproduct (the additive connectives).
Extending techniques used in the study of the multiplicative fragment to treat
the additives is known to be non-trivial, and this is also the case for our work.
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Although we will work exclusively with intuitionistic linear logic, we briefly
present the corresponding classical linear logic, which has sequents Γ ` ∆, and
two important new connectives, linear negation ( )⊥ (originally presented as a
defined connective except on the atomic propositions) and the ‘par’ connective,
written
&
. This has the introduction (or right) rule
Γ ` A,B,∆
Γ ` A &B,∆
It turns out that
&
is the de Morgan dual of ⊗, and that in this logic A ( B
can be defined A⊥
&
B.
This logic is of more than passing interest to us because of its position as
a predecessor of the system LU [Gir93] introduced by Girard in 1993. LU has
a number of interesting features, but the most relevant to our study is its use
of a split context. In LU, a general sequent has the form Γ; ∆ ` ∆′; Γ′, where
the positions occupied by the Γ,Γ′ are known as intuitionistic zones and those
occupied by the ∆,∆′ are linear zones. Hence the above sequent should be read
(roughly): “using formulae Γ intuitionistically and formulae ∆ linearly, we can
prove formulae ∆′ linearly or formulae Γ′ intuitionistically”. Although LU is
essentially a classical logic, it contains as subsystems minimal logic, classical logic,
intuitionistic linear logic and classical linear logic, and we will take advantage in
particular of the fact that it contains intuitionistic linear logic as a subsystem to
present an alternative formulation of that logic. We will sketch this later in this
introduction, but for now it is interesting to note that the structural rules of LU
include (amongst others) admissible weakening in both intuitionistic zones, and
two flavours of cut:
Γ; ` A; Γ′ Γ, A; ∆ ` ∆′,Γ′
Γ; ∆ ` ∆′; Γ′ (I-Cut)
Γ; ∆2 ` ∆′2, A; Γ′ Γ; ∆1, A ` ∆′1; Γ′
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` ∆′1,∆′2; Γ′
(L-Cut)
The presence of zones adds complexity to the structural rules, and this complexity
will be crucial in capturing the interaction between linear and intuitionistic types
and computations.
Linear Term Calculi
The first stage in assigning terms to proofs in a natural deduction formulation
of intuitionistic linear logic is to consider the minimal intuitionistic linear logic
defined above. Just as the minimal intuitionistic logic can be annotated with the
typed λ-calculus, the minimal intuitionistic linear logic can be annotated with a
linear typed λ-calculus, and this was done by a number of people, mostly along
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the lines of [Abr93]. Most of these systems also went on to annotate the I/E-pair
for the tensor connective in what has since become the standard way:
∆1 ` t:A ∆2 ` u:B
∆1,∆2 ` t⊗ u:A⊗ B
(⊗I) ∆1 ` t:A⊗ B ∆2, x:A, y:B ` u:C
∆1,∆2 ` let x⊗ y:A⊗B be t in u:C
(⊗E)
From now on we may omit type annotations in terms, where they can be recon-
structed from derivations. It should be noted that in some accounts, which include
those of Abramsky [Abr93] and Wadler [Wad93] the syntax let t be x⊗ y in v and
slight variants of it were used instead of that given here. The term construct t⊗v is
self-explanatory, and the term construct let x⊗ y be t in u is a pattern-matching
constructor which can be thought of as decoding its argument t into two parts
which are then substituted for the bound variables x and y in its argument u.
As in minimal logic, we can give an equality judgement which is a congruence
over axiomatic equalities corresponding to proof-equivalences. The β- and η-
equivalences for the ⊗ connective are easily given, and they generate β- and
η-axiomatic equality judgements as follows:
(β) Γ ` let x⊗ y be t⊗ u in v = v{t, u/x, y}:C
(η) Γ ` let x⊗ y be t in x⊗ y = t:A⊗B
Unlike minimal logic, however, when we consider the whole equality judgement
on terms corresponding to proof equivalence and normalisation, the term calculus
as presented so far already has one particular drawback which is inherent in much
work on linear logic. Whereas in the type-theory arising from minimal logic with
no additional rules, the equality judgement is simply based on the familiar βη-
equality of the typed λ-calculus, in the case of linear logic equalities arise which
are not β- or η-equalities, the so-called “commuting conversions”. For example,
consider the following proofs:
Γ1, A ` B ⊗B′ Γ2, B,B′, A ` C
Γ1,Γ2, A ` C
(⊗E)
Γ1,Γ2 ` A( C
(( I) Γ1 ` B ⊗B
′
Γ2, B,B′, A ` C
Γ2, B,B′ ` A( C
(( I)
Γ1,Γ2 ` A( C
(⊗E)
where the proof Γ1, A ` B ⊗B′ is obtained from the proof Γ1 ` B ⊗B′ by weak-
ening. The difference between these two proofs arises because we have used the
two essentially independent rules in two different orders. However, semantically
and intuitively, it is sensible to ask that they be equivalent. This gives us the
axiomatic equality:
Γ ` λx.let y ⊗ y′ be t in u = let y ⊗ y′ be t in λx.u:A( C
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which holds under appropriate free and bound variable conditions. There are a
variety of such proof equivalences and corresponding axiomatic equalities. Cat-
egorically, these equalities are soundly modelled by virtue of the interaction of
the ⊗-functor with composition.
Another way of thinking of them is to recall the intuitive reading given above of
the let -⊗ constructor as a pattern matching substitution. Then it should have the
usual properties of substitution, for example commuting with other substitutions
and term structure, under suitable free variable conditions. A similar situation
arises in a more familiar setting; if we consider the terms:
Γ ` casesA,A′,B→C t of x in (λy.u) or x′ in (λy.v):B→ C
and
Γ ` λy.(casesA,A′,C t of x in u or x′ in v):B→ C
it seems very plausible that they be equal, since the functions they describe are
intuitively the same. However, such an equality is not derivable from the βη-
equalities of the construct, and hence must be added as an axiomatic equality.
Given term annotations for this system, the most difficult problem remaining
is the annotation of the intuitionistic rules for the connective !. A first attempt,
by Abramsky [Abr93], simply annotated the key promotion rule:
Γ ` t:A
Γ `!t :!A (Prom)
where Γ is a sequence of typings x1 :!A1 . . . xr :!Ar. However, Wadler [Wad92] and
Mitchell and Lincoln [LM92] noticed that there was a technical problem with this
presentation, because of the failure of a linear substitution lemma (given a typing
judgement ∆ ` t:A and one ∆′, x:A ` u:B, there should be a typing judgement
∆,∆′ ` u{t/x}:B). This is connected to the fact that the !-connective does not
have a “real” natural deduction presentation, since it has four rules rather than
an I/E-pair.
In order to avoid the problem, Benton, Bierman, dePaiva and Hyland gave
a syntax [BBdPH93b, BBdPH93a] which changed the form of each rule except
(Der) by adding an element of substitution for each of the fresh assumptions
(each of !∆ in the case of Prom). This gave the rule
Promotion
∆i `Mi :!Ai (i = 1..r) x1 :!A1, . . . , xr :!Ar ` N :B
∆′′ ` promote ~M for ~x in N :!B
Benton proved strong normalisation for the β − cc fragment of the equality of
this system [Ben95b]. We present this system in full in chapter 2. However, this
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system is complex, notably in its equality judgement. Since the !-connective does
not have an I/E-pair in the logic, it is not immediately clear what its axiomatic
equalities should be, and in fact there are a large number of axiomatic equalities
involving the term constructs associated with it.
Considering classical logics, although Abramsky [Abr93] gave an annotation
for classical linear logic, it had been thought that term calculi were not the most
appropriate presentation of the proofs of classical linear logic, partly because of
the huge number of proof equivalences induced by the possibility of selecting more
than one formula on the right of the turnstile as the primary formula of a rule.
Hyland and dePaiva [HdP93] gave a system of term assignment for a linear logic
with multiple conclusions, having the par constructor, which also exhibited these
characteristic equivalences.
A more significant development occurred when Parigot presented a system of
term assignment for classical logic [Par92, Par93] which has since been adapted
by Bierman [Bie96b, Bie96a] to give a linear form. The main feature of Parigot’s
system and its linear derivatives is that there is an identified formula on the right
which is always the active formula in introduction rules, and there are explicit
structural rules allowing the exchange of this identified formula with another
formula on the right, thereby recapturing the power of classical logic.
As yet there have been no attempts to give a syntax for the proofs of the unified
logic LU. However, a preliminary linear version of the logical framework [HHP93]
based on a natural deduction presentation of its intuitionistic fragment was given
in [MPP92], based on a logic having sequents of the form Γ; ∆ ` A. This present-
ation independently inspired the annotations of [Plo93b] and [Wad93], and the
linear logical frameworks of Pfenning and Cervesato [CP96, Pfe94] and Ishtiaq
and Pym [IP]. We will sketch the annotation of [Plo93b] in the next section, and
present a full development in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. This work was done
in the academic year 1994-1995, published initially in [Bar96].
Meanwhile, Benton has given [Ben95a, Ben94] a type-theory in this style for
a general categorical model which encompasses the monoidal adjunction models
of intuitionistic linear logic, and Benton and Wadler [BW96] have used this type-
theory to relate the computational λ-calculus, due to Moggi [Mog91], to linear
logic.
Systems with split contexts have also proved popular in the logic program-
ming community. A system similar to those mentioned above was presented
by Miller [Mil94a, HM94] again building on the work of Miller, Plotkin and
Pym [MPP92], and another by Harland and Pym [PH94, HPW96].
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Proof nets
Although term calculi are a popular syntax for the proofs of many kinds of lo-
gics, mostly intuitionistic, Girard’s original presentation of linear logic [Gir87]
employed an alternative graphical syntax, that of proof nets. These are essen-
tially graphs in which edges, labelled with formulae, represent assumptions and
conclusions occuring in a derivation, and nodes, labelled with rule names, rep-
resent the application of the various rules. The main advantage of this approach
is that rules are not applied globally, as a term construct is applied to a whole
term, but only apply to the edges labelled with the formulae involved in the rule
application.
In the intuitionistic case, therefore, proof nets have the distinct advantage
over term-calculi that two proofs which differ by a proof equivalence which would
induce a commuting conversion on terms are assigned the same proof net. Further,
since the βη-equalities which hold between proofs are essentially local in the proof-
net representation, we can decide them using a local rewrite system.
A
∆Γ
Figure 1.1: A Proof Net
To see how proof nets work, let us consider the translation from a term calculus
for a split-context linear logic to proof nets for that logic, due to the author. We
represent the proof net corresponding to a deduction Γ; ∆ ` A as in figure 1.1,
where a wire with a stroke through it represents a number of wires, the dashed
wires labelled with Γ represent the intuitionistic assumptions and the plain wires
labelled with ∆ represent the linear assumptions.
We can see how proof nets avoid commuting conversions by considering the
translation of terms into proof nets via a translation Φ. Consider the action
of Φ on the tensor introduction term Γ; ∆ ` t⊗ u :A⊗ B, which can be seen in
figure 1.2. In this proof net, we can see that the edges representing the conclusions
of the two subterms t and u are connected to a node for the rule instance ⊗I ,








Φ( ) Φ( )t u
Figure 1.2: Tensor Introduction
Also, notice the treatment of the intuitionistic assumptions. Since both subterms
are typed using the same set of intuitionistic assumptions Γ, we need to duplicate
each assumption in Γ to provide one copy for each sub-proof. This behaviour will
be repeated for the translation of any rule with two premises.
Now consider the tensor elimination rule. The derivation
Γ; ∆ ` let x⊗ y be t in u:C
is mapped by Φ to the proof net in figure 1.3. Again, we copy the intuitionistic
C





Figure 1.3: Tensor Elimination
assumptions, once for each sub-net, but in this case, the new node which is added
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to represent the ⊗E rule is only connected to the edges labelled by x :A, y :B
and A⊗B. Hence, the trailing edge representing the conclusion of the term is the
same trailing edge representing the conclusion of the sub-term u. This property
of the proof-net representation of the ⊗E rule accounts for the fact that terms
equal via commuting conversions due to ⊗E are mapped to equal proof nets, as
the reader may verify by drawing some sample proof nets. At this point it is
worth noting that although proof nets do remove the proof-equivalences due to
commuting conversions, those which arise in connection with the linear analogue
of ∨ and its corresponding cases constructor do not map to equalities in the same
way. The proper treatment of the additives is an ongoing research area.
β
η
Figure 1.4: Tensor β-η-rewrites
Now, we can give rewrites capturing the βη-equality for the ⊗-construct as
seen in figure 1.4. These should be read as saying that any proof net containing
the redex as a subnet rewrites to the proof net having that redex replaced by
the reduct. It is obvious just from the form of this presentation that these are
local. It is worth noting that the η-rewrite is given the form of an expansion,
rather than the more familiar contraction. This is technically in order to make
the rewrite confluent, but is also motivated by work of Ghani [Gha95].
Since their introduction, proof-net systems have been given for most, if not all,
linear logics, for example [GAL92b, Gir96]. Beyond these, graphical forms based
on proof nets have been used in a number of areas. For example, the nets of [CS97,
BCS95], used in categorical coherence reasoning, are very close neighbours of proof
nets for intuitionistic linear logic, for example as given in [DR89]. More generally,
Lafont has defined interaction nets [Laf90, Laf95], which are a general graphical
syntax based on proof nets extended with arbitrary node types. This development
is similar to our addition of general rules to minimal logic, and allows interaction
nets to apply to a wide range of computational situations.
Possibly the most far-reaching impact of proof nets has been on the optimal
λ-reduction problem [Lév80, Wad71] in the untyped λ-calculus. In defining an
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efficient evaluation strategy for λ-terms, it quickly becomes obvious that, for
example, in a term such as (λx.xx)((λx.y)z) we should first reduce the application
((λx.y)z), since this will otherwise be reduced twice, one in each copy replacing
an x in xx. The optimal λ-reduction problem is to efficiently mechanise the
strategy for deciding which rewrite is appropriate at each stage. There is no
simple solution, but Lamping [Lam90b] gave a graphical method based upon a
system of λ-graphs with added connectives. Gonthier, Abadi and Lévy [GAL92a]
then showed that this extra structure corresponded in the typed case to that of
proof nets for intuitionistic linear logic, and that the required reduction strategy
could be explained systematically under this interpretation. Mackie [Mac94] also
investigated implementation issues for λ-calculus using graphical frameworks.
Action Calculi
Action calculi were first presented by Milner in [Mil93c]; the definitive reference
is [Mil96]. They can be understood as a structural framework equipped with
general operator rules determined by arities similar to those of binding operators.
Originally designed to allow a uniform presentation of various process calculi in
order to compare them, action calculi are powerful enough to represent a wide
range of interesting systems. A particular action calculus is determined by a
signature, which in Milner’s presentation [Mil96] consists of a set of prime arities,
similar to basic types in a term calculus, and a set of operators having arities
built over those prime arities, called controls. Given a signature, actions, similar
to terms, are constructed, themselves having arities which are analogous to the
types assigned to terms in a type-theory. However, in contrast to the situation in
a type theory, actions are constructed combinatorially from the internal language
of a symmetric monoidal category with certain other constructors (in something of
the sense of Curien’s categorical combinators [Cur86, Cur85]). In this framework,
variables, which are called names, are reserved for a purpose analogous to that of
variables in the intuitionistic term calculus, with the linearity springing directly
from the categorical language. In fact, Gardner [Gar95] has shown that each
action calculus is equivalent to a closed action calculus which does not have free
names.
A significant amount of theory supports action calculi. They are equipped
with normal forms, called molecular forms. These, interestingly, can be given
in a graphical form, as action graphs, which are related to proof nets. They
have a semantics, which has been steadily refined since Milner’s original paper
introduced action structures [Mil93c]. Control structures [MMP95], which are
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categories with naming structure, were followed by a fibrational equivalent not
requiring naming structure, due to Hermida and Power [HP95]. This was proved
equivalent by Power [Pow96] to an alternative formulation, which is closely related
to the structural fragment of models of linear logic. Minor variants of these models
were used in the work of Gardner et al. [HG, BGHP97].
A higher-order extension of the action calculus was given by Milner in [Mil94b,
Mil93a], and a reflexive extension in [Mil94c], providing a facility for recursion.
Normal (molecular) forms [Mil93b] exist for these extensions, although not for
their combination. Hasegawa and Gardner have related the higher-order extension
of action calculi to Moggi’s computational λ-calculus [HG].
Categorical Semantics
We now introduce and motivate the semantics we will use to model linear logic.
The models we will consider are based on linear-non-linear models. These are
pairs of categories (C,S) such that C is a cartesian closed category (CCC, or
CC category) and S is a symmetric monoidal closed category (SMCC, or SMC






The intention behind the construction is that the normal power of intuition-
istic logic, arising from the exponential, should be modelled in the CCC, with the
intuitionistic linear logic being as usual modelled in the SMCC. This idea emerged
in 1993 from discussions between a number of people, including Plotkin, Benton
and Hyland. However, it was only during further work by Benton [Ben95a] and
Bierman [Bie95] that the details became clear, and in particular that it was ne-
cessary to impose the requirement that the adjunction be monoidal. In [Ben94]
there is an extensive comparison between these models and the previously pro-
posed models [BBdPH93b]. In fact, although Benton required that the cartesian
category be closed, this is not essential for our purposes, and we take the more
general definition.
Let us consider the intuition behind this in a little more detail. Imagine that
the category C is a category of total functions, and that the category S is a
category of ‘computations’, or processes—we are deliberately being vague about
the precise nature of this, but we certainly mean to allow the possibility of non-
termination or non-functional behaviour of other kinds. Note that the category of
total functions must be cartesian: there can only be one function from any type
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to the unit type, that which returns the unique element of the unit type; and,
further, the function f ; 〈g, h〉, which evaluates f and uses the result in g and h
respectively, must be the same as the function 〈f ; g, f ;h〉 which evaluates f twice
in evaluating the functions f ; g and f ;h.
By contrast, the category of computations cannot be cartesian, at least be-
cause there are potentially many computations returning no result. These might
include nonterminating computations, processes which interact with the user, or
ones which have other side-effects. Also, it is not the case that doing a computa-
tion once and using the result as the input to two other computations is the same
as doing the first computation twice, once for each computation. This equality
will fail, for example, if the first computation has any side effects.
Now consider the action of the functors in our intuitive model. The functor F
takes functions to computations, intuitively saying that all functions can be com-
puted, or that functions are a subset of processes. This is a natural requirement
on any notion of computation. The existence of the functor G then corresponds to
a kind of completeness; it says that for each computation or process, there must
be a function simulating it on a suitable representation of its input. The adjunc-
tion F a G specifies that there must exist natural transformations FG⇒ Id and
Id⇒ GF . The first of these then implies that we can reconstruct a computation
from the function representing it, and the second that from a function we can
construct a function representing its computation.
Not all candidate notions of total function and computation satisfy the above
intuitive representability and completeness conditions. Partly for this reason, we
will later be considering an important fragment of this model, which we might call
the structural fragment. This consists of a cartesian category C, a (not necessarily
closed) symmetric monoidal category S and a strong monoidal functor F : C → S
(which may not have an adjoint):
C F - S
Now in order for notions of total function and computation intuitively to provide
a model of this fragment, we require only that functions yield computations, or
equivalently can be computed by processes.
The basic components of this model are all very familiar to category the-
orists, and substantially predated the introduction of linear logic; for example,
the definitions of symmetric monoidal category (also tensor category), cartesian
closed category and monoidal adjunction can all be found in [Mac71]. One major
area of research in category theory is the study of coherence problems for various
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types of categories. In particular, coherence in monoidal categories has been the
subject of much study, for example in [KM72, KL80, Mac71, Sol90].
The coherence problem for a class of categories is the problem of deciding
which diagrams (made up from elementary natural transformations present in
each instance of the class) commute in every category in the class. One clas-
sical result due to MacLane [Mac71, Mac63] is that in (symmetric) monoidal
categories, every such diagram commutes. However, the situation is not uni-
formly this simple; in the case of symmetric monoidal closed categories, we do
not have that every diagram made out of the elementary natural transformations
commutes [KM72]. For these, there is a famous counter-example which we will
present in chapter 8. The theories of monoidal categories and cartesian categories
have further been clarified by work on general classes of categorical structure by
Kelly, Power and Robinson [BKP89, PR94].
One interesting approach to such problems uses syntactic methods. Consider-
ing the case of cartesian closed categories, we know that a category built from the
terms of typed λ-calculus (the term category) is complete for the class of cartesian
closed categories, which is to say that any equality between elementary natural
transformations holds in every cartesian closed category if and only if it holds
in the term category. Since the equality of arrows in the term category is based
on the equality judgement of the typed λ-calculus, to decide this is to solve the
coherence problem for cartesian closed categories. More generally, to decide the
equality on any accurate representation of the proofs of minimal logic is to solve
this coherence problem. Along these lines, in [MRA93], Mackie, Román and Ab-
ramsky used a type theory for multiplicative linear logic to approach the problem
of coherence for symmetric monoidal closed categories. Another natural question
is whether proof nets help in the solution of coherence problems, as they are an
efficient representation of proofs, and indeed, Seely et al. [CS97, BCST96] have
adapted proof-net technology for the ⊗ − &-fragment of classical linear logic to
this end.
Since the advent of linear logic, its models have been of major interest.
Barr [Bar91] initially gave a semantics for the ⊗−⊥ fragment of classical linear
logic in his ∗-autonomous categories, which have a symmetric monoidal structure
with a dualising object [Bar79] (again substantially predating linear logic itself).
Then Seely [See89] and the group at Cambridge [Bie95, Ben95a, BBdPH93a]
developed the underlying ideas for different fragments of the full logic.
For the purposes of this thesis, we are particularly interested in the work of
Day [Day70b, Day73, Day70a] on the Yoneda embedding of a category C into its
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presheaf category SetCop. He showed that given a symmetric monoidal category,
the presheaf category is symmetric monoidal closed, and the Yoneda embedding
functor is symmetric monoidal. The analogous result holds for cartesian categor-
ies. We will use these results to generate a model of multiplicative intuitionistic
linear logic from one of the structural fragment, so obtaining conservative exten-
sion results.
1.3 Development
Having motivated our approach, and surveyed the relevant background material,
we now give an overview of the original work in this thesis.
We start by presenting, in chapter 2, the reformulation of intuitionistic linear
logic based on LU which was mentioned in the previous section. Known con-
sequently as DILL, dual intuitionistic linear logic has sequents of the general form
Γ; ∆ ` A, where Γ is a set of intuitionistic assumptions, and ∆ is a multiset of
linear assumptions.
The basic axioms are:
Γ, A; ` A (I-Ax) Γ;A ` A (L-Ax)
which, together with the admissible rules:
Γ; ∆ ` B
Γ, A; ∆ ` B (Weak)
Γ; ` A Γ, A; ∆ ` B
Γ; ∆ ` B (I-Cut)
Γ; ∆1 ` A Γ; ∆2, A ` B
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` B
(L-Cut)
make up the structural rules of the logic. As might be expected from our previous
discussion of the relationship between the structural rules and those for the con-
nectives, in rules having two premises the intuitionistic contexts are shared and
the linear contexts are kept separate; for example, consider the tensor I/E-pair:
Γ; ∆1 ` A Γ; ∆2 ` B
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` A⊗B
(⊗I) Γ; ∆ ` A⊗B Γ; ∆2, A,B ` CΓ; ∆1,∆2 ` C
(⊗E)




Γ; ∆1 `!A Γ, A; ∆2 ` B
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` B
(!E)
The rules of the logic, and particularly this I/E-pair for the !-connective, make
the proof structure much simpler than that of intuitionistic linear logic in its
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conventional presentation. One characterising proof equivalence of the logic is as
follows:
Γ; !A,∆ ` B
Γ, A; ∆ ` B
In the same way as we did above for minimal logic, we proceed in chapter 2
to give a type-theory in which the rules of the logic become typing rules, using
the Curry-Howard correspondence. We build this type theory over a signature of
primitive types and constants, and given a typing judgement Γ; ∆ ` t :A we have
that variables typed in Γ may occur many times (or not at all) free in t, whereas
variables typed in ∆ must occur exactly once free in t. The variables typed in Γ
must be disjoint from those typed in ∆. The most significant difference between
this type theory and that due to [BBdPH93b], presented above, occurs in the
treatment of the !-connective and its rules. The straightforward term assignment
Γ; ` t:A
Γ; `!t :!A (!I)
Γ; ∆1 ` t :!A Γ, x:A; ∆2 ` u:B
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` let !x be t in u:B
(!E)
allows us to prove the two substitution lemmas corresponding to the cut rules.
Further, the β- and η-equivalences for the !-connective arising from its presenta-
tion with an I/E-pair generate β- and η-axiomatic equalities for it:
(β) Γ; ∆ ` let !x be !t in u = u{t/x}:A (η) Γ; ∆ ` let !x be t in !x = t :!A
This is in contrast to the complex treatment of the connective forced in the case
of the single-context linear logic presented above.
We then complete the linear version of the familiar triangle by giving, in
chapter 3, a categorical semantics for the type-theory of DILL, which is based on
the adjunction model of linear logic described earlier. We show that the type
theory is sound and complete with respect to these models in the standard way,
using a term model construction.
Now, just as we sketched the construction of a general theory of operators over
the structural fragment of minimal logic, it is profitable to consider a general
theory of rules and hence operators built on the structural fragment of DILL,
but with one slight alteration. Instead of assuming that there is just one set of
primitive propositions, as in DILL, we assume two sets; a set of primitive linear
propositions (or types) and a set of primitive intuitionistic propositions (or types).
We further assume that any primitive intuitionistic type is also a primitive linear
type. In this definition, we are intuitively saying that some linear types are in
fact value types, for example natural numbers or booleans, elements of which can
be copied.
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We construct this logic in chapter 4; a sequent has the general form Γ; ∆ ` A
where Γ is a set of primitive intuitionistic propositions, ∆ is a multiset of primitive
linear propositions, and A is a primitive linear proposition. Because we have
replaced the set of primitive propositions of DILL with two sets, the new logic has
another structural rule, the I-L-rule, which holds for any intuitionistic proposition
Q:
Γ; ∆1 ` Q Γ, Q; ∆2 ` A
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` A
(I-L)
We build a theory of general operators on this structural foundation, and proceed
to annotate it in chapter 4, as we did for minimal logic. Considering equivalence
between proofs in this two-zoned setting raises substantial naturality issues, which
we discuss at length before presenting the equality judgement of the type-theory.
We parameterise this equality judgement over a set of axiomatic equalities, giving
us an expressive theory of binding operators in the setting of a linear type-theory,
which we call general linear type-theory.
We then consider the categorical semantics of this general framework, using
natural transformations, in chapter 5. The basis of the model is the structural
fragment of models of linear logic mentioned above.
Having developed the theory of this general linear type theory, it is helpful to
consider an example, and in fact we provide a set of examples by showing that
each instance of Milner’s (static) action calculi, presented earlier, is equivalent
to an instance of our general type theory in which the controls correspond to
binding operators of a certain restricted form. In chapter 6, we first define action
calculi and show the equivalence to instances of our theory, and then go on to
consider three higher-order extensions of action calculi, one of which is due to
Milner [Mil94b], one of which is largely folklore, and one of which is due to
the author. We show that these extensions, and various structure-preserving
translations which exist between them, correspond to extensions of the type-
theories corresponding to action calculi and translations between them in our
theory. Finally in chapter 6, we consider the semantics for action calculi inherited
from that of the instances of our general theory, and compare it to the semantics
of action calculi given by Power [Pow96].
Inspired by the generality of the higher-order extensions of action calculi, in
chapter 7 we define higher-order general linear type theories, which are a subset
of general linear type-theories having operators and equalities based on those of
linear logic for the (, ⊗ and ! connectives. We can then define the higher-order
extension of a given instance of our theory as that theory with the connectives,
operators and the corresponding equalities ‘freely’ added. It is not immediately
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clear that this addition does not yield a trivial structure (as is the case with some
extensions of action calculi, see [Mil94b]), but we are able via the semantics to
use a presheaf construction to show that the obvious embedding of a theory into
its higher-order extension is conservative. As a corollary, this shows the same
conservativity property for the morphisms of action calculi described earlier.
We complete our development in chapters 8 and 9 by considering decidability
issues for the type-theories and equalities we have introduced. Historically, decid-
ing equality judgements in linear type-theories has been complex, because of the
commuting conversions mentioned earlier, and because of confluence problems
with the reductive orientation of the axiomatic equalities. The situation is much
clearer in the case of proof nets, since it is not complicated by the commuting
conversions.
We might, therefore, consider a system of proof nets for our general linear
type-theory. However, to define such a graphical system and prove the delicate
results on its rewrites would be cumbersome. Hence we present a system of
relations, which are non-graphical analogues of proof nets for general linear type-
theories. It is worth noting that the proof nets which we use for intuition can be
formally presented, and in fact that this has been done by the author [Bar] for a
closely-related system of proof nets for the logic DILL.
A proof net labelling a derivation of Γ; ∆ ` A corresponds to a relation D
relating variables ~x of type Γ, ~y of type ∆ to a variable z of type A. Each
proof-rule corresponds to a primitive relation, and cut is modelled by a multiary
relational composition. Let us take, for example, the proof net (for DILL) in
figure 1.3.
This corresponds to the term
; x′ :A⊗ C, y :B ` let x1 ⊗ x2 be x′ in x1 ⊗ (y ⊗ x2):A⊗ (B ⊗ C)
and the relation
R(x′, y, z) = ∃x1 :A, x2:C, y′:B ⊗ C.(z = x1 ⊗ y′) ∧ (y′ = y ⊗ x2) ∧ (x1 ⊗ x2 = x′)
If we were then to abstract y from this, to give the term
; x′ :A⊗ C ` λy :B.let x1 ⊗ x2 be x′ in x1 ⊗ (y ⊗ x2):B( (A⊗ (B ⊗ C))
this would have the relation
S(z′, x′) = ∀y :B.∃z :(A⊗ (B ⊗C)).(z′y = z) ∧R(x′, y, z)
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B    C
Figure 1.5:
Just as we have that commuting conversion proof equivalences correspond to
equalities on the proof nets, we can see that the commuting-conversion equivalent
form of this proof (constructed as on page 14), which has the term
; x′ :A⊗ C ` let x1 ⊗ x2 be x′ in (λy :B.x1⊗ (y ⊗ x2)):B( (A⊗ (B ⊗ C))
has a relation
S ′(z′, x′) = ∃x1:A, x2:C.(x1⊗ x2 = x′) ∧
∀y :B.∃z :(A⊗ (B ⊗ C)), y′:B ⊗ C.(z′y = z) ∧ (y′ = y ⊗ x2) ∧ (z = x1 ⊗ y′)
which is the same as S(z′, x′) up to certain obvious syntactic manipulations of
the quantifiers.
Using these relations, we can give a syntactic representation of the proofs
of our general linear type-theory. We can then define rewrites on them which
are confluent and strongly normalising, such that two relations have the same
normal form under rewriting if and only if they correspond to terms which are
judged equal in an instance of the type-theory over an empty axiom set. We call
such an instance pure. This strongly-normalising rewrite then provides a decision
procedure for any pure instance of our general linear type-theory.
Furthermore, this result immediately provides a complete solution to the co-
herence problem for the structural fragment of linear logic. Via our completeness
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result, a diagram commutes in all models of any suitable pure instance if and
only if it does in the term-model, and checking this amounts to checking a term
equality in the pure instance, which is therefore decidable.
However, it must be said that there are few useful systems which arise as pure
instances of our general linear type theory; in order to present systems for action
calculi and linear logic we have had to incorporate extra axiomatic equalities,
which mean that our decidability result no longer applies. We proceed, therefore,
to extend the system of relations and rewrites to the higher-order case. We define
pure higher-order instances to be instances of our higher-order general linear type
theory over an empty axiom set. We then give relations and rewrites on them
which again are confluent and normalising, and such that two relations have the
same normal form if and only if they correspond to terms which are judged equal
in the pure higher-order instance of the type-theory. As before, this provides a
decision procedure for such pure higher-order instances, and this time provides a
complete solution to the coherence problem for models of our higher-order general
linear type-theory, in the same way as before.
This result is more substantial. It has as corollaries the decidability of the
equality of all the action calculi fragments studied (by virtue of our conservativity
results), the decidability of the equality judgement in the type theory of DILL,
and hence the decidability of the equality judgement in the ‘Cambridge’ type
theory [BBdPH93b]. We should also note that Ghani [Gha96] independently
decided the βη − cc equality of DILL(C), working within the term syntax and
using expansionary η-rewrites.
Finally, we note that the system of relations and rewrites for a pure instance
of our general linear type-theory embeds soundly and fully into the system of
relations and rewrites for the higher-order extension of the pure instance. In
this way we obtain a syntactic conservativity proof for conservativity on pure
instances, a subcase of the problem solved semantically in chapter 7.
1.4 Chapter Summary
Having introduced our approach, and the main concepts involved, we summarise
the contents of the rest of this thesis.
2) An Alternative Formulation of ILL This chapter introduces our altern-
ative formulation of intuitionistic linear logic built over sequents Γ; ∆ ` A.
Having given the alternative logic, we give the derived type theory and some
useful results, and then proceed to show that the type theory is equivalent
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to the familiar Cambridge type theory [BBdPH93b] over ILL, up to provable
equality.
3) The Semantics of DILL In this chapter, we give a semantics for the type
theory based on DILL, and show it to be sound and complete by the con-
struction of a term model. We also consider the relation between the models
we have chosen and another influential notion of model, first stated for the
Cambridge type theory.
4) Linear Type Theories In this chapter, we move away from linear logic. We
present a generalisation of Aczel’s binding operators, and then introduce
a general linear logic over the structural rules of DILL, which incorporates
rules derived from these binding operators. We then give the type-theory
Lin(O,A) based on this logic.
5) The Semantics of Lin(O,A) In this chapter we develop a semantics of the
generalised type-theory presented in the previous chapter. This is based
around the structural fragment of the models of ILL.
6) Action Calculi and Extensions In this chapter we introduce Milner’s ac-
tion calculi and show how they can also be viewed as instances of our general
linear type theory. We also show the same for various higher-order exten-
sions of action calculi, including that given by Milner himself. Further, we
consider the semantics induced by our semantics for the general linear type
theory.
7) Higher-Order Extensions In this chapter we introduce higher-order type
theories in general, give the canonical higher-order extension of a general
linear type theory, inspired by linear logic, and use a categorical argument
to show that the embedding of any general linear type-theory into its higher-
order extension is conservative. We then consider various implications of
this result for the theory of action calculi. We also introduce an instance of
the higher-order type theory which is equivalent to the system DILL(C).
8) Normal Forms for Lin(O,A) In this chapter, we introduce relations, our
syntax for proofs based on proof nets. We show that using a rewrite and
an equality on relations, we can give a system which is equivalent to the
familiar general linear type-theory under a restricted derivable equality.
9) Normal Forms and Decidability This chapter extends the results of the
previous chapter by showing that the full provable equality of any pure in-
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stance of our general linear type theory is equivalent to a rewrite over and
equality on relations. We further show that this rewrite is strongly nor-
malising, and the equality is decidable, thereby showing that the provable
equality judgement of the general linear type-theory with empty axiom set
is decidable. This result is then extended by giving rewrites for the higher-
order type-theories which decide the axiomatic equality of the higher-order
theory without arbitrary axioms.
10) Conclusion We discuss the implications of this work, future directions and
questions raised, in particular discussing classical linear logics, enriching
our general linear type-theory with a rewrite, and applications to process
calculi.
1.5 Historical Notes
The work in chapters 2 and 3 is based on a talk [Plo93b] and unpublished
notes [Plo93a] by Gordon Plotkin, whilst the work on action calculi, higher-
order action calculi and conservativity in chapters 6 and 7 is a reformulation of




An Alternative Formulation of
ILL
We introduce an alternative natural deduction formulation of ILL, dual intuition-
istic linear logic (henceforth DILL), in which we use two kinds of assumptions,
linear and intuitionistic. The exponential is introduced with rules allowing a de-
duction of a formula !A from a formula A when no linear assumptions have been
used, and eliminated by allowing a conclusion !A to substitute for an intuitionistic
assumption A.
When we express this natural deduction formulation in a sequent style, the
general form of a sequent is Γ; ∆ ` A, which is interpreted as meaning that
from intuitionistic assumptions in Γ and linear assumptions in ∆ we can deduce
A. This splitting of the context leads to an extra intuitionistic axiom form, but
the remainder of the rules are very similar to their counterparts in the natural
deduction formulation of ILL.
Having outlined the form of the logic, we can see that it is easy to give a
term assignment calculus. The introduction and elimination rules for ! are reflec-
ted in two new term constructs, an introduction construct !t and an elimination
construct let !x be u in t, together forming a constructor-destructor pair.
In this chapter, we first present the logic DILL, and then give the type theory
based upon it. We then present the type theory ILLand show its relation to the
type theory based on DILL.
2.1 The Logic DILL
In order to present the logic, we assume a base set PL of primitive propositions,
ranged over by l, k . . . , and then define formulae, ranged over by A,B,C . . . :
A ::= l ∈ PL | I | A⊗ A | A( A | !A
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Now we define an logical context to be a pair of a set of formulae and a multiset
of formulae, where we overload comma for the (set/multiset) union and for the
empty (set/multiset). We will write such a pair as Γ; ∆, where the Γ is the
intuitionistic part and ∆ is the linear part.
We now assume a set C of formulae, the primitive assumptions. These are
assumptions which we may use in a deduction with no further justification. We
give the rules of the logic over PL and C, which we call D(PL,C).
Definition 2.1.1 (Logical Rules of D(PL,C))
We say that a sequent Γ; ∆ ` A can be derived for a formula A in D(PL,C) if it
can be shown using the following rules:
(Int− Ax) Γ, A; ` A (Lin− Ax) Γ;A ` A
(Ass) Γ; ` A (A ∈ C)
(I − I) Γ; ` I
Γ; ∆1 ` I Γ; ∆2 ` A
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` A
(I − E)
Γ; ∆1 ` A Γ; ∆2 ` B
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` A⊗B
(⊗− I) Γ; ∆1 ` A⊗B Γ; ∆2, A,B ` C
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` C
(⊗−E)
Γ; ∆, A ` B
Γ; ∆ ` A( B (( I)
Γ; ∆1 ` A( B Γ; ∆2 ` A
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` B
(( E)
Γ; ` A
Γ; `!A (!− I)
Γ; ∆1 `!A Γ, A; ∆2 ` B
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` B
(!− E)
As remarked in the introduction, we have replaced the four rules involving the
!-connective in the original form of ILL with the introduction-elimination pair seen
above. The contraction and weakening rules previously used are now derivable
by virtue of the fact that we allow contraction and weakening in the intuitionistic
side of the context.
The Structural Rules
We can now give three structural rules for this logic: we have intuitionistic weak-
ening and two flavours of cut, one intuitionistic and one linear.
Γ; ∆ ` B
Γ, A; ∆ ` B Weakening
Γ; ∆1 ` A Γ; ∆2, A ` B
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` B
(L− Cut) Γ; ` A Γ, A; ∆ ` BΓ; ∆ ` B (I −Cut)
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These three structural rules can be shown to be admissible, by which we mean
that given a derivation of the premise of each rule, we can construct a derivation
of its conclusion. Further, using these structural rules we can prove the lemma:
Lemma 2.1.2 (L-Transfer)
The following structural rule is admissible:
Γ;A,∆ ` B
Γ, A; ∆ ` B
We now go on to state a number of defining equivalences for the connectives,
which characterise their behaviour. One of the main motivations for this logic is
the equivalence for ! presented here:
Lemma 2.1.3 (!-Equivalence)
In the presence of the structural rules, the two-way proof rule:
Γ; !A,∆ ` B
Γ, A; ∆ ` B
is equivalent to the (!− I), (!− E) pair introduced earlier, in the sense that in a
system having the structural rules we would be able to derive the same sequents
using the two way proof rule as we could with the introduction-elimination pair.





Γ; `!A (I − Cut)
Further, we can derive !−E:
Γ; ∆1 `!A
Γ, A; ∆2 ` B
Γ; !A,∆2 ` B
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` B
(L− Cut)
Going the other way, it is easy to derive both directions of the equivalence
given the (!− I), (!−E) pair. The forward direction follows from one use of !-E,
and the other direction is an instance of linear cut and weakening:
Γ, A; ` A
Γ, A; `!A
Γ; !A,∆ ` B
Γ, A; !A,∆ ` B
Γ, A; ∆ ` B

We give similar results for the other connectives:
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Lemma 2.1.4 (Equivalences)
In the presence of the structural rules:
• The two-way proof rule Γ; ∆, I ` C
Γ; ∆ ` C is equivalent to the I − I, I − E pair.
• The two way proof rule Γ; ∆, A⊗B ` C
Γ; ∆, A,B ` C is equivalent to the ⊗− I,⊗− E
pair.
• The two way proof rule Γ; ∆ ` A( B
Γ; ∆, A ` B is equivalent to the ( −I,( −E
pair.
These are all proved in a similar way to that for !.
2.2 The Type Theory DILL(C)
We can now annotate the assumptions with variables, and obtain a type-theory
from our logic. The types of the type theory (over primitive types PL) are precisely
the formulae of the logic (over primitive propositions PL). We assume a countably
infinite set of variables X ranged over by x, y . . . (which will be ubiquitous in this
thesis), and we now assume a set of constants C ranged over by c . . . , each of
which has a type of DILL. We write c:A to indicate that the constant c has the
type A. We refer to the pair (PL, C) as a DILL-signature , and let C . . . range
over DILL-signatures. We will also assume that C = (PL, C), C′ = (P′L, C′) and
similarly.
Definition 2.2.1 (Pre-Terms)
We define pre-terms, ranged over by t, u . . . , as follows:
t ::= x | c:A | ∗ | let ∗ be t in t | t⊗ t | let x⊗ x:A⊗A be t in t
| λx:A.t | tt | !t | let !x:A be t in t
Having given pre-terms with type annotations, we omit them where possible
for brevity. We define the usual capture-avoiding substitution t{u/x}, and also
use a simultaneous form t{~u/~x}, where ~u is a sequence of pre-terms and ~x is a
sequence of variables. In pre-terms, let x⊗ y be t in u binds x and y in u, λx.t
binds x in t, and let !x be t in u binds x in u. We will identify pre-terms up to
α-equivalence on bound variables. The multiset of free variables of a pre-term t,
written FV(t), is defined inductively, where the mixed complement M − S for M
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FV(let ∗ be u in t) = FV(u) ∪ FV(t)
FV(t⊗ u) = FV(t) ∪ FV(u)
FV(let x⊗ y be u in t) = FV(u) ∪ (FV(t)− {x, y})
FV(λx.t) = FV(t)− {x}
FV(tu) = FV(t) ∪ FV(u)
FV(let !x be u in t) = FV(u) ∪ (FV(t)− {x})
FV(!t) = FV(t)
Now we recall from appendix A the definitions of typing and (dual) typing
context along with their auxiliary definitions, for the variable set X and the set
of types of DILL.
We will now give a type theory with judgements of the form Γ; ∆ ` t :A,
where Γ; ∆ is a typing context, t is a pre-term and A is a type (or formula of the
logic). We call this type-theory DILL(C).
In order to give the typing rules of DILL(C), we recall the merge relation
∆ = ∆1#∆2, read as ∆ is a merge of ∆1 and ∆2, from appendix A.
Definition 2.2.2 (The Typing Judgement of DILL(C))
The rules for deriving typing judgements Γ; ∆ ` t :A are as follows, where ∆′ =
∆1#∆2:
(Int− Ax) Γ1, x:A,Γ2; ` x:A (Lin−Ax) Γ; x:A ` x:A
(Ass) Γ; ` c:A
(I − I) Γ; ` ∗:I (I − E) Γ; ∆1 ` t:I Γ; ∆2 ` u:A
Γ; ∆′ ` let ∗ be t in u:A
(⊗− I) Γ; ∆1 ` t:A Γ; ∆2 ` u:B
Γ; ∆′ ` t⊗ u:A⊗B (⊗−E)
Γ; ∆1 ` u:A⊗B Γ; ∆2, x:A, y:B ` t:C
Γ; ∆′ ` let x⊗ y:A⊗ B be u in t:C
(( I) Γ; ∆, x:A ` t:B
Γ; ∆ ` (λx:A.t):(A( B) (( E)
Γ; ∆1 ` u:A( B Γ; ∆2 ` t:A
Γ; ∆′ ` (ut):B
(!− I) Γ; ` t:A
Γ; `!t :!A (!− E)
Γ; ∆1 ` u :!A Γ, x:A; ∆2 ` t:B
Γ; ∆′ ` let !x :!A be u in t:B
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Definition 2.2.3 (Term)
A Γ; ∆ term t of type A in DILL(C) for some typing context Γ; ∆ and type A
is a pre-term such that Γ; ∆ ` t :A is a valid typing judgement. We will often
indicate that a pre-term t is a Γ; ∆ term of type A by writing Γ; ∆ ` t :A, or omit
the context and typing where it is clear.
We now say that for a term Γ; ∆ ` t :A, a variable x ∈ FV(t) is an intuition-
istic free variable of t if it occurs in occurs in dom(Γ), and x ∈ FV(t) is a linear
free variable of t if it occurs in dom(∆).
Lemma 2.2.4 (Typing Properties)
We have the following in the type system DILL(C):
Free Variables I If Γ; ∆ ` t :A, then the underlying set of the multiset FV(t) is
a subset of dom(Γ) ∪ dom(∆).
Free Variables II If Γ; ∆, x:A ` t:B, then x occurs precisely once in FV(t).
Strengthening If Γ, x:A; ∆ ` t:B and x 6∈ FV(t), then Γ; ∆ ` t:B.
I-Transfer If Γ; ∆, x:A ` t:B, then Γ, x:A; ∆ ` t:B.
Unique Derivation Given a Γ; ∆ term t of type A, there is a unique derivation
of the typing judgement Γ; ∆ ` t:A.
The proofs of these properties are straightforward. Given the unique deriv-
ation lemma, we will interchangeably refer to terms and derivations of typing
judgements.
We now present some admissible annotated structural rules, where ∆′ =
∆1#∆2.
Γ, y :B, x:A,Γ′ ` t:C
Γ, x:A, y :B,Γ′ ` t:C (I − Exch)
Γ; ∆1, y :B, x:A,∆2 ` t:C
Γ; ∆1, x:A, y :B,∆2 ` t:C
(L− Exch)
Γ; ∆ ` t:B
Γ, x:A; ∆ ` t:B (Weak)
Γ, x:A, y :A; ∆ ` t:B
Γ, x:A; ∆ ` t{x/y}:B (Cont)
Γ; ` u:A Γ, x:A; ∆ ` t:B
Γ; ∆ ` t{u/x}:B (I − Cut)
Γ; ∆1 ` u:A Γ; ∆2, x:A ` t:B
Γ; ∆′ ` t{u/x}:B (L− Cut)
These are shown to be admissible easily- notably, the linear exchange is shown
by virtue of the merging we have incorporated into the typing rules. We outline
the proof of the linear cut lemma. The proof proceeds by induction on the
structure of t, and we consider only a few example cases in the proof; the rest are
similar.
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Proof: Note that since x :A is a linear typing, x must occur precisely once in
FV(t), by our lemma.
• If t is y then y is x, since x is free in y, and hence the required sequent is
the second premise.
• If t is λy :B.t′ then by considering the unique derivation, it must end:
Γ; ∆1, x:A, y :B ` t′ :C
Γ; ∆1, x:A ` (λy :B.t′):B( C
By the induction hypothesis on the premise, we now have:
Γ; ∆1,∆2, y′ :B ` t′{y′/y, u/x}:C
where y′ is a fresh variable not occuring in ∆2, and the required sequent
follows by abstraction (up to α-conversion).
• If t is let !y :C be t1 in t2 then we know that we have a derivation:
Γ; ∆′1 ` t1 :!C Γ, y :C; ∆′′1 ` t2 :B
Γ; ∆1 ` let !y :C be t1 in t2 :B
where ∆1 = ∆′1#∆
′′




1. In either case
we can use the induction hypothesis to obtain the result required, possibly
using α-conversion as before.
We now need to define a notion of (term-)contexts, where these may be linear
(ie, use their ‘argument’ linearly) or intuitionistic (ie, use their argument inside
a !-construct).
We define a general pre-context, written C[ ], as follows:
C[ ] ::= | let ∗ be C[ ] in t | let ∗ be t in C[ ] | t⊗ C[ ] | C[ ]⊗ t |
let x⊗ x be C[ ] in t | let x⊗ x be t in C[ ] | λx.C[ ] | C[ ]t | tC[ ] |
!C[ ] | let !x be C[ ] in t | let !x be t in C[ ]
It is easily shown there will be precisely one occurrence of the symbol in every
pre-context. We extend the definition of free variable multiset to pre-contexts
FV(C[ ]) in the obvious way by saying FV( ) = ∅.
Definition 2.2.5 (Instantiation of Pre-contexts)
Define C[t] for a given pre-context C[ ] and pre-term t to be the pre-context C[ ]
with the unique occurrence of the symbol replaced by t. We can easily show by
induction over contexts that C[t] is a pre-term.
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Definition 2.2.6 (Context)
A Γ; ∆, A-Γ′; ∆′, B context is a pre-context C[ ] such that for any term Γ; ∆ ` t:
A, we have a derivation of the judgement Γ′; ∆′ ` C[t]:B.
Although this definition is not constructive, it can be formulated in an equi-
valent but much more lengthy constructive form, using a system of judgements
of the form Γ; ∆ ` C : Γ; ∆, A− Γ′; ∆′, B. For the pre-contexts we will claim are
contexts, it will be easy to see that the definition above is satisfied.
Definition 2.2.7 (Linear and Binding Contexts)
We say that a context is linear if it does not contain the clause !C[ ]. Further, a
context binds a variable x if the context is constructed with the use of a clause
instance let x⊗ y be t in C[ ], let y ⊗ x be t in C[ ], λx.C[ ] or let !x be t in C[ ].
Now we can define our contextual equality judgement.
Definition 2.2.8 (The Equality Judgement)
We say that two terms Γ; ∆ ` t :A and Γ; ∆ ` u :A are provably equal of type
A in an environment Γ; ∆, written Γ; ∆ ` t = u :A, if their equality is provable
using the following rules:
Γ; ∆ ` t:A
Γ; ∆ ` t = t:A
Γ; ∆ ` t = t′ :A Γ; ∆ ` t′ = t′′ :A
Γ; ∆ ` t = t′′ :A
Γ; ∆ ` t = u:A
Γ; ∆ ` u = t:A
Γ; ∆ ` t = u:A
Γ′; ∆′ ` C[t] = C[u]:B
where C[ ] is a Γ; ∆, A-Γ′; ∆′, B-context.
(β) (η)
Γ; ∆ ` let ∗ be ∗ in t = t:A Γ; ∆ ` let ∗ be t in ∗ = t:I
Γ; ∆ ` let x⊗ y be u1 ⊗ u2 in t = t{u1/x, u2/y}:A Γ; ∆ ` let x⊗ y be t in x⊗ y = t:A⊗B
Γ; ∆ ` (λx:A.t)u = t{u/x}:A Γ; ∆ ` λx:A.(tx) = t:A( B
where x is not free in t
Γ; ∆ ` let !x:A be !u in t = t{u/x}:A Γ; ∆ ` let !x:A be t in !x = t :!A
In these, C is supposed to be a linear context.
Γ; ∆ ` let ∗ be t in C[u] = C[let ∗ be t in u]:A
Γ; ∆ ` let x⊗ y be t in C[u] = C[let x⊗ y be t in u]:A
Γ; ∆ ` let !x be t in C[u] = C[let !x be t in u]:A
where C[ ] does not bind x or contain it free
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These commuting conversions are the equality judgements which correspond to
the trivial proof permutations which exist in linear logics. In other presentations
of term calculi for ILL, the proof permutations are expressed as a large number
of primitive typed equality judgements such as:
Γ; ∆ ` let x⊗ y be t in u1 ⊗ u2 = u1 ⊗ (let x⊗ y be t in u2):A⊗B
where x, y are not free in u.
These many individual typed equalities all occur as examples of one of our
commuting conversion schemas. For example, the typed equality above would be
an instance of our second commuting conversion axiom, where the context C is
v ⊗ .
Note 2.2.9 (Commuting Conversions of !−E)
Notice that the restriction on the context in the !-commuting conversion, means
that it does not have as an instance the following equality judgement:
y :!A; `!(let !x be y in x) = let !x be y in !x:A
This cannot be motivated from the proof structure of linear logic, and it corres-
ponds to imposing an extra requirement on models (idempotency of the comonad
!).
From now on, we will assume that whenever we write t = u, there exists an
appropriate equality judgement Γ; ∆ ` t = u:A.
Equivalences
We can now prove a lemma extending our results on equivalences to the typed
case.
Lemma 2.2.10 (Equivalences)
• If Γ; ∆, x : I ` t :A, then Γ; ∆ ` t{∗/x} : A, and if Γ; ∆ ` u : A, then
Γ; x : I,∆ ` let ∗ be x in u :A, where x is fresh. Further, these maps are
inverse up to provable term equality.
• If Γ; ∆, x1 :A, x2 :B ` t :C, then Γ; ∆, y :A ⊗ B ` let x1 ⊗ x2 be y in t :C
where y is fresh, and if Γ; ∆, y :A ⊗ B ` u :C, then Γ; ∆, x1 :A, x2 :B `
u{x1⊗x2/y} :C where x1 and x2 are fresh. Further, these maps are inverse
up to provable term equality.
• If Γ; ∆ ` t :A ( B, then Γ; ∆, x :A ` tx :B where x is fresh, and if
Γ; ∆, x :A ` u :B, then Γ; ∆ ` λx :A.u :A ( B. Further, these maps are
inverse up to provable term equality.
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• If Γ; x :!A,∆ ` t :B, then Γ, y :A; ∆ ` t{!y/x} :B where y is fresh, and if
Γ, y :A; ∆ ` u :B, then Γ; x :!A,∆ ` let !y be x in u :B where x is fresh.
Further, these maps are inverse up to provable term equality.
It is interesting to note that we could use these equivalences to define the
term equality. If we consider the typing system without any notion of equality
judgement, and read the equivalences above as isomorphisms on proofs, they say
the following:
Proofs Γ; ∆, x:I ` t:A are isomorphic to proofs Γ; ∆, x:I ` let ∗ be x in t{∗/x}:A
Proofs Γ; ∆ ` u:A are isomorphic to proofs Γ; ∆ ` let ∗ be ∗ in u:A
Proofs Γ; ∆, x1:A, x2:B ` t:C are isomorphic to proofs
Γ; ∆, x1:A, x2:B ` let x⊗ y be x⊗ y in t:C
Proofs Γ; ∆, y:A⊗ B ` u:C are isomorphic to proofs
Γ; ∆, y:A⊗B ` let x1 ⊗ x2 be y in u{x1 ⊗ x2/y}:C
Proofs Γ; ∆, x:A ` t:B are isomorphic to proofs Γ; ∆, x:A ` (λx.t)x:B
Proofs Γ; ∆ ` u:A( B are isomorphic to proofs Γ; ∆ ` λx.(ux):A( B
Proofs Γ, x:A; ∆ ` t:B are isomorphic to proofs Γ, x:A; ∆ ` let !x be !x in t:B
Proofs Γ; y :!A,∆ ` u:B are isomorphic to proofs
Γ; y :!A,∆ ` let !x be y in u{!x/y}:B
Now the alternative equality judgement with the symmetric, transitivity, re-
flexivity and congruence rules already defined, with the addition of two cut rules:
Γ; ∆1 ` u:A Γ; x:A,∆2 ` t = t′ :B
Γ; ∆′ ` t{u/x} = t′{u/x}:B
Γ; ` u:A Γ, x:A; ∆ ` t = t′ :B
Γ; ∆ ` t{u/x} = t′{u/x}:B
(where ∆′ = ∆1#∆2) and with the axiomatic equalities induced by the proof
isomorphisms listed above is equivalent in strength to the equality judgement
first defined.
A Definable Intuitionistic Function Space
We now briefly present a definable extension to the logic and term calculus given
above. In order to make the syntax more usable, we show how we can define the
types and terms associated with an intuitionistic arrow type purely in terms of
the structures we already have.
Definition 2.2.11 (The Intuitionistic Arrow)
Types Define the type A→ B in our new system as the type !A( B.
Terms Define the intuitionistic abstraction and application term constructs as
follows (where we use γ for the abstraction, and y is fresh):
γx:A.t = λy :!A let !x :!A be y in t
tu = t(!u)
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Now we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2.12 (Typing and Equality Rules for →)
The following introduction and elimination rules are admissible in DILL(C):
Γ, x:A; ∆ ` t:B
Γ; ∆ ` γx:A.t:A→ B → −I
Γ; ∆ ` t:A→ B Γ; ` u:A
Γ; ∆ ` tu:B →−E
The following equality judgements are admissible in DILL(C):
Γ; ∆ ` (γx:A.t)u= t[u/x]:A Γ; ∆ ` γx:A.(tx) = t:A→ B
Clearly we can erase the typings from the introduction and elimination rules to
obtain admissible introduction and elimination rules for → in the logic DILL(C).
This construct and its associated terms and equalities can by virtue of this
lemma be used without changing the development to follow. Other definitions
of this function space are possible via more complex embeddings of intuitionistic
logic into linear logic; for example see Benton [BW96] or Schellinx [Sch94].
2.3 The Type Theory ILL(C)
We present the type-theory based on ILL due to Benton et al. [BBdPH93b], with
two amendments. Firstly, we build the type theory over a dill-signature, in the
analogous way to DILL, and secondly we have adapted the presentation of the
equality in op. cit. using contexts to express the commuting conversions, and
giving an equality judgement. For brevity we do not present the logic; this can
be found in [BBdPH93b].
We assume the same set X of variables as used in DILL(C). The types of
ILL(C) are exactly those of DILL(C). Given this, we define pre-terms, ranged over
by M,N . . . as follows:
M ::=x | c:A | ∗ | let ∗ be M in M |M ⊗M | let x⊗ x:A⊗ A be M in M |
λx:A.M |MM | promote ~M for x :!A . . .x :!A in M |
derelict(M) | copy M for x, x :!A in M | discard M in M
As before, we will omit type information in pre-terms where convenient. Following
Benton et al., we use the form (discard ~M in N) to abbreviate
(discard M1 in . . . in discard Mr in N)
We also use (copy ~M for ~x, ~y in N) to abbreviate
(copy M1 for x1, y1 in . . . copy Mr for xr, yr in N)
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We now summarise the binding behaviour of the pre-terms: the pre-terms
let x⊗ y be M in N and copy M for x, y in N bind x and y in N ; the pre-term
λx.M binds x in M and the pre-term promote ~M for ~X in N bind each of the ~x
in N . Again, we will require a standard capture-avoiding notion of substitution
M{N/x}, and its simultaneous counterpart t{~u/~x}.
Now we define an ILL typing context as a single typing context over the variable
set X and the types of DILL(C). We give the contextual typing judgement ∆ `
M :A as follows:
Definition 2.3.1 (The Typing Judgement)
The rules for deriving judgements ∆ ` M :A are as follows, where ∆′ = ∆1#∆2
and ∆′′ = ∆1# . . .#∆r:
(Lin− Ax) x:A ` x:A (Ass) ` c:A
(I − I) ` ∗:I (I −E) ∆1 ` M :I ∆2 ` N :A
∆′ ` let ∗ be M in N :A
(⊗− I) ∆1 `M :A ∆2 ` N :B
∆′ ` M ⊗N :A⊗B (⊗− E)
∆1 ` N :A⊗B ∆2, x:A, y :B ` M :C
∆′ ` let x⊗ y :A⊗B be N in M :C
(( I) ∆, x:A ` M :B
∆ ` (λx:A.M):(A( B) (( E)
∆1 `M :A( B ∆2 ` N :A
∆′ ` (MN):B
(Weak) ∆1 `M :!A ∆2 ` N :B
∆′ ` discard M in N :B
(Der) ∆ `M :!A∆ ` derelict(M):A
Contraction
∆1 `M :!A ∆2, x :!A, y :!A ` N :B
∆′ ` copy M as x, y in N :B
Promotion
i = 1..r ∆i `Mi :!Ai x1 :!A1, . . . , xr :!Ar ` N :B
∆′′ ` promote ~M for ~x in N :!B
Definition 2.3.2 (Term)
We define a ∆ term t of type A in ILL(C) to be a pre-term t of ILL(C) such that
we can derive the typing judgement ∆ ` t:A.
We can now give admissible exchange and linear cut rules.
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Definition 2.3.3 (Pre-contexts)
We define pre-contexts for ILL(C) inductively as follows:
C[ ] ::= | let ∗ be C[ ] in t | let ∗ be t in C[ ] | t⊗ C[ ] | C[ ]⊗ t |
let x⊗ x be C[ ] in t | let x⊗ x be t in C[ ] | λx.C[ ] | C[ ]t | tC[ ] |
promote ~M1, C[ ], ~M2 for ~x in N | promote ~M for ~x in C[ ]
copy C[ ] for x, y in N | copy M for x, y in C[ ]derelict(C[ ])
discard C[ ] in N | discard M in C[ ]
We define the instantiation of a pre-context C[ ] with a pre-term M again to
be the pre-context with the unique occurrence of the symbol replaced by the
pre-term M . We say that any pre-context constructed with no instance of the
schema promote ~M for ~x in C[ ] is linear.
Definition 2.3.4 (Context)
We define a ∆, A-∆′, B′ context to be a pre-context C[ ] such that for any term
∆ ` t:A, we have ∆′ ` C[t]:B.
Again, this definition of contexts is not inductive, but as in the case of contexts
for DILL(C), it could easily be equivalently given inductively.
Definition 2.3.5 (The Equality Judgement)
We define a contextual equality judgement ∆ ` M = N :A, where M and N are
∆ terms of type A, by the following rules (where for brevity we write M = N for
∆ `M = N :A):
The Congruence Rules
∆ `M :A
∆ `M = M :A
∆ ` M = M ′ :A ∆ `M ′ = M ′′ :A
∆ `M = M ′′ :A
∆ ` M = N :A
∆ ` N = M :A
∆ ` t = u:A
∆′ ` C[t] = C[u]:B
where C[ ] is a ∆, A-∆′, B-context.
The Basic Equalities
let ∗ be ∗ in M = M (2.1)
let ∗ be M in ∗ = M (2.2)
let x⊗ y be M1 ⊗M2 in N = N{M1/x,M2/y} (2.3)
let x⊗ y be M in x⊗ y =M (2.4)
(λx.M)N = M{N/x} (2.5)
λx.(Mx) = M (2.6)
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The Commuting Conversions For linear C[ ],
let ∗ be M in C[N ] = C[let ∗ be M in N ] (2.7)
let x⊗ y be M in C[N ] = C[let x⊗ y be M in N ] (2.8)
discard M in C[N ] = C[discard M in N ] (2.9)
copy M for x, y in C[N ] = C[copy M for x, y in N ] (2.10)
The Exponential Equalities
derelict (promote ~M for ~x in N ) = N{ ~M/~x} (1)
discard (promote ~M for ~x in N ) in N ′ = discard ~M in N ′ (2)
promote M for x in derelict (x) = M (3)
copy M for x, y in N = copy M for y, x in N (4)
copy M for x, y in (discard x in N ) = N{M/y} (5)
copy M for x, y in copy y for x′, y′ in N = copy M for y, y′ in copy y for x, x′ in N
(6)
promote M ′, ~M for x′, ~x = discard M ′ in (promote ~M for ~x in N ) (7)
in (discard x′ in N )
copy (promote ~M for ~x in N ) = copy ~M for ~x1, ~x2 in N ′{p1, p2/y1, y2} (8)
for y1, y2 in N ′
(where p1 = promote ~x1 for ~x in N and p2 = promote ~x2 for ~x in N)
promote M ′, ~M for x′, ~x = copy M ′ for y′1, y
′
2 in p3 (9)
in (copy x′ for y1, y2 in N )
(where p3 = promote ~M, y′1, y
′
2 for ~x, y1, y2 in N)
promote (promote ~y1 for ~x1 in M), ~y2 = promote ~y1, ~y2 for ~y3, ~x2 in N{p4/x′} (10)
for x′, ~x2 in N
(where p4 = promote ~y3 for ~x1 in M)
2.4 Relating DILL and ILL
We now show that DILL is essentially equivalent to ILL at the level of the respect-
ive type-theories, by which we mean firstly that we can give a translation from
DILL(C) to the type-theory ILL(C), and one in the reverse direction, such that
two terms are equal in ILL(C) if and only if their images are equal in DILL(C)and
secondly that we can give a translation from the terms of DILL(C) derivable with
no intuitionistic assumptions, ; ∆ ` t :A, to the terms of ILL(C). Wherever num-
bers are used to refer to particular equalities of ILL(C), those numbers are as
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given in section 2.3. Of course these translations easily yield translations on the
logics DILL and ILL.
In the following, we will use the abbreviation (let !~x be ~u in t) to indicate the
term
let !x1 be u1 in . . . let !xr be ur in t
in DILL(C). We use the turnstile `ILL(C) to indicate the typing and equality
judgements of ILL(C) and similarly the turnstile `DILL(C) to indicate those of
DILL(C) where the distinction is unclear.
We will define two translations, Φ taking ILL(C) to DILL(C), and Ψ taking
DILL(C) to ILL(C). These translations will be the identity on types.
Lemma 2.4.1 (Properties of the Translations)
The following are properties of Φ and Ψ:
1. If ∆ `ILL(C) M :A, then ; ∆ `DILL(C) Φ(M):A
2. If x1 :A1 . . . xr :Ar; ∆ `DILL(C) u :A, then x1 :!A1 . . . xr :!Ar,∆ `ILL(C) Ψ~x(u):
A
3. If ∆ `ILL(C) M = N :A, then ; ∆ `DILL(C) Φ(M) = Φ(N):A
4. If x1 :A1 . . . xr :Ar; ∆ `DILL(C) t = u :A, then x1 :!A1 . . . xr :Ar,∆ `ILL(C)
Ψ~x(t) = Ψ~x(u):A
5. If ∆ `ILL(C) M :A, then ∆ `ILL(C) Ψε(Φ(M)) = M :A
6. If ; ∆ `DILL(C) t:A, then ; ∆ `DILL(C) Φ(Ψε(t)) = t:A
Given these lemmas, we can prove:
Theorem 1 (Equivalence)
1. ∆ `ILL(C) M = N :A iff ; ∆ `DILL(C) Φ(M) = Φ(N):A
2. ; ∆ `DILL(C) t = u:A iff ∆ `ILL(C) Ψε(t) = Ψε(u):A
Proof The two proofs are almost identical. Consider the first case. We already
have the implication
∆ `ILL(C) M = N :A implies ; ∆ `DILL(C) Φ(M) = Φ(N):A
Now assume ; ∆ `DILL(C) Φ(M) = Φ(N) : A. By lemma 2.4.1 (4), we have that
∆ `ILL(C) Ψε(Φ(M)) = Ψε(Φ(N)) :A, but we also have by lemma 2.4.1 (5) that
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∆ `ILL(C) Ψε(Φ(M)) = M :A, and hence the other direction of the implication
holds.
The proof of the second case uses the analogous results in lemma 2.4.1 (3)
and 2.4.1 (6) 
We now proceed to give the details of the translations, and prove lemma 2.4.1,
thereby showing that the results of theorem 1 hold.
From Intuitionistic Linear Logic to DILL
Now we can define the translation Φ from the intuitionistic linear type theory
ILL(C) to DILL(C).
Definition 2.4.2 (The Translation Φ)
On Types we define Φ to be the identity.




Φ(let ∗ be M in N) = let ∗ be Φ(M) in Φ(N)
Φ(M ⊗N) = Φ(M) ⊗ Φ(N)
Φ(let x⊗ y be M in N) = let x⊗ y be Φ(M) in Φ(N)
Φ(λx.M) = λx.Φ(M)
Φ(MN) = Φ(M)Φ(N)
Φ(discard M in N) = let !x1 be Φ(M) in Φ(N)
Φ(copy M for x, y in N) = let !x1 be Φ(M) in Φ(N)[!x1/x, y]
Φ(derelict(M)) = let !x1 be Φ(M) in x1
Φ(promote ~M for ~x in N) = let !~x1 be ~Φ(M) in !(Φ(N)[!~x1/~x])
where in the last four rules x1 is a fresh variable from X.
Now we need to prove the lemma.
Lemma 2.4.1 (1) If ∆ `ILL(C) M :A, then ; ∆ `DILL(C) Φ(M):A.
Proof This proof is by induction over the structure of the term t. We give a
summary proof only.
Axiom Instance: In this case, we have x :A ` x :A, so that the translation is
; x:A ` x:A, which is derivable.
Assumption and Unit-I In these cases there is almost nothing to show, as
the corresponding typing rules in DILL(C) are analogous. We note the
requirement that we have the same constants in each type theory.
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⊗-Introduction: We present this case as an example of the simple cases not
involving the exponential. We have the derivation
∆1 `M :A ∆2 ` N :B
∆ `M ⊗N :A⊗B (⊗− I)
where ∆ = ∆1#∆2.
By the inductive hypothesis, we have ; ∆1 ` Φ(M):A, and ; ∆2 ` Φ(N):
A, so we have ; ∆ ` Φ(M) ⊗ Φ(N) :A⊗ B via the ⊗-introduction rule of
DILL(C). But Φ(M ⊗N) = Φ(M) ⊗Φ(N), so we are done.
⊗-E,(-I and (-E: Again these rules in ILL(C) are exactly parallelled in DILL(C).
Weakening Rule: In this case, we have the derivation
∆2 `M :!A ∆1 ` N :B
∆ ` discard M in N :B
where ∆ = ∆1#∆2.
By intuitionistic weakening and our inductive hypothesis, in DILL(C) we
have x1 :A; ∆1 ` Φ(N) :B. Now one application of our !-E rule gives
us ; ∆ ` let !x1 be Φ(M) in Φ(N) :B, but Φ(discard M in N) is precisely
let !x1 be Φ(M) in Φ(N).
Contraction: In this case, we have the derivation in ILL(C):
∆1 `M :!A ∆2, x :!A, y :!A ` N :B
∆ ` copy M for x, y in N :B
where ∆ = ∆1#∆2.
Now by the inductive hypothesis, in DILL(C) we have the derivations:
; ∆1 ` Φ(M) :!A
and
; ∆2, x :!A, y :!A ` Φ(N):B
But now, using the substitution lemmas of DILL(C) and the !-I,E pair, we
have the following derivation:
; ∆ ` let !x1 be Φ(M) in Φ(N){!x1/x, y}:B
which proves the case.
48
Dereliction: In this case we have the derivation
∆ ` M :!A
∆ ` derelict M :A
in ILL(C). Using the inductive hypothesis, we have in DILL(C) that
; ∆ ` Φ(M) :!A
so using one instance of !-E and an intuitionistic axiom, we have
; ∆ ` let !x1 be Φ(M) in x1 :A
as required.
Promotion Rule: The derivation here is
i = 1..r ∆i `Mi :!Ai x1 :!A1 . . . xr :!Ar ` N :B
∆ ` promote ~M for ~x in N :B
where ∆ = ∆1# . . .#∆r.
By the substitution lemma and the inductive hypothesis, we have y1 : A1 . . . yr :
Ar; ` Φ(N){!~y/~x}:B. Hence, by the promotion rule of DILL(C), we have
y1 :A1 . . . yr :Ar; `!Φ(N){!~y/~x} :!B
We also have by induction ; ∆i ` Φ(Mi) :!Ai for each i = 1..r. Hence, by r
applications of the !-E rule, we have
; ∆i ` let !~y be ~Φ(M) in !Φ(N){!~y/~x}:B
This is precisely what is given in the translations. 
We now give one auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 2.4.3
We have that for terms ∆1, x:A ` M :B and ∆2 ` N :A of ILL(C),
; ∆ ` Φ(M{N/x}) = Φ(M){Φ(N)/x}:B
where ∆ = ∆1#∆2.
This is easily proved by induction over the first term, M , and we leave it to
the reader.
We now prove the lemma on derivable equality judgements.
Lemma 2.4.1 (3) If ∆ `ILL(C) M = N :A, then ; ∆ `DILL(C) Φ(M) = Φ(N):A.
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Proof This is proved by induction over the derivation of the derivable equality
judgement ∆ ` M = N :A in ILL(C). First we consider all the one-step de-
rivations, ie axioms. However, since there are a large number of these, most of
which are identical to those already given in DILL(C), we give the proof only for
the substantially different ones, that is the exponential axioms. It is routine for
the other equality axioms and the reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity rules.
In the following, we show it for the exponential axioms based on the numbering
given in the definition of the equality judgement of ILL(C). We omit contexts
and types for equality judgements in this proof for brevity, as they will always be
reconstructible from those present in the relevant axiomatic equality.
1): In this case, the image of the left-hand side is
let !y be (let ~!z be ~Φ(M) in !Φ(N){!~z/~x}) in y
This is equivalent by a commuting conversion (since w and zi are fresh) to
let ~!z be ~Φ(M) in (let !y be !Φ(N){!~z/~x} in y)
However, (let !y be !Φ(N){!~z/~x} in y) = Φ(N){!~z/~x}. Hence the image of
the left-hand side of the equality is
let ~!z be ~Φ(M) in (Φ(N){!~z/~x})
But now by commuting conversions and η-equality, this is equal to Φ(N){ ~Φ(M)/~x},
which is the image of the right-hand side of the equality.
2): In this case, the image of the left-hand side is:
let !y be (let ~!z be ~Φ(M) in !Φ(N){!~z/~x}) in Φ(N ′)
This is equivalent by a commuting conversion (since y and zi are fresh) to
let ~!z be ~Φ(M) in (let !y be !Φ(N){!~z/~x} in Φ(N ′))
We know, however, that y does not occur in Φ(N ′), as it is fresh, so this is
equal to let ~!z be ~Φ(M) in Φ(N ′), which is precisely the image of the right-
hand side.
3): In this case, the image of the left-hand side is:
let !y be Φ(M) in !(let !z be !y in z)
which is β-equal to
let !y be Φ(M) in !y
which is η-equal to the image of the right-hand side.
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4): In this case, the image of the left-hand side is:
let !z be Φ(M) in Φ(N){!z/x, y}
which is easily seen to be the image of the right-hand side by analogous
reasoning.
5): In this case the image of the left-hand side is
let !z be Φ(M) in (let !z′ be x in Φ(N)){!z/x, y}
which is equal to
let !z be Φ(M) in (let !z′ be !z in Φ(N)){!z/y}
but by one β-equality this is
let !z be Φ(M) in Φ(N){!z/y}
so we can now see that via commuting conversions and an η-equality this
is Φ(N){Φ(M)/y}, which is the image of the right-hand side.
6): In this case the left hand side of the equality has image
let !z be Φ(M) in (let !z′ be y in Φ(N){!z′/x′, y′}){!z/x, y}
but this is equal to
let !z be Φ(M) in (let !z′ be !z in Φ(N){!z′/x′, y′}){!z/x}
However, by a β-equality this is equal to
let !z be Φ(M) in Φ(N){!z/x, y′, x′}
and by a similar process we can see that the image of the right-hand side is
also equal to this term.
7): In this case, the image of the left-hand side is:
let !z′, !~z be Φ(M ′), ~Φ(M) in !(let !z′′ be x′ in Φ(N)){!z′, !~z/x′, ~x}
which is
let !z′, !~z be Φ(M ′), ~Φ(M) in !(let !z′′ be !z′ in Φ(N)){!~z/~x}
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which is β-equal to
let !z′, !~z be Φ(M ′), ~Φ(M) in !(Φ(N)){z′, !~z/z′′, ~x}
This is
let !z′ be Φ(M ′) in (let !~z be ~Φ(M) in !Φ(N){z′, !~z/z′′, ~x})
but we know that z′′ does not occur in Φ(N), so this is
let !z′ be Φ(M ′) in (let !~z be ~Φ(M) in !Φ(N){!~z/~x})
which is the image of the right-hand side.
8): In this case, the image of the left-hand side is:
let !z′ be (let !~z be ~Φ(M) in !Φ(N){!~z/~x}) in Φ(N ′){!z′/y1, y2}
This is equivalent, again by a commuting conversion, to
let !~z be ~Φ(M) in (let !z′ be !Φ(N){!~z/~x} in Φ(N ′){!z′/y1, y2})
Now this is β-equal to
let !~z be ~Φ(M) in (!Φ(N){!Φ(N ′){!~z/~x}/y1, y2})
But !Φ(N){!Φ(N ′){!~z/~x}/y1, y2} is β-equal to
!Φ(N){let ! ~z′′ be !~z in !Φ(N ′){! ~z′′/~x}/y1, y2}
And this in turn is the same as
!Φ(N ){(let ! ~z′′ be ~x′ in !Φ(N ′){! ~z′′/~x}), (let ! ~z′′ be ~x′′ in !Φ(N ′){! ~z′′/~x})/y1, y2}{!~z/~x′, ~x′′}
which is
Φ(N{(promote ~x′ for ~x in N ′), (promote ~x′′ for ~x in N ′)/y1, y2}{!~z/~x′, ~x′′})
Therefore, the image of the left-hand side is
let ! ~z′′ be ~Φ(M) in
(Φ(N{(promote ~x′ for x in N ′), (promote ~x′′ for x in N ′)/y1, y2}{! ~z′′/~x′, ~x′′}))
But this is precisely the image of the right-hand side, so we are done.
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9): In this case, the image of the left-hand side is:
let !z′, !~z be Φ(M ′), ~Φ(M) in !(let !z′′ be !z′ in Φ(N){!z′′/y1, y2}){!~z/~x}
This is
let !z′, !~z be Φ(M ′), ~Φ(M) in !(let !z′′ be !z′ in Φ(N){!z′′/y1, y2}{!~z/~x})
which is β-equal to
let !z′, !~z be Φ(M ′), ~Φ(M) in !(Φ(N){!z′/y1, y2}{!~z/~x})
and this is equal to
let !z′ be Φ(M ′) in (let !~z be ~Φ(M) in !(Φ(N){!z′/y1, y2}{!~z/~x}))
But this is η-equal to the translation of the right-hand side.
10): The image of the left-hand side of this equality is
let !z′, ! ~z′′ be (let ! ~z′′′ be ~y1 in !Φ(M)[! ~z′′′/~x1]), ~y2 in !Φ(N){!z′, ! ~z′′/x′, ~x2}
By commuting conversions this is equal to
let ! ~z′′′ be ~y1 in (let !z′, ! ~z′′ be !Φ(M){! ~z′′′/~x1}, ~w in !Φ(N){!z′1, ! ~z′′/x′, ~x2})
This then is η-equal to
let ! ~z′′′ be ~y1 in (let ! ~z′′ be ~y2 in !Φ(N){!Φ(M){! ~z′′′/~x1}, ! ~z′′/x′, ~x2})
This is abbreviated to
let ! ~z′′′, ! ~z′′ be ~y1, , ~y2 in (!Φ(N){!Φ(M){! ~z′′′/~x1}, ! ~z′′/x′, ~x2})
But by an η-equality this is equal to
let ! ~z′′′, ! ~z′′ be ~y1, ~y2 in (!Φ(N){(let ! ~z′′′′ be ! ~z′′′ in !Φ(M){! ~z′′′′/~x1}), ! ~z′′/x′, ~x2})
and this can be written as
let ! ~z′′′, ! ~z′′ be ~y1, ~y2 in (!Φ(N){(let ! ~z′′′′ be !~z in !Φ(M){! ~z′′′′/~x1})/x′}){! ~z′′′, ! ~z′′/~z, ~x2}
But now this is the image of the right-hand side.

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From DILL(C) to ILL(C)
For each term of DILL(C) x1 : A1 . . . xr : Ar; ∆ ` t : A, we give a term x1 :
!A1 . . . xr :!Ar,∆ ` Ψ~x(t):A in ILL(C).
Definition 2.4.4 (The Translation Ψ)
On Types define Ψ as the identity.
On Terms define Ψ as follows:
Ψ~y(x:A) =
discard ~y1~y2 in derelict(x) if ~y = ~y1x~y2discard ~y in x otherwise
Ψ~y(c) = discard ~y in c
Ψ~y(∗) = discard ~y in ∗
Ψ~y(let ∗ be t in u) = copy ~y for ~y1, ~y2 in (let ∗ be Ψ~y1(t{~y1/~y}) in Ψ~y2(u{~y2/~y}))
Ψ~y(t⊗ u) = copy ~y for ~y1, ~y2 in Ψ~y1(t{~y1/~y})⊗Ψ~y2(u{~y2/~y})
Ψ~y(let x1 ⊗ x2 be t in u) = copy ~y for ~y1, ~y2 in p1
where p1 = let x1 ⊗ x2 be Ψ~y1(t{~y1/~y}) in Ψ~y2(u{~y2/~y})
Ψ~y(λx.t) = λx.Ψ~y(t)
Ψ~y(tu) = copy ~y for ~y1, ~y2 in Ψ~y1(t{~y1/~y})Ψ~y2(u{~y2/~y})
Ψ~y(!t) = promote ~y for ~y1 in Ψ~y1(t{~y1/~y})
Ψ~y(let !x be t in u) = copy ~y for ~y1, ~y2 in Ψ~y2x(u{~y2/~y}){Ψ~y1(t{~y1/~y})/x}
where ~y1 and ~y2 are vectors of fresh variables.
We first make an abbreviation; given a sequence of types ~A = A1 . . .Ar, we will
write ! ~A for !A1 . . .!Ar. Similarly, given a sequence of typings Γ = x1 :A1 . . . xr :
Ar, we will write !Γ for x1 :!A1 . . . xr :!Ar.
Lemma 2.4.1 (2) If Γ; ∆ `DILL(C) t:A, then !Γ,∆ `ILL(C) Ψ~y(t):A.
Proof This is proved by induction over the first derivation. We leave most of
this proof, as it is routine, but we consider the tensor introduction as a sample
case, and also the rules for ! as they are significantly different.
Tensor Introduction We have in this case that there is a deduction in DILL(C)
Γ; ∆1 ` u:A Γ; ∆2 ` v :B
Γ; ∆ ` u⊗ v :A⊗B
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where ∆ = ∆1#∆2. By the inductive hypothesis we have that there exist
derivations in ILL(C) (using some α-conversion, and assuming that Γ = ~y :
~C):
~y1 :! ~C,∆1 ` Ψ ~y1(u{~y1/~y}):A⊗B
and
~y2 :! ~C,∆2 ` Ψ ~y2(v{~y2/~y}):A⊗B
Now we have by the tensor introduction in ILL(C)
~y1 :! ~C, ~y2 :! ~C,∆ ` Ψ ~y1(u{~y1/~y})⊗Ψ ~y2(v{~y2/~y}):A⊗B
But by a sequence of copies, we can now obtain:
!Γ,∆ ` copy ~y for ~y1, ~y2 in Ψ ~y1(u{~y1/~y})⊗Ψ ~y2(v{~y2/~y}):A⊗B
which is precisely the image of the tensor. In fact, the technique of modelling
the shared intuitionistic context with repeated contractions accounts for all
of the copy constructs in the definition of Ψ.
!-Introduction In this case, we have the following deduction in DILL(C):
Γ; ` t:A
Γ; `!t :!A
By the inductive hypothesis, we have a derivation in ILL(C)(using some
α-conversion)
~y′ :! ~B ` Ψ~y′(t{~y′/~y}):A
where Γ = ~y : ~B. Now by one use of promotion, we have
!Γ ` promote ~y for ~y′ in Ψ~y′(t{~y′/~y}) :!A
which is precisely the image of !t.
!-Elimination In this case, we have the following derivation in DILL(C).
Γ; ∆1 ` t :!A Γ, x:A; ∆2 ` u:B
Γ; ∆ ` let !x be t in u:B
where ∆ = ∆1#∆2. Hence again by the inductive hypothesis we have the
following derivations in ILL(C) (using some α-conversion:
~y1 :! ~C,∆1 ` Ψ ~y1(t{~y1/~y}) :!A
where Γ = ~y : ~C, and
~y2 :! ~C, x :!A,∆ ` Ψ ~y2(u{~y2/~y}):B
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Now by the admissible cut rule in ILL(C) we have
~y1 :! ~C, ~y2 :! ~C,∆ ` Ψ~y2(u{~y2/~y}){Ψ ~y1(t{~y1/~y})/x}:B
Now by the familiar series of contractions, we have
!Γ,∆ ` copy ~y for ~y1, ~y2 in Ψ ~y2(u{~y2/~y}){Ψ ~y1(t{~y1/~y})/x}:B

We now give auxiliary lemmas relating intuitionistic and linear substitutions
in DILL(C) to substitution in ILL(C).
Lemma 2.4.5 (Linear Substitution)
If we consider the substitution:
Γ; ∆1, x:A `DILL(C) t:B Γ; ∆2 `DILL(C) u:A
Γ; ∆1,∆2 `DILL(C) t[u/x]:B
where Γ = ~y : ~C, then
Ψ~y(t[u/x]) = copy ~y for ~y1, ~y2 in Ψ ~y1(t{~y1/~x}){Ψ(u) ~y2{~y2/~x}/x}
Lemma 2.4.6 (Intuitionistic Substitution)
If we consider the substitution:
Γ, x:A; ∆ `DILL(C) t:B Γ; `DILL(C) u:A
Γ; ∆ `DILL(C) t[u/x]:B
where Γ = ~y : ~C, then we have that
Ψ~y(t[u/x]) = copy ~y for ~y1, ~y2 in Ψ ~y1,x(t{~y1/~y}){promote ~y2 for ~y3 in Ψ ~y3(u{~y3/~y})/x}
These are both routine inductions over the structure of the first term, and are
left to the reader.
Now we can prove the equality lemma:
Lemma 2.4.1.4 If Γ; ∆ `DILL(C) t = u :A, then !Γ,∆ `ILL(C) Ψ~y(t) = Ψ~y(u) :A
where Γ = ~y : ~A.
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Proof This is proved again by induction over the length of the derivation of
equality in DILL(C). We consider only the exponential equalities, as it is easy but
time-consuming to show that the other components of the equality rule system
over DILL(C) correspond to equalities on ILL(C).
!-β This equality is:
Γ; ∆ ` let !x be !u in v = v{u/x}:A
The image of the left-hand side of this is:
copy ~y for ~y1, ~y2 in Ψ ~y1(v[~y1/~y])[promote ~y2 for ~y3 in Ψ ~y3(u[~y3/~y]/x])
assuming that Γ = ~y : ~C. But this is just the image of intuitionistic substi-
tution in ILL(C).
!-η This equality is
Γ; ∆ ` let !x be t in !x = t:!A
The image of the left-hand side is
copy ~y for ~y1, ~y2 in (discard ~y2 in promote x for x′ in derelict x′ ){Ψ ~y1(t{~y1/~y})/x}
assuming that Γ = ~y : ~B. By equality (5) of ILL(C) we have that this is
precisely
copy ~y for ~y1, ~y2 in (discard ~y2 in Ψ ~y1(t{~y1/~y}))
However, using equality (7) this is just Ψ~y(t)
Commuting Conversions are dealt with easily, as they translate to the com-
muting conversions in ILL(C). 
Lemma 2.4.1.5 For any term ∆ `ILL(C) M :A of ILL, ∆ `ILL(C) Ψε(Φ(M)) =A
M .
Proof We note first that the translation Φ is effectively the identity on terms
other than those containing the exponential constructors. Moreover, since Φ
translates sequents to sequents derivable from no intuitionistic assumptions, ap-
plying Ψ to these sequents gives the identity (as we need no copy or discard
constructs). Hence we know that Ψ(Φ(t)) is the identity except perhaps on terms
involving the exponential constructors.
We prove that the translation satisfies the property above by consideration of
the structure of t. We consider only the exponential cases.
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derelict: In this case, we have that M has the form derelict(N), and hence that
Φ(M) has the form let !z be Φ(N) in z. This must have the following de-
rivation in DILL(C):
z :A; ` z :A ; ∆ ` Φ(N) :!A
; ∆ ` let !z be Φ(N) in z :A
The translation Ψ takes this derivation to
z :!A ` derelict (z):A ∆ ` Ψ〈〉(Φ(N)) :!A
Ψ(∆) ` derelict (z){Ψε(Φ(N))/z}:A
which is derelict(Ψε(Φ(u))), but this is βη-equal to derelict (u) by the in-
ductive hypothesis.
discard: In this case, M has the form discardN in N ′, so that Φ(M) is let !z be Φ(N) in Φ(N ′).
This must have the following derivation in DILL(C):
; ∆1 ` Φ(N) :!A z :A; ∆2 ` Φ(N ′):B
; ∆ ` let !z be Φ(N) in Φ(N ′):B
where ∆ = ∆1#∆2. Ψ applied to this derivation gives the following:
z :!A,∆1 ` discard z in Ψε(Φ(N ′)):B ∆2 ` Ψε(Φ(N)) :!A
∆ ` discard z in (Ψε(Φ(N ′))){Ψε(Φ(N))/z}:B
but since z does not occur in Φ(N ′) and hence in Ψε(Φ(N ′)), this is precisely
discard Ψε(Φ(N)) in (Ψε(Φ(N ′))) which is βη-equal to discard N in N ′ by
hypothesis.
copy: Here, Φ(M) has the form let !z be Φ(N) in Φ(N ′){!z/x, y}, and therefore
has the derivation:
z :A; ∆1 ` Φ(N ′){!z/x, y}:B ; ∆2 ` Φ(N) :!A
; ∆ ` let !z be Φ(N) in Φ(N ′){!z/x, y}:B
Under Ψ, this derivation becomes
z :!A,∆1 ` copy z for x, y in Ψε(Φ(N ′)):B ∆2 ` Ψε(Φ(N)) :!A
∆ ` copy z for x, y in Ψε(Φ(N ′)){Ψε(Φ(N))/z}:B
which is copy Ψε(Φ(N)) for x, y in Ψε(Φ(N ′)), which is by hypothesis equal
to copy N for x, y in N ′, or M .
promote: In this case, M has the form promote ~N for ~x in N ′. Hence Φ(M) is
let !~z be Φ( ~N) in !Φ(N ′){!~z/~x}.
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This has the derivation
~z : ~A; `!Φ(N ′)[!~z/~x]:B ; ∆i ` Φ(Ni) :!Ai (i = 1 . . . r)
; ∆ ` let !~z be ~Φ(N) in !Φ(N ′){!~z/~x}:B
where ∆ = ∆1# . . .#∆r. When Ψ is applied, this becomes
~z : ~!A ` promote ~z for ~x in Ψε(Φ(N ′)):B ∆i ` Ψε(Φ(Ni)) :!Ai (i = 1 . . . r)
∆ ` (promote ~z for ~x in Ψε(Φ(N ′))){Ψε(Φ(N1)) . . .Ψε(Φ(Nr))/z1 . . . zr}:B
but this final term is just promote ~Ψε(Φ(N)) for ~x in Ψε(Φ(N ′)), which is
equal to the original term by induction.
We can prove an analogous lemma for the alternative direction:
Lemma 2.4.1 )(6) For any term ; ∆ ` t:A of DILL(C), ; ∆ ` Φ(Ψε(t)) = t:A.
This is easily proved in the same manner as the previous lemma.
Now by virtue of the proof at the beginning of this section, we have the results:
Theorem 1.1 ∆ `ILL(C) M = N :A iff ; ∆ `DILL(C) Φ(M) = Φ(N):A
Theorem 1.2 ; ∆ `DILL(C) t = u:A iff ∆ `ILL(C) Ψε(t) = Ψε(u):A
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Chapter 3
The Semantics of DILL
We now show that DILL(C) can be soundly and completely mapped into a class
of models for linear logic. By this we mean that we can map terms Γ; ∆ ` t :A
to morphisms in the model in such a way that the Γ; ∆ terms t and u of type A
are judged to be equal Γ; ∆ ` t = u : A if and only if the interpretations of the
derivations are equal in every model of the class.
The models we will consider are based on linear-non-linear models, which
were introduced by Benton [Ben95a] and studied by Bierman [Bie95]. These are
pairs of categories (C,S) such that C is a CCC and S is a SMCC and there
is a monoidal adjunction between them. The intention behind the construction
is that the normal power of intuitionistic logic, arising from the exponential,
should be modelled in the CCC, with the intuitionistic linear logic being as usual
modelled in the SMCC. This idea emerged in 1993 from discussions between a
number of people, including Plotkin, Benton and Hyland. However, it was only
during further work by Benton [Ben95a] that the details became clear, and in
particular that it was necessary to impose the requirement that the adjunction be
monoidal. In [Ben94] there is an extensive comparison between these models and
the previously proposed models [BBdPH93b]. In fact, although Benton required
that the cartesian category be closed, this is not essential for our purposes, and
we take the more general definition.
3.1 The Interpretation
We will make extensive use of the primitive categorical definitions in appendix A.2,
and in particular will refer to equations there using their numbers with no further
comment.
The carrier of a DILL(C)-model is a quadruple (C,S, F,G), such that C is a
CC, S is a SMCC and F a G : C → S is a strong monoidal functor. We will
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write un for the unit of the monoidal adjunction, and nu for its counit.
Definition 3.1.1 (DILL(C)-Model)
A DILL(C)-model, which we will write L, is a carrier (C,S, F,G) together with
a primitive interpretation function [[ ]]LPL : PL → obj(S) and a morphism [[c]]
L
C ∈
S(I, [[A]]) for each constant c:A in C, where the interpretation function is exten-
ded to arbitrary types in the obvious way, as defined shortly.
Where the particular model we are referring to is clear, we may omit the super-
script L on the interpretation [[ ]]L.
We now make some definitions to simplify the interpretation. For a sequence of
objects in the category S, ~X = X1 . . . Xr, we define
⊗ ~X to be the left-bracketed
tensor of this sequence, ⊗ ~X = (..(X1 ⊗ X2) ⊗ . . . Xr) Also, for a sequence of
typings ~x: ~A, we define !(~x: ~A) = ~x :! ~A.
Given a DILL(C)-model L over signature (PL,C), we now define an interpret-
ation [[ ]]L which takes the types and typing contexts of DILL(C) to objects in S,
and takes the terms of DILL(C) to morphisms in S.
Definition 3.1.2 (The Interpretation on Types and Contexts)
On Types We define [[ ]]L on types as follows:
[[l]] = [[l]]PL for l ∈ PL
[[I ]] = I
[[A⊗B]] = [[A]]⊗ [[B]]
[[A( B]] = [[A]]( [[B]]
[[!A]] = FG([[A]])
On Typing Contexts We extend this firstly to sequences of types by saying
that [[A1 . . .Ar]] =
⊗
([[A1]] . . . [[Ar]]). We then say that for a sequence of typings
∆, [[∆]] = [[|∆|]]. We then extend the definition to typing contexts by saying that
for a typing context Γ; ∆, [[Γ; ∆]] = [[!|Γ|, |∆|]].
We can now define some context-manipulation arrows, using the structure we
have in the model.
Define
permA,B,A′,B′ :(A⊗B)⊗ (A′ ⊗B′)→ (A⊗ A′)⊗ (B ⊗B′)
mge∆,∆1,∆2 :[[∆]]→ [[∆1,∆2]] where ∆ = ∆1#∆2
sep∆1,∆2 :[[∆1,∆2]]→ [[∆1]]⊗ [[∆2]]
dupΓ :[[!|Γ|]]→ [[!|Γ|]]⊗ [[!|Γ|]]
splitΓ,∆,∆1,∆2 :[[Γ; ∆]]→ [[Γ; ∆1]]⊗ [[Γ; ∆2]] where ∆ = ∆1#∆2
discΓ :[[!|Γ|]]→ I
promΓ :[[Γ; ]]→![[Γ; ]]
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as follows:
permA,B,A′,B′ = aA,B,A′⊗B′; (idA ⊗ a−1B,A′,B′); (idA ⊗ (sB,A′ ⊗ id[[B′]]));
(idA ⊗ aA′,B,B′); a−1A,A′,B⊗B′)
mge∆,∆1,∆2 =

sepx:A,∆′ ; (id[[A]] ⊗mge∆′,∆′1,∆2); sep
−1
x:A,(∆′1,∆2)
if ∆ = x:A,∆′ and ∆1 = x:A,∆′1
sepx:A,∆′ ; (id[[A]] ⊗mge∆′,∆1,∆′2); (id[[A]] ⊗ sep∆1,∆′2);
a[[A]],[[∆1]],[[∆′2]]; (s[[A]],[[∆1]] ⊗ id∆′2)(sep
−1
∆1,A ⊗ id∆′2); sep
−1
(∆1,A),∆′2
if ∆ = x:A,∆′ and ∆2 = x:A,∆′2
idI if ∆ = ∆1 = ∆2 =
sep∆1,∆2 =

(sep∆1,∆′2 ⊗ id[[A]]); a[[∆1]],[[∆2]],[[A]];
id[[∆1]] ⊗ sep−1∆′2,A) where ∆1 6= and ∆2 = x:A,∆
′
2
ri−1[[∆2]] if ∆1 =
li−1[[∆1]] if ∆2 =
dupΓ =

dupΓ′,x:A ⊗ (F (cG[[B]]); m−1G[[B]],G[[B]]);
perm!(Γ′,x:A),!(Γ′,x:A),y:!B,y:!B if Γ = Γ′, x : A, y : B
F (cG[[A]]); m−1G[[A]],G[[A]] if Γ = x:A
riI if Γ =








discΓ′,y:B ⊗ (F (dG[[A]]); mi−1); ri−1I if Γ = Γ′, y :B, x:A
F (dG[[A]]); mi−1 if Γ = x:A
idI if Γ =
promΓ =

promΓ′,y:B ⊗ F (unG[[A]]) if Γ = Γ′, y :B, x:A
F (unG[[A]]) if Γ = x:A
mi if Γ =
where mX,Y and mi are the monoidality natural transformations for the functor
FG.
The interpretation will take a term Γ; ∆ ` t:A to an arrow
[[Γ; ∆ ` t:A]] : [[Γ; ∆]]→ [[A]]
in the SMCC part of L.
Definition 3.1.3 (The Interpretation on Sequents)
First we recall that given a Γ; ∆ term t of type A, there is a unique derivation
of the typing judgement Γ; ∆ ` t :A. We now define [[ ]]L inductively over the
structure of this unique derivation as follows:
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Linear Axiom Here we have:
[[Γ; x:A ` x:A]] : [[Γ;A]]→ [[A]]
= sep,!Γ,A; (discΓ ⊗ id[[A]]); ri[[A]]
Intuitionistic Axiom Here, we have
[[Γ, x:A,Γ′; ` x:A]] : [[Γ, A,Γ′; ]]→ [[A]]
= sep(!Γ,x:!A),!Γ′; (sep(!Γ),!x:A⊗ id[[!Γ′]]);((discΓ ⊗ derA)⊗ discΓ′); liI⊗[[A]]; ri[[A]]
Constant Axiom Here. we have
[[Γ; ` c:A]] : [[Γ; ]]→ [[A]]
=discΓ; [[c]]C
I-introduction Here we have:
[[Γ; ` ∗:I ]] : [[Γ; ]]→ [[I ]]
= discΓ
I-elimination We need to interpret the derivation
Γ; ∆1 ` t:I Γ; ∆2 ` u:A
Γ; ∆ ` let ∗ be t in u:A
where ∆ = ∆1#∆2. In this case, we have arrows
f : [[Γ; ∆1]]→ [[I ]]
g : [[Γ; ∆2]]→ [[A]]
Hence we have
[[Γ; ∆ ` let ∗ be t in u:A]] : [[Γ; ∆]]→ [[A]]
=splitΓ,∆,∆1,∆2 ; (f ⊗ g); ri[[A]]
⊗-introduction The rule is:
Γ; ∆1 ` t:A Γ; ∆2 ` u:B
Γ; ∆ ` t⊗ u:A⊗B
where ∆ = ∆1#∆2. Using the premises, we already have arrows
f : [[Γ; ∆1]]→ [[A]]
g : [[Γ; ∆2]]→ [[B]]
63
Hence we have
[[Γ; ∆ ` t⊗ u:A⊗B]] : [[Γ; ∆]]→ [[A⊗B]]
=strΓ,∆,∆1,∆2 ; (f ⊗ g)
⊗-Elimination The rule is
Γ; ∆1 ` u:(A⊗B) Γ; ∆2, x:A, y :B ` t:C
Γ; ∆ ` let x⊗ y be u in t:C
where ∆ = ∆1#∆2. We have arrows:
f : [[Γ; ∆1]]→ [[A⊗B]]
g : [[Γ; ∆2, A,B]]→ [[C]]
Hence we have
[[Γ; ∆ ` let x⊗ y be u in t:C]] :[[Γ; ∆]]→ [[C]]
=splitΓ,∆,∆2,∆1; (id[[Γ;∆2]] ⊗ f); sep−1(!Γ,∆2),(A⊗B); g
(-introduction The rule is as follows:
Γ; ∆, x:A ` t:B
Γ; ∆ ` λx.t:A( B
so we have an arrow:
f : [[Γ; ∆, A]]→ [[B]]
Hence we have
[[Γ; ∆ ` λx.t:A( B]] :[[Γ; ∆]]→ [[A( B]]
=λ(sep−1(!Γ,∆),A; f)
(-elimination The rule is:
Γ; ∆1 ` u:(A( B) Γ; ∆2 ` t:A
Γ; ∆ ` (ut):B
where ∆ = ∆1#∆2, so we have arrows:
f : [[Γ; ∆1]]→ [[A( B]]
g : [[Γ; ∆2]]→ [[A]]
Hence we have
[[Γ; ∆ ` (ut):B]] : [[Γ; ∆]]→ [[B]]
=splitΓ,∆,∆1,∆2; (f ⊗ g); ap[[A]],[[B]]
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!-introduction The rule is:
Γ; ` t:A
Γ; `!t :!A
so we have an arrow:
f : [[Γ; ]]→ [[A]]
Hence we have
[[Γ; `!t :!A]] :[[Γ; ]]→ [[!A]]
=promΓ;FG(f)
!-elimination The rule is:
Γ; ∆1 ` u :!A Γ, x:A; ∆2 ` t:B
Γ; ∆ ` let !x be u in t:B
where ∆ = ∆1#∆2. Hence we have arrows:
f : [[Γ; ∆1]]→ [[!A]]
g : [[Γ, A; ∆2]]→ [[B]]
Hence we have
[[Γ; ∆ ` let !x be u in t:B]] : [[Γ; ∆]]→ [[B]]
= strΓ,∆,∆1,∆2 ;(f ⊗ id[[Γ;∆2]]); sep−1!A,(!Γ,∆2); mge(!A,!Γ,∆2),!Γ,(!A,∆2); g
3.2 Soundness
Having given the interpretation function [[ ]]L, we now need to show that the inter-
pretation is sound. That is, we need to demonstrate that the equality judgement
we have given for DILL(C) is respected by the interpretation [[ ]]L for any model
L.
First we need to prove two technical lemmas, which give the interpretations
of the two substitutions in the model:
Lemma 3.2.1
If [[Γ; ∆1 ` t:A]] = f and [[Γ; ∆2, x:A ` u:B]] = g, and ∆ = ∆1#∆2, then
[[Γ; ∆ ` u[t/x]:B]] = splitΓ,∆,∆2,∆1 ;(id[[Γ;∆′]] ⊗ f); sep−1(!Γ,∆),A; g
Lemma 3.2.2
If [[Γ; ` t:A]] = f and [[Γ, x:A; ∆ ` u:B]] = g, then
[[Γ; ∆ ` u[t/x]:B]] = splitΓ,∆, ,∆;((promΓ;FG(f))⊗ id[[Γ;∆]]); adminΓ,∆,A; g
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where adminΓ,∆,A : [[!A]]⊗ [[Γ; ∆]]→ [[Γ, A; ∆]] is defined:
adminΓ,∆,A = (id[[!A]] ⊗ sep!Γ,∆); (s[[!A]],[[!Γ]] ⊗ id[[∆]]); (sep−1!Γ,!A ⊗ id[[∆]]); sep−1!(Γ,A),∆
These lemmas are proved by induction over the structure of the first term. The
proofs are again left to the reader, but as an example we prove the intuitionistic
lemma in the case where u is the term Γ, x :A; ` x :A. Clearly, in this case the
result of the substitution {t/x} is just the term Γ; ` t:A, so we need to show:
f = splitΓ, , , ; ((promΓ;FG(f))⊗ id[[Γ; ]]); adminΓ, ,A; sep(!Γ,x:!A), ;
(sep(!Γ),!x:A ⊗ id[[ ]]); ((discΓ ⊗ derA)⊗ disc ); liI⊗[[A]]; ri[[A]]
We can see that adminΓ, ,A = s[[!A]],[[!Γ]]; sep−1!Γ,!x:A, and hence the right-hand side of
this simplifies to
splitΓ, , , ; ((promΓ;FG(f))⊗ id[[Γ; ]]); s[[!A]],[[!Γ]]; sep−1!Γ,!x:A; sep(!Γ),!x:A; (discΓ⊗derA); ri[[A]]
But this is precisely
splitΓ, , , ; ((promΓ;FG(f))⊗ id[[Γ; ]]); (derA ⊗ discΓ); s[[A]],I ; ri[[A]]
By the adjunction and the tensor rules, this is
splitΓ, , , ; (f ⊗ discΓ); li[[A]]
which is
splitΓ, , , ; (id[[Γ; ]] ⊗ discΓ); ri[[Γ; ]]; f
But we can prove that splitΓ, , , ; (id[[Γ; ]] ⊗ discΓ); ri[[Γ; ]] = id[[!Γ]], so that the result
holds.
Now we are able to prove soundness by considering the derivation of equality
judgements in DILL(C).
Theorem 2 (Soundness)
If Γ; ∆ ` tu : A then
[[Γ; ∆ ` t:A]] = [[Γ; ∆ ` u:A]]
Proof
I − β In this case, we have
Γ; ∆ ` let ∗ be ∗ in t = t : A
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The interpretation of the left hand side is the arrow
strΓ, ,∆; (discΓ ⊗ g); ri[[A]]
but
strΓ, ,∆; (discΓ ⊗ id[[Γ;∆]]) = ri−1[[Γ;∆]]
so this is just g by naturality of ri.
I − η In this case we have
Γ; ∆ ` let ∗ be t in ∗ = t : I
The interpretation of the left-hand side of this is the arrow
strΓ,∆, ; (f ⊗ discΓ); riI
but by a symmetric equality to that used above we have that this is
li−1[[Γ;∆]]; (f ⊗ idI); riI
but now since riI = liI this is just f .
⊗− η First, note that
[[Γ; x:A, y :B ` x⊗ y :A⊗B]] = strΓ,A,B; ((lcon!Γ,A; (discΓ ⊗ id[[A]]); ri[[A]])
⊗ (lcon!Γ,B; (discΓ ⊗ id[[B]]); ri[[B]]))
= lcon!Γ,(A,B); (discΓ ⊗ id[[A⊗B]]); ri[[A⊗B]]
This means that
[[Γ; ∆ ` let x⊗ y be t in x⊗ y]] = strΓ, ,∆; (id[[Γ; ]] ⊗ f); a−1[[Γ; ]],A,B; lcon!Γ,(AB);
(discΓ ⊗ idA⊗B); ri[[A]])
= strΓ, ,∆; (id[[Γ; ]] ⊗ f); (discΓ ⊗ idA⊗B); riA⊗B
= strΓ, ,∆; (discΓ ⊗ f); riA⊗B
= f
!− β In this case,
[[Γ; ∆ ` let !x be !t in u:B]] =strΓ, ,∆; ((promΓ;FG(f))⊗ id[[Γ;∆]]); (id[[!A]] ⊗ lcon!Γ,∆2);
(s[[!A]],[[!Γ]] ⊗ id[[∆2]]); (lcon−1!Γ,!A ⊗ id[[∆2]]); lcon−1!(Γ,A),∆2; g
which is just the interpretation of u[t/x].
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λ− β In this case, assuming that [[Γ; ∆1, A ` t :B]] = f and [[Γ; ∆2 ` u :A]] = g,
we have
[[Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` (λx.t)u:B]] =strΓ,(∆1,A),∆2; (λ(lcon−1(!Γ,∆1),A; f)⊗ g); ap[[A]],[[B]]
=strΓ,∆1,∆2 ; (id[[Γ;∆1]] ⊗ g); lcon−1!Γ,∆1 ; f
=[[Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` t[u/x]:B]]
Congruence These cases are easily shown, firstly because categorical equality
is an equivalence, and secondly since given a context C[ ] and a term t,
the interpretation of a term having the form C[t] is a term of the internal
language of the category containing a sub-term the interpretation of t.
This shows soundness. 
3.3 The Term Model
The first stage in establishing completeness is to define the term model of DILL(C).
It is clear that we will as normal construct the term category to form the SMCC
part of the model, but we will need to use a somewhat more complex construction
to provide the CCC part.
Definition 3.3.1 (The Term Category)
We define the term category ST for the signature (PL,C) as follows:
• The objects of ST are the types of DILL(C).
• ST (A,B) = {[(x, t)A,B]| ; x :A ` t :B}, where we write [(x, t)A,B] to denote
the equivalence class of (x, t)A,B under the equivalence ≡ defined by:
(x, t)A,B ≡ (y, u)A,B if ; x:A ` t = u{x/y} : B
For now on, we will write [(x, t)]A,B as [x, tA,B] for clarity, and omit the type
information where possible. Also, we will assume where necessary that in referring
to [x, t] and [y, u] etc., the pairs (x, t) and (y, u) are chosen from their equivalence
classes in such a way that the variables x and y are distinct, unless they are
explicitly identified.
Now define identities and substitution:
• idA = [x, x]
• [x, t]; [y, u] = [x, u{t/y}]
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Now it is easily demonstrated that these definitions give a category, given
primitive results on substitution. Further, we certainly have appropriate primitive
interpretation functions [[ ]]PL : PL → obj(S), given by the identity, and [[c]]C given
by [x, let ∗ be x in c] for each constant c in C. The next step is to show that ST is
in fact a SMCC. First we define the tensor of two objects A and B as the object
A⊗B, and on arrows we define the tensor and its associated natural isomorphisms
as follows:
[x1, t]⊗ [x2, u] = [y, let x1 ⊗ x2 be y in t⊗ u]
riA : I ⊗ A→ A = [y, let x1 ⊗ x2 be y in let ∗ be x1 in x2]
liA : A⊗ I → A = [y, let x1 ⊗ x2 be y in let ∗ be x2 in x1]
aA,B,C = [y1, let x1 ⊗ y2 be y1 in let x2 ⊗ x3 be y2 in (x1 ⊗ x2)⊗ x3]
: A⊗ (B ⊗C)→ (A⊗B)⊗ C
sA,B : A⊗B → B ⊗ A = [y, let x1 ⊗ x1 be y in x2 ⊗ x1]
We can easily now show:
ri−1A = [x, ∗ ⊗ x]
li−1A = [x, x⊗ ∗]
a−1A,B,C = [y1, let y2 ⊗ x3 be y1 in let x1 ⊗ x2 be y2 in x1 ⊗ (x2 ⊗ x3)]
s−1A,B = sB,A
We give the proof of the fact that riA has the inverse given above as an example.
In order to show that the given arrow ri has the inverse [x, ∗ ⊗ x], there are two
cases to consider. Firstly we consider the composition riA; [x, ∗ ⊗ x], which is
[y, ∗ ⊗ (let x1 ⊗ x2 be y in let ∗ be x1 in x2)]
Now in DILL(C) we have by two commuting conversions the equality judgement
; y :I ⊗ A ` ∗ ⊗ (let x1 ⊗ x2 be y in let ∗ be x1 in x2)
= let x1 ⊗ x2 be y in (let ∗ be x1 in ∗)⊗ x2 :I ⊗ A
and by η equalities for ⊗ and I the equality judgement
; y :I ⊗ A ` let x1 ⊗ x2 be y in (let ∗ be x1 in ∗)⊗ x2 = y :A⊗A
and hence
[y, ∗ ⊗ (let x1 ⊗ x2 be y in let ∗ be x1 in x2)] = [y, y]
as required. Secondly, we consider the composition [x, ∗ ⊗ x]; riA, which is
[x, let x1 ⊗ x2 be ∗ ⊗ x in let ∗ be x1 in x2]
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But in DILL(C) we have by ⊗ and I − β-equalities the equality judgement
; x:A ` let x1 ⊗ x2 be ∗ ⊗ x in let ∗ be x1 in x2 = x:A
so that we have
[x, let x1 ⊗ x2 be ∗ ⊗ x in let ∗ be x1 in x2] = [x, x]
as required. 
In future we omit the explicit statements of the equality judgements which
justify the equalities between equivalence classes, and merely annotate some of
these equalities with the axiomatic equalities of DILL(C) used to derive them.
⊗
is a Functor
We need to show that the definition given above of the tensor is functorial. This
amounts to showing that identities are preserved:
[x, x]⊗ [x′, x′] = [y, let x⊗ x′ be y in x⊗ x′]
(by ⊗− η) = [y, y]
and that composition is preserved. We show this in the second place of the
functor; the proof for the first place is analogous.
[x, x]⊗ ([y, t]; [y′, u])
= [x′, let x⊗ y be x′ in x⊗ (u{t/y′})]
(by ⊗-cc and β) = [x′, let x′′ ⊗ y′ be (let x⊗ y be x′ in x⊗ t) in x′′ ⊗ u]
= ([x, x]⊗ [y, t]); ([x′′, x′′]⊗ [y′, u])
We now need to check that the specified natural transformations ri, li, a and
s have the correct properties:
riA There is one diagram to check here for naturality, and two equalities for
isomorphism.
riA; [x, t]
= [y, t{let x′ ⊗ x be y in let ∗ be x′ in x/x}]
(by cc) = [y, let x′ ⊗ x be y in let ∗ be x′ in t]
(by cc and ⊗− β) = [y, let y′ ⊗ y′′ be let x′ ⊗ x be y in x′ ⊗ t
in let ∗ be y′ in y′′
]
= (idI ⊗ [x, t]); riB
This shows the naturality of ri. We previously demonstrated that riA was
an isomorphism.
liA The diagrams in this case are exactly analogous to the above ones, and
hence are omitted.
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aA,B,C We first check naturality for this arrow.
aA1,A2,A3; ([x1, t1)]⊗ [x2, t2])⊗ [x3, t3]
= [y′, let x1 ⊗ x′
be let y1 ⊗ y′′ be y′ in let y2 ⊗ y3 be y′′ in (y1 ⊗ y2)⊗ y3
in let x2 ⊗ x3 be x′ in (t1 ⊗ t2)⊗ t3]
(by cc, α-conv. and ⊗− β)
= [y′, let x1 ⊗ x′ be y′ in let x2 ⊗ x3 be x′ in (t1 ⊗ t2)⊗ t3]
(by cc and ⊗− β)
= [y′, let y1 ⊗ y′′
be let x1 ⊗ x′ be y′ in let x2 ⊗ x3 be x′ in t1 ⊗ (t2 ⊗ t3)
in let y2 ⊗ y3 be y′ in (y1 ⊗ y2)⊗ y3]
= [x1, t1]⊗ ([x2, t2]⊗ [x3, t3]); aB1,B2,B3
The isomorphism is easily seen.
sA,B We need to show naturality:
[x, t]⊗ [y, u]; sB1,B2
= [y′′, let x′ ⊗ y′ be let x⊗ y be y′′ in t⊗ u
in y′ ⊗ x′
]
(by cc and ⊗− β) = [y′′, let x⊗ y be y′′ in u⊗ t]
(by cc, α-conv. and ⊗− β) = [y′′, let y ⊗ x be let x′ ⊗ y′ be y′′ in y′ ⊗ x′
in u⊗ t
]
= sA1,A2 ; [y, u]⊗ [x, t]
Again, the isomorphism is easily seen.
From now on we will omit the justifications of equality steps for brevity.
Now we need to show that the coherence equalities given earlier hold in ST . We
check these by number based on the numbering given in appendix A.2. Because
the demonstration for larger equalities consists of equalities between huge terms
of DILL(C), we check here only equalities A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.5 and A.2.6.
A.2.2
LHS =[y′, let x1 ⊗ x2
be let y′′ ⊗ x′′′ be y′ in let x′ ⊗ x′′ be y′′ in x′ ⊗ (x′′ ⊗ x′′′)
in x1 ⊗ (let y1 ⊗ y2 be x2 in let ∗ be y1 in y2)]
=[y′, let y′′ ⊗ x′′′ be y′ in let x′ ⊗ x′′ be y′′ in x′ ⊗ (let ∗ be x′′ in x′′′)]
=[y′, let y′′ ⊗ x′′′ be y′ in (let x′ ⊗ x′′ be y′′ in let ∗ be x′′ in x′)⊗ x′′′]
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A.2.3
LHS =[y′, let x⊗ y be y′ in let ∗ be y in x]
=[y′, let x⊗ y be y′ in let ∗ be y in let ∗ be x in ∗]
=[y′, let x⊗ y be y′ in let ∗ be x in y]
=RHS
A.2.5 We show this by demonstrating sA,B; sB,A = id.
LHS =[y′′, let x⊗ y be let x′ ⊗ y′ be y′′ in y′ ⊗ x′ in y ⊗ x]
=[y′′, y′′]
A.2.6
LHS =[y′′, let x⊗ y be let x′ ⊗ y′ be y′′ in y′ ⊗ x′ in let ∗ be y in x]
=[y′′, let x′ ⊗ y′ be y′′ in let ∗ be x′ in y′]
=RHS
At this point we have shown that the term category is an s.m. category. It
remains to demonstrate that a suitable candidate exists for the right adjoint of
the tensor.
Closedness of the SMC
We will define the functor ( on types in the obvious way, and on morphisms
[x, t] : A→ B, [y, u] : A′ → B′ and [x′, t′] : A⊗B → C as follows:
[x, t]( [y, u] : (B ( A′)→ (A( B′) = [x′, λx:A.(u{(x′t)/y})]
λ[x′, t′] : A→ (B ( C) = [x′′, λy′ :B.(t′{(x′′ ⊗ y′)/x′})]
apA,B : A⊗ (A( B)→ B = [y, let x1 ⊗ x2 :(A( B)⊗ A be y in x1x2]
It is easy to show that these definitions give a functor, and that it is right
adjoint to the tensor, using lemma 2.2.10. Hence the term category ST is an
SMCC.
Having shown that ST is a SMCC, and hence forms part of a DILL(C)-model,
we now need to find a suitable candidate for the CCC part of this model.
The Intuitionistic Term category
We now give an explicit construction of a strict cartesian category which we will
show to be adjoint to the term category.
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Definition 3.3.2 (The Intuitionistic Term Category)
We define the intuitionistic term category CT as follows:
• The objects of CT are sequences of types of DILL(C).
• CT ( ~A, ~B) = {[(~x,~t) ~A, ~B]|~x : ~A; ` ti : Bi for ti ∈ ~t}, where we write [(~x,~t) ~A, ~B]
to denote the equivalence class of (~x,~t) ~A, ~B under the equivalence≡C defined
by:
(~x,~t) ~A, ~B ≡C (~y, ~u)
~A, ~B if for all ti ∈ ~t, ~x: ~A; ` ti = ui{~x/~y} : Bi
As before, we write [~x,~t] ~A, ~B for [(~x,~t)] ~A, ~B for clarity, omit type information
where possible and assume that the variables ~x and ~y in the arrows [~x,~t] [~y, ~u]
are always chosen from the equivalence classes so as to make all the variables in
the concatenation ~x~y distinct, except where explicitly identified.
Now define identities and substitution:
• id ~A = [~x, ~x]
• [~x,~t]; [~y, ~u] = [~x, ~u{~t/~y}]
It is again easy to show that these definitions make CT into a category. We now
specify the strict cartesian structure on sequences of types to be concatenation,
and on morphisms where [~x,~t] : ~A1 → ~B1 and [~y, ~u] : ~A2 → ~B2:
[~x,~t]× [~y, ~u] : ~A1 ~A2 → ~B1 ~B2 = [~x~y,~t~u]
〈[~x,~t], [~x, ~u]〉 : ~A1 → ~B1 ~B2 = [~x,~t~u]
pi,r : A1 . . .Ar → Ai = [~x, xi]
These definitions make CT into a strict cartesian category; as an example, we
show the defining equality of the projections:
〈[~x, t1] . . . [~x, tr]〉; pi,r = [~x, t1 . . . tr]; [~y, yi]
= [~x, ti]
It is possible to make this category into a CCC by defining an arrow type
A→ B =!A( B, but we do not do this here.
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ST is monoidally adjoint to CT
Now, in order to construct a term model for DILL(C), we need to show that the
categories ST and CT which we have constructed are monoidally adjoint.
Note 3.3.3 (Strict Tensor)
Firstly, since we will be mapping a strict cartesian structure into the category ST ,
we will need to define some new term constructors. Define the tensor of ⊗t1 . . . tr
⊗t1, . . . tr =

∗ if r = 0
t1 if r = 1
(⊗t1 . . . tr−1)⊗ tr otherwise
Further, we need to define a let term construct to eliminate sequences of variables,
which we again do as follows:
let ⊗x1 . . . xr be t in u =

let ∗ be t in u if r = 0
u[t/x1] if r = 1
let z ⊗ xr be t
in (let ⊗x1 . . . xr−1 be z in u) otherwise
Now, assume that Γ; ∆′′, ~x: ~A ` u:B, that Γ; ∆′′′ ` u′ :⊗ ~A, and that Γ; ∆′i ` t:Ai
for i = 1 . . . r, where ~A = A1 . . . Ar. Then, using the β and η equalities of DILL(C),
we can derive equality judgements:
Γ; ∆ ` let ⊗~x be ⊗~t in u = u{~t/~x}:B Γ; ∆′′′ ` let ⊗~x be u′ in ⊗~x = u′ :⊗ ~A
where ∆ = ∆′′#∆′1# . . .#∆
′
r. Now assume we have a Γ1; ∆1, A1− Γ2; ∆2, A2
linear term context C[ ]. Given Γ1; ∆1, ~x: ~B ` u :A1, Γ2; ∆′ ` t′ :⊗ ~B and Γ; ∆′′i `
ti :!Bi for i = 1 . . . r, where ~B = B1 . . . Br, we have:
Γ; ∆ ` let !~x be ~t in ⊗!~x = ⊗~t⊗! ~A
Γ2; ∆′′′ ` C[let ⊗~x be t′ in u] = let ⊗~x be t′ in C[u]:A2
where ∆′′′ = ∆′#∆2 and ∆ = ∆′1# . . .#∆r.
Definition 3.3.4 (The Functors FT and GT )
We define the functors FT : CT → ST and GT : ST → CT :
FT ( ~A) = ⊗! ~A
FT ([~x,~t]) = [y, let ⊗~x1 be y in let !~x be ~x1 in ⊗!~t]
GT (A) = A
GT ([x, t]) = [x, t]
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We show that these definitions are functorial. It is easy to see that G preserves
identities and composition, but more tricky for F . To show that it preserves
identities:
FT (id ~A) = FT ([~x, ~x])
= [y, let ⊗~x1 be y in let !~x be ~x1 in ⊗!~x]
= [y, let ⊗~x1 be y in ⊗~x1]
= [y, y]
To show that it preserves composition:
FT ([~x,~t]; [~y, ~u]) = FT ([~x, ~u{~t/~y}])
= [y′, let ⊗~x1 be y′ in let !~x be ~x1 in ⊗!(~u{~t/~y})]
= [y′, let ⊗~x1 be y′ in let !~x be ~x1 in let !~y be !~t in ⊗!~u]
= [y′, let ⊗ ~x3
be let ⊗~x1 be y′ in let !~x be ~x1 in ⊗!~t
in let ⊗~x2 be ⊗~x3 in let !~y be ~x2 in ⊗!~u]
= FT ([~x,~t]);FT ([~y, ~u])
We now need to show that both FT and GT are monoidal functors. This
means we must give natural transformations mGA,B : G(A)G(B) → G(A ⊗ B),
miG : → G(I), mFA,B : F ( ~A)⊗ F ( ~B)→ F ( ~A~B) and miF : I → F ( ).
mGA,B = [xy, x⊗ y]
miG = [ε, ∗]
mF~A, ~B = [y
′, let x1 ⊗ x2 be y′
in let ⊗~y1 be x1 in let ⊗~y2 be x2 in ⊗~y1~y2
]
miF = [x, x]
We must now check naturality and certain coherence conditions.
Naturality of mG Assume that f = [x, t] and that g = [y, u]. Then
LHS = (G(f) ×G(g)); mG
= [xy, tu]; [x′y′, x′ ⊗ y′]
= [xy, t⊗ u]
= [xy, x⊗ y]; [y′, let x⊗ y be y′ in t⊗ u]




LHS = [y′, let x1 ⊗ x2 be y′ in let ∗ be x1 in x2]
= [y′, let x1 ⊗ x2 be y′ in x1 ⊗ x2];
[x′, let x1 ⊗ x2 be x′ in let ∗ be x1 in x2]; [x′, x′]
A.2.9) for mF
LHS = [y′, let x1 ⊗ x2 be y′ in x2 ⊗ x1];
[x′, let x1 ⊗ x2 be x′
in let ⊗~y1 be x1 in let ⊗~y2 be x2 in ⊗~y1~y2
]
= [y′, let x1 ⊗ x2 be y′ in let ⊗~y1 be x2 in let ⊗~y2 be x1 in ⊗~y1~y2
= [y′, let x1 ⊗ x2 be y′
in let ⊗~y1 be x1 in let ⊗~y2 be x2 in ⊗~y1~y2
];
[x′, let ⊗~x1~x2 be x′ in ⊗~x2~x1]
A.2.8) for mG
LHS = [x, x]
= [x, ∗ ⊗ x]; [y′, let x⊗ y be y′ in let ∗ be x in y]
= [x, ∗x]; [xy, x⊗ y];G([y′, let x⊗ y be y′ in let ∗ be x in y])
= RHS
A.2.9) for mG
LHS = [xy, yx]; [xy, x⊗ y]
= [xy, y⊗ x]
= [xy, x⊗ y]; [y′, let x⊗ y be y′ in y ⊗ x]
= [xy, x⊗ y];G([z, let x⊗ y be z in y ⊗ x])
= RHS
We need to establish that there is an adjunction between ST and CT . First we
give the counit and unit:
[x, let !y be x in y] = nuA : FGA→ A
[~x,⊗!~x] = un ~A : ~A→ GF ( ~A)
Now, consider an arbitrary morphism [x, t] : F ~A→ B in ST . Define [x, t]∗ to be
the morphism [~y, t{⊗!~y/x}] : ~A→ GB in CT . But now:
F ([x, t]∗); nuB = [y′, let ⊗~x′ be y′ in let !~y be ~x′ in !t{⊗!~y/x}]; [x, let !y be x in y]
= [y′, let ⊗~x′ be y′ in let !~y be ~x′ in t{⊗!~y/x}]
= [y′, t{y′/x}]
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Therefore the adjunction triangle commutes. Now assume that it does so for
[~y, u] : ~A→ GB, that is to say
[y′, let ⊗~x′ be y′ in let !~y be ~x′ in !u] = [y′, t{y′/x}]
This equality implies that
; y′ :⊗! ~A ` let ⊗~x′ be y′ in let !~y be ~x′ in !u = t{y′/x}:B
and by substituting ⊗!~y for y′ this implies that
~y : ~A; `!u = t{⊗!~y/x}:B
This implies that our choice of [x, t]∗ is the unique such making the adjunction
triangle commute. Hence we have the required adjunction. We now need to check
that the adjunction is monoidal, ie that the unit and counit of the adjunction are
monoidal natural transformations. In order to check this, we need the maps
mFG,miFG,mGF and miGF :
[x, let ∗ be x in !∗] = mFGI
I → FGI
[x′, let x1 ⊗ x2 be x′ in let !x′1 be x1 in let !x′2 be x2 in !(x′1 ⊗ x′2)] = mFGA,B
FGA⊗ FGB → FG(A⊗B)
[ε, ∗] = mGF
→ GF ( )
[xy, let ⊗~x1 be x in let ⊗~x2 be y in ⊗~x1~x2] = mGF~A, ~B
(GF ~A)(GF ~B)→ GF ( ~A~B)
We now need to check certain coherence conditions:
A.2.10) for nu
LHS = [x′, let x1 ⊗ x2 be x′ in let !x′1 be x1 in let !x′2 be x2 in !(x′1 ⊗ x′2)];
[x, let !y be x in y]
= [y′, let x1 ⊗ x2 be y′ in let !x′1 be x1 in let !x′2 be x2 in x′1 ⊗ x′2]
A.2.11) for nu
LHS = [x, let ∗ be x in !∗]; [x, let !y be x in y]





= [~x1~x2, (⊗!~x1)(⊗!~x2)]; [xy, let ⊗~x1 be x in let ⊗~x2 be y in ⊗~x1~x2]
A.2.11) for un
LHS = [ε, ∗]
= RHS
We have now demonstrated that ST is monoidally adjoint to CT . We now
make the definition:
Definition 3.3.5 (DILL(C) Term Model)
Define the term model of DILL(C) which we will call LT , to be the carrier
(ST , CT , FT , GT ) equipped with the primitive interpretation functions [[ ]]PL : PL →
obj(S) given by the identity and [[c]]C = [x, let ∗ be x in c].
We have by our previous calculations that this is a DILL(C)-model over sig-
nature (PL,C).
3.4 Completeness
In order to prove completeness, it now suffices to prove a lemma:
Lemma 3.4.1
[[~x′:Γ; ~x′′ :∆ ` t:A]]LT = [x, let ⊗~y~x′′ be x in let !~x′ be ~y in t] in the SMCC part of
the term model LT .
We prove this lemma by induction over the structure of the term. Now com-
pleteness is easy:
Theorem 3 (Soundness and Completeness)
Suppose we have terms Γ; ∆ ` t :A and Γ;: ∆ ` u :A, where Γ = ~x′ : ~B′ and
∆ = ~x′′ : ~B′′. Then Γ; ∆ ` t = u : A if and only if [[Γ; ∆ ` t:A]]L = [[Γ; ∆ ` u:A]]L
in every DILL(C)-model,L.
Proof We have the forward direction of the implication, soundness, proved
earlier. As for the other direction, assume that [[Γ; ∆ ` t :A]]L = [[Γ; ∆ ` u :
A]]L for all DILL(C)-models L. Then since LT is an DILL(C)-model we have by
lemma 3.4.1 that
[x, let ~y~x′′ be x in let !~x′ be ~y in t] = [x, let ~y~x′′ be x in let !~x′ be ~y in u]
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and hence we have
; x : ⊗! ~B′, ~B′′ ` let ~y~x′′ be x in let !~x′ be ~y in t = let ~y~x′′ be x in let !~x′ be ~y in u : A
But now it follows that if we substitute
⊗
!~x′, ~x′′ for x in both terms we still have
an equality. However, under this substitution, we have:
Γ; ∆ ` let ~y~x′′ be (⊗!~x′, ~x′′) in let !~x′ be ~y in t = t:A
and hence
Γ; ∆ ` t = u : A
as required. 
3.5 ILL and Other Models
Our proof of completeness above has certain easy corollaries. Firstly, since we
have shown that the type theory ILL(C) together with its βη-cc equality is iso-
morphic to a subsystem of DILL(C), with its βη-cc equality, we know that the
models of DILL(C) will be very closely related to models of ILL(C). We give some
results which are easily proved.
Lemma 3.5.1 (Interpretation for ILL(C))
If ∆ `ILL(C) M :A, then we have an arrow [[ ; ∆ ` Φ(M) :A]] : [[∆]] → [[A]] in the
SMCC part of any DILL(C)-model.
This is obvious from the form of the maps [[ ]] and Φ.
Corollary 3.1 (Soundness for ILL(C))
If ∆ `ILL(C) M = N : A, then the arrows [[ ; ∆ ` Φ(M):A]] and [[ ; ∆ ` Φ(N):A]]
are equal in the SMCC part of any DILL(C)-model.
This follows from the fact that Φ preserves equalities, and from the fact that
[[ ]] is sound.
Corollary 3.2 (Soundness and Completeness for ILL(C))
For terms ∆ `ILL(C) M :A and ∆ `ILL(C) N :A, ∆ `M = N : A if and only if
[[ ; ∆ ` Φ(M):A]] = [[ ; ∆ ` Φ(N):A]]
in the SMCC part of every DILL(C)-model.
79
Proof Clearly by completeness, [[ ; ∆ ` Φ(M) : A]] = [[ ; ∆ ` Φ(N) : A]] iff
; ∆ `DILL(C) Φ(M) = Φ(N) : A, and this is true iff ∆ ` M = N : A by our
translation results.
Hence we have shown that ILL(C) is complete for DILL(C)-models.
Relating DILL(C)-models and Cambridge Models
We now recall that together with the original presentation of ILL(C), in [BBdPH93b],
a categorical model was given based on a SMCC with a comonoidal comonad.
These models were referred to as linear categories, or sometimes as Cambridge
categories. It is natural to ask how this model of linear logic relates to the
DILL(C)-models we have used, and indeed this question has been considered in
detail by Benton in [Ben95a], with respect to his LNL-models. We summarise
two of his results.
Lemma 3.5.2 ([Ben95a], Corollary 8)
Any LNL-model has as its SMCC part a linear category.
Lemma 3.5.3 ( [Ben95a], Corollary 17)
Any linear category is the SMCC part of at least one LNL-model.
This last lemma is of particular interest because the construction of a suitable
CC part to make the LNL-model can be accomplished in a variety of ways. We
can now prove the following lemma, which neatly confirms the claim made in
[BBdPH93a]:
Theorem 4 (ILL(C) and linear categories)
For two terms ∆ `ILL(C) M :A and ∆ `ILL(C) N :A of ILL(C), ∆ `ILL(C) M = N :
A iff
[[ ; ∆ ` Φ(M):A]]L = [[ ; ∆ ` Φ(N):A]]L
in every DILL(C)-model L.
Proof We have via completeness that [[ ; ∆ ` Φ(M):A]]L = [[ ; ∆ ` Φ(N):A]]L
iff ; ∆ `DILL(C) Φ(M) = Φ(N) : A, and by translation results that this is true iff




We now present a generalised linear type-theory, which consists of a basic struc-
tural part similar to the structural part of DILL, operator rules for operators in a
given signature, and axiomatic equalities over terms given by a primitive axiom
set. This linear type-theory is general enough to have as instances both DILL(C)
and also all the static action calculi of Milner.
4.1 Introduction
Operators
Historically, many intuitionistic logics and typing systems have been constructed
on the familiar foundation of the intuitionistic axiom Γ, A ` A and cut rule
Γ ` A Γ, A ` B
Γ ` B
including some typing systems which are not based on any other logical struc-
ture. In order to consider such systems, we recall Aczel’s general binding oper-







where formulae A and B are discharged from the assumptions. More generally,
we will allow a general operator rule to take an arbitrary number of proofs as ar-
guments, and to discharge any assumptions from those proofs, giving a deduction
of any formula. A suitable definition of operator along these lines encompasses
all the common introduction and elimination rules of most logics based on these
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structural rules. Now consider annotations of proofs with terms in such a sys-
tem. The type theoretic formulation corresponding to the ∨-elimination rule
given above involves a “cases construction”:
Γ, x:A ` u:C Γ, y :B ` v :C Γ ` t:A∨B
Γ ` cases((x:A)u, (y :B)v, t):C
Here, notice that the discharging of assumptions A and B in the operator rule
corresponds via the Curry-Howard correspondence to the binding of the variables
x and y in u and v, the annotations of the corresponding deduction, respectively.
The typing rule for a general such operator is:
Γ, ~x1 : ~A1 ` t1 :B1 . . .Γ, ~xr : ~Ar ` tr :Br Γ ` u1 :C1 . . .Γ ` us :Cs
Γ ` K((~x1 : ~A1)t1, . . . , (~xr : ~Ar)tr, u1, . . . , us):B
where each ~xi : ~Ai denotes the sequence of distinct variables which are bound in
the ith component. This general theory can be pushed through into the semantics
as well, yielding a model in which operators are interpreted as natural transform-
ations between the hom-sets representing proofs of the appropriate types.
Linearity
Considering DILL(C) and its properties, we notice that many of the characterising
rules, which in ILL(C) involve the type constructor !, in DILL(C) arise as properties
of the structural rules. Consider the ‘structural fragment’ of the logic DILL(C),
which consists of the following rules:
(Int− Ax) Γ, A; ` A (Lin− Ax) Γ;A ` A
and the (derivable) cut rules:
Γ; ∆1 ` A Γ; ∆2, A ` B
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` B
(L− Cut) Γ; ` A Γ, A; ∆2 ` BΓ; ∆ ` B (I − Cut)
We can see within the rules which are admissible in this very restricted system
that we clearly have intuitionistic structure, given by the intuitionistic axiom and
cut rules, and correspondingly linear structure, given by the linear axiom and cut
rules. In the same way as many systems are viewed as intuitionistic by virtue of
the structural rules they have as a basis, many systems are viewed and described
as ‘linear’ due to their use of the linear structural rules and context maintenance
disciplines, whilst not being based on the full linear logic. Hence we might well
wish to consider a system of general operators based on the structural fragment
of DILL(C), along the same lines as that described above.
82
First, however, there is one more important generalisation to make. When
we consider the logic DILL(C), we see that a sequent Γ; ∆ ` A is equivalent to
a sequent ; !Γ; ∆ ` A. This reflects an underlying fact about the logic, which
is that all types are viewed as linear, and the intuitionistic fragment of the lo-
gical system is constructed over the linear types. Now in many applications, for
example Moggi’s computational λ-calculus [Mog89], exactly the opposite view is
taken, which is to say that all types are essentially intuitionistic (or value types),
and that the linearly constructed type-system over them is viewed as a a system
of computations. Clearly, in order to account for these equally valid and inter-
changeable views, it makes sense for us to allow both intuitionistic and linear
types. In keeping however with the approach of DILL(C), which is focussed more
on the linearity of a system, we will view intuitionistic types or formulae as a
subset of linear types or formulae.
Therefore, we will take a general sequent Γ; ∆ ` A in which the formulae in
Γ must be intuitionistic, and those in ∆, A are linear, although since each intu-
itionistic type is also linear they may be intuitionistic. If we write Q for a general
intuitionistic formula and A for a general linear formula, then the structural rules
are as follows:
(Int− Ax) Γ, Q; ` Q (Lin− Ax) Γ;A ` A
with the (derivable) cut rules:
Γ; ∆1 ` A Γ; ∆2, A ` B
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` B
(L− Cut) Γ; ` Q Γ, Q; ∆2 ` A
Γ; ∆ ` A (I − Cut)
and the new rule:
Γ; ∆1 ` Q Γ, Q; ∆2 ` A
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` A
(F )
Now this new F -rule is needed because in general, we have another cut-like
operation which allows us to use the image of the intuitionistic structure (weak-
ening and contraction) in the linear part on an intuitionistic type. This was not
needed previously as we had no intuitionistic types.
Given this framework, a general operator will be able to bind arbitrary se-
quences of linear and intuitionistic variables in each of its arguments. It is also
convenient to allow a sequent-style presentation of the operator theory, in which
as well as discharging assumptions (binding variables) an operator instance can
introduce new assumptions (free variables). This generalisation does not change
the expressive power of the system, but is convenient for the representation of the
operators we shall consider. We will discuss this further after the typing system
has been introduced.
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The final amendment which we will make to the straightforward introduction
of operators into this framework is in considering naturality. As can be seen
simply by considering the form of the typing rule for the cases-construct and its
corresponding operator, substitution for any variable in the intuitionistic context
Γ commutes through the application of the operator transparently. This corres-
ponds to the interpretation of operators of this kind as natural transformations
in the semantics. However, in the case where we have two distinct parts to the
typing context, we might ask what the corresponding property is on interpreta-
tion. It turns out that to allow such transparent substitution on the intuitionistic
context is to insist that an operator be natural in the linear category over the
intuitionistic category, and to allow such transparent substitution in the linear
context is to insist that an operator be natural in the linear category over the
linear category.
Considering the operators we will be using, not all of them are linearly nat-
ural in each argument, and so we allow a general operator to have two sets of
arguments, one in which it is only intuitionistically natural and one in which it
is linearly natural as well.
4.2 The Generalised Logic
Firstly, we present the propositions of the logic. We assume two sets MI ⊆ ML of
primitive intuitionistic propositions and primitive linear propositions, ranged over
by Q,R . . . and A,B . . . respectively. (Note that we have overloaded A,B . . . to
refer both to formulae of DILL and linear arities; where it is not clear from the
context, we shall explicitly state which reading is intended.) Now a generalised
logical context is a pair consisting of a set of intuitionistic formulae and a multiset
of linear formulae. In the usual way, we write such a pair as Γ; ∆, where Γ is the
intuitionistic part, or set of intuitionistic formulae, and ∆ is the linear part, or
multiset of linear formulae.
We also assume two sets OI ⊆ OL of operators, ranged over by O . . . . To each
of these operators is associated an arity of the form:
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)Br ; (~Q′1; ~A′1)B′1, . . . , (~Q′s; ~A′s)B′s
(~Q′′; ~A′′)B′′
where we insist that any operator in OI which we will call intuitionistic, must
have an arity of the form:
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)Br;
(; )R
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Together, the sets MI , ML, OI and OL make up a generalised signature ; we
let such generalised signatures be ranged over by O = (MI ,ML,OI,OL).
The general form of the arity of an operator given above should be read
as saying that the operator O has r arguments in which it is intuitionistically
natural, and s arguments in which it is intuitionistically and linearly natural.
We consider operators which have arguments that they are not linearly natural
in because several operators of interest fall into this category, notably the !-
operator of DILL(C) and the operators of Milner’s action calculi, which all are
only intuitionistically natural. The general form for the arity of an intuitionistic
operator also given above is more restricted because of certain properties we will
require of all such operators, in the equality of the type-theory. The leading
example of an intuitionistic operator is given by the !-introduction of DILL(C),
which in this framework will be an intuitionistic operator of arity:
(; )A;
(; )!A
because intuitively it represents the lifting of a general linear term to be in the
intuitionistic world.
Though the general operator signature is quite complex, it would be possible to
start with a signature containing just intuitionistically natural operators, and to
define these less primitive notions using the equality theory; for example we could
equip a simple type theory with a linearly natural operator by giving it a family
of intuitionistically natural operators and adding certain equality judgements to
the set of axioms of the type theory.
Before proceeding, we introduce some notation. Many operators that we will
introduce have a general arity in which either r or s is zero, or they have no binding
behaviour for a given argument. We will represent this absence of arguments or
binding behaviour by the absence of any marker- for example, the operator ! with
no linearly natural arguments and just one intuitionistically natural argument
with no binding behaviour has arity:
(; )A ;
(; )!A
We can now present the logic, which we call Lin(O).
Definition 4.2.1 (The Logic Lin(O))
We say that a sequent Γ; ∆ ` A can be derived, for a linear formula A and a
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generalised logical context Γ; ∆, if this can be shown using the following rules:
(Int−Ax) Γ, Q; ` Q (Lin− Ax) Γ;A ` A
Γ; ∆1 ` Q Q,Γ; ∆2 ` A
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` A F
Γ, ~Q1; ~A1 ` B1 . . . Γ, ~Qr; ~Ar ` Br
Γ, ~Q′1; ∆1, ~A
′
1 ` B′1 . . . Γ, ~Q′s; ∆s, ~A′s ` B′s
Γ; ∆′1 ` Q′′1 . . . Γ; ∆′r′ ` Q′′r′
Γ; ∆′′1 ` A′′1 . . . Γ; ∆′′s′ ` A′′s′
Γ; ∆ ` B′′ (O)
where ∆ = ∆1, . . . ,∆s,∆′1, . . .∆′r′,∆′′1, . . . ,∆′′s′ and where this last rule may be
used for any operator O ∈ OL having arity:
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)Br ; (~Q′1; ~A′1)B′1, . . . , (~Q′s; ~A′s)B′s
(~Q′′; ~A′′)B′′
where ~Q′′ = Q′′1 . . . Q′′r′ and ~A′′ = A′′1 . . . A′′s′.
We briefly explain these rules. The axioms are self-explanatory, and familiar
from the presentation of DILL. The F -rule, which resembles a non-conventional
intuitionistic cut, is justified because it is only allowed in the case where the
‘cut’ formula is intuitionistic. For the operator rule, we assume a derivation of
each of the sequents appearing above the line in order to deduce the sequent
below the line. The rule assumes firstly premises for the linearly natural and
the intuitionistically natural arguments of the operator, and secondly premises
demonstrating the propositions which are the fresh inputs of the conclusion of
the operator. These are necessary so that both the appropriate cut rules will be
admissible for the logic, or equivalently to give an adequate notion of substitution
in the type theory.
The Structural rules
Given the operator rule presented above, we have the following three structural
rules, as expected; a weakening rule and linear and intuitionistic cut rules:
Γ; ∆ ` A
Γ, Q; ∆ ` A Weak
Γ; ∆1 ` A Γ; ∆2, A ` B
Γ; ∆1,∆2 ` B L
Γ; ` Q Γ, Q; ∆ ` A
Γ; ∆ ` A I
These are all admissible. We note that the intuitionistic cut is redundant in
this logical setting since it is a special case of the F -rule. This redundancy will
disappear in the type-theory because these two rules will have different actions
on terms, in general.
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4.3 The Typing System Lin(O)
Having given this logic, we can now proceed to annotate its contexts and deriva-
tions with variables and terms respectively. We assume the same set of variables
used in DILL(C), X, ranged over as before by x, y . . . , and construct pre-terms as
follows:
Definition 4.3.1 (Pre-Terms)
We define pre-terms over a signature (MI ,ML,OI,OL), ranged over by v, w . . .
as follows:
v ::=x | let x:Q be v in v
| O((~x: ~Q; ~x: ~A)v, . . . , (~x: ~Q; ~x: ~A)v; (~x: ~Q; ~x: ~A)v, . . . , (~x: ~Q; ~x: ~A)v)(~v;~v)
where we have an operator clause for every operator O ∈ OL.
We omit typing information in pre-terms where convenient. The binding beha-
viour of the let construct is familiar, and the operator construct
O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y
′










1, . . . , w
′
s′)
binds the variables ~xi and ~yi in vi for all i from 1 to r, and the variables ~x′j and
~y′j in wj respectively for all j = 1 . . . s. We assume the usual capture-avoiding
substitution v{w/x} and we may also use a simultaneous form v{~w/~x}.
We can now define the notion of the multiset of free variables of a pre-term v,
which we write FV(v), unambiguously overloading our previous notation. In the
following, we again use the mixed complement M−S, where M is a multiset and
S is a set, for the multiset resulting when all copies of anything in S are removed
from M .
FV(x) = {x}
FV(let x be v in w) = (FV(w)− {x})∪ FV(v)
FV(O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y
′




















We again recall the definitions of appendix A, and add to them by saying that
a linear typing is a typing of a variable from the set X with a linear type, and
conversely an intuitionistic typing is a typing of a variable with an intuitionistic
type. Then an intuitionistic typing sequence is a sequence of intuitionistic typings,
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and similarly for linear typing sequences. Then a typing context is a pair of an
intuitionistic typing sequence and a linear typing sequence, written as usual as
Γ; ∆ where Γ is the intuitionistic part and ∆ is the linear part.
We now give the typing rules of the generalised type system over a signature
O, which we will refer to again as Lin(O).
Definition 4.3.2 (The Typing Rules of Lin(O))
We say a typing judgement Γ; ∆ ` v :A can be derived, for a typing context Γ; ∆,
a pre-term v and a linear type A, when this can be shown using the following
rules:
(I − Ax) Γ, x:Q,Γ′; ` x:Q (L− Ax) Γ; x:A ` x:A
Γ; ∆1 ` v :Q x:Q,Γ; ∆2 ` w:A
Γ; ∆ ` let x:Q be v in w:A (F ) (where ∆ = ∆1#∆2)
Γ, ~x1 : ~Q1; ~y1 : ~A1 ` v1 :B1 . . . Γ, ~xr : ~Qr; ~yr : ~Ar ` vr :Br






1 ` w1 :B′1 . . .
Γ, ~x′s : ~Q′s; ∆s, ~y′s : ~A′s ` ws :B′s
Γ; ∆′1 ` v′1 :Q′′1 . . . Γ; ∆′r′ ` v′s :Q′′r′
Γ; ∆′′1 ` w′1 :A′′1 . . . Γ; ∆′′s′ ` w′s′ :A′′s′
Γ; ∆ ` O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y′1)w1, . . . , (~x′s; ~y′s)ws)(v′1, . . . , v′r′;w′1, . . . , w′s′):B′′
(O)




1 . . .∆
′′
s′, and there is an instance of
this last rule for any operator O with arity
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)Br ; (~Q′1; ~A′1)B′1, . . . , (~Q′s; ~A′s)B′s
(~Q′′; ~A′′)B′′
where ~Q′′ = Q′′1 . . . Q′′r′ and ~A′′ = A′′1 . . . A′′s′.
Definition 4.3.3 (Term)
For a typing context Γ; ∆ and a linear type A, a Γ; ∆-term v having type A of
Lin(O) is a pre-term of Lin(O) such that we can derive Γ; ∆ ` v :A. We will often
say “the term Γ; ∆ ` v :A” meaning “the Γ; ∆ term v of type A”.
We now say that, given a typing judgement Γ; ∆ ` v :A, a variable x ∈ FV(v)
is an intuitionistic free variable of v if it occurs in dom(Γ), and x ∈ FV(v) is an
linear free variable of v if it occurs in dom(∆).
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Operators and Natural Deduction
Now that we have presented the basic typing system and shown how operators
are assigned arities, it is worth discussing the process by which a sequent-style
operator rule becomes a natural deduction typing rule. Our presentation of op-
erators as primitives has been sequent-style from the outset, since we allow new
assumptions in the result of an operator. If we were to directly adopt the operator
arity rule as the logical rule for the operator, then in our natural deduction system
a cut into one of these new assumptions would not be eliminable. In fact, this
problem is a generalisation of a problem which historically arose in connection




In that rule, we intuitively bind all the inputs !Γ and introduce fresh ones of the
same types, since this operator is not linearly natural. However, if we take this
rule then it is not possible to eliminate a cut into one of the assumptions. The
solution to this problem as proposed by Benton et al. was to incorporate the
possibility of a cut into any of the assumptions, giving the rule:
∆1 `!B1 . . . ∆r `!Br !B1 . . .!Br ` A
∆1, . . .∆r `!A Prom
′
This is precisely the approach we have adopted, incorporating the possibility
of a cut into any new assumption in the output of an operator, and this approach
is the canonical way of turning a sequent system into a natural deduction one.
We choose to work with sequent-style operators partly because they are easier
to work with and also since Milner’s action calculi have a sequent-style approach
inherited from their categorical underpinning.
We can now prove the following typing properties of Lin(O).
Lemma 4.3.4 (Typing Properties)
We have the following in the system Lin(O):
Free Variables I If Γ; ∆ ` v :A, then the underlying set of the multiset FV(v)
is a subset of dom(Γ) ∪ dom(∆).
Free Variables II If Γ; x:A,∆ ` v :B, then x occurs precisely once in FV(v).
Strengthening If Γ, x:Q; ∆ ` v :B and x 6∈ FV(v), then Γ; ∆ ` v :B.
I-Transfer If Γ; ∆, x:Q ` v :A, then Γ, x:Q; ∆ ` v :A.
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Unique Derivation Given a typing context Γ; ∆ and a linear type A, for each
Γ; ∆ term v of type A there is a unique derivation of the typing judgement
Γ; ∆ ` v :A. Further, given a pre-term v ad a typing context Γ; ∆, there is
at most one A such that v is a Γ; ∆-term of type A.
The proofs of these properties are simple. For example, we prove that every
term has a unique derivation.
Proof We can prove this by induction over the pre-term structure of v. If
the pre-term is a variable, it is clear that there is only one possible derivation,
which will use the intuitionistic or linear axiom depending on where the variable
is typed in the context. If the pre-term is a let-clause, say let x:Q be v in w, we
know that all the linear free variables of v and w are typed in ∆. But then since
each distinct free variable must occur either in v or w, we know that ∆ = ∆1#∆2
where ∆2 is the unique subsequence of ∆ which types precisely the linear free
variables of v and ∆2 is the unique subsequence which types precisely the linear
free variables in w. Now, if we take ∆ = ∆′1#∆
′
2, where ∆1 6= ∆′1 and ∆2 6= ∆′2,
we can see by our free variable lemma that v will not be a Γ; ∆′1 − Q term and
w will not be a Γ; ∆′2 term of type A. Hence the only possible typing derivation
of the let x:Q be v in w is constructed from the unique derivation of the typings
Γ; ∆1 ` v :Q and Γ; ∆2 ` w:A. If the pre-term is an operator instance
O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y
′






we have precisely the multiary case of the same problem, where we have a unique
partition of ∆ into subsequences based on the linear free variables of the ~w~v′ ~w′.

The Substitution Rules
We can now give typed versions of the two cut rules given earlier, with some other
typed structural rules:
Γ, x:Q, y :R,Γ′; ∆ ` v :A
Γ, y :R, x:Q,Γ′; ∆ ` v :A (I − Exch)
Γ; ∆, y :B, x:A,∆′ ` v :C
Γ; ∆, x:A, y :B,∆′ ` v :C (L− Exch)
Γ; ∆ ` v :A
Γ, x:Q; ∆ ` v :A (Weak)
Γ, x:Q, y :Q; ∆ ` v :A
Γ, x:Q; ∆ ` v{x/y}:A (Cont)
Γ; ` w:Q Γ, x:Q; ∆ ` v :A
Γ; ∆ ` v{w/x}:A (I − Cut)
Γ; ∆1 ` w:A Γ; ∆2, x:A ` v :B
Γ; ∆ ` v{w/x}:B (L− Cut)
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where in the linear cut rule, ∆ = ∆1#∆2. These are all admissible typing
rules. In particular, the linear exchange is admissible by virtue of the merging
that we have incorporated into the F and O rules.
Constants
It will be convenient to consider a particular class of operators, those with arity
;
(; )A
for some A ∈ ML. An operator O of this form for a given A will have a typing
rule of the form:
Γ; ` O(; )(; ):A
We will refer to such an operator as a constant of arity A, and abbreviate the
term form O(; )(; ) as O where convenient.
4.4 The Type Theory Lin(O,A)
We will now present the equality judgement of the type theory. This has two
parts, in a similar way to the typing system. We have the structural equality
judgements for congruence and the F -equality, and we also assume an axiom set
of typed equalities (to capture the behaviour of the operators).
First we need to define the notion of term-context, in order to define congru-
ence. We define a pre-context, written C[ ], as follows:
C[ ] ::= | let x be C[ ] in v | let x be v in C[ ] |
O((~x; ~x)v, . . . , (~x; ~x)C[ ], . . . , (~x; ~x)v; (~x; ~x)v, . . . , (~x; ~x)v)(~v;~v)
| O((~x; ~x)v, . . . , (~x; ~x)v; (~x; ~x)v, . . . , (~x; ~x)C[ ], . . . , (~x; ~x)v)(~v;~v)
| O((~x; ~x)v, . . . , (~x; ~x)v; (~x; ~x)v, . . . , (~x; ~x)v)(v . . .C[ ] . . . v;~v)
| O((~x; ~x)v, . . . , (~x; ~x)v; (~x; ~x)v, . . . , (~x; ~x)v)(~v; v . . . C[ ] . . . v)
Now define the instantiation of a pre-context C[ ] by a pre-term v, written
C[v], as the pre-context C[ ] but with the unique occurrence of replaced by
the pre-term v. It is easy to show that the instantiation of any pre-context by a
pre-term is a pre-term.
Definition 4.4.1 (Term Context)
A Γ; ∆−A/Γ′; ∆′ −B-term context of Lin(O) is a pre-context C[ ] such that for
any term Γ; ∆ ` v :A of Lin(O), we have a derivation of the typing judgement
Γ′; ∆′ ` C[v]:B.
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As before, this definition of contexts is not inductive, but could be equivalently
presented in an inductive form.
An equality judgement over the typing system Lin(O) has the form Γ; ∆ ` v =
w:A, where v and w are both Γ; ∆-terms of type A.
An axiom set is a set of typed equality judgements. We let A range over axiom
sets. We now define intuitionistic terms:
Definition 4.4.2 (Intuitionistic Term)
A Γ; -term is intuitionistic if it is an instance of the following inductive definition:
v ::= x | O((~x; ~x)v, . . . , (~x; ~x)v; )(; )
for some intuitionistic operator O.
We can now define the derivable equality judgements of the type-theory Lin(O)
over the axiom set A.
Definition 4.4.3 (The Equality of Lin(O) over A)
An equality judgement Γ; ∆ ` v = w :A is derivable if it is present in the axiom
set A or is derivable using the following rules:
(Refl) Γ; ∆ ` v = v :A
Γ; ∆ ` v = w:A Γ; ∆ ` w = w′ :A
Γ; ∆ ` v = w′ :A (Trans)
Γ; ∆ ` v = w:A
Γ; ∆ ` w = v :A (Sym)
Γ; ∆ ` v = w:A
Γ′; ∆′ ` C[v] = C[w]:B (Cong)
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where C[ ] is a Γ; ∆−A/Γ′; ∆′ −B term-context.
(F − βv) Γ; ∆ ` let x be v in w = w{v/x}:A
where Γ; ` v :Q is an intuitionistic term
(F − η) Γ; ∆ ` let x be v in x = v :Q
(cc− 1) Γ; ∆ ` let x be v in (let y be w in w′) = let y be (let x be v in w) in w′ :A
where x is not free in w′ and y is not free in v
(cc− 2) Γ; ∆ ` let x be v in (let y be w in w′) = let y be w in (let x be v in w′):A
where x is not free in w and y is not free in v
(cc− 3) Γ; ∆ ` let x be v in O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y′1)w1, . . . , (~x′s; ~y′s)ws)(~v′;w′1 . . .w′s′) =
O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y
′





′;w′1 . . . (let x be v in w
′
i) . . .w
′
s′):A
where x does not occur free other than possibly in w′i
(cc− 4) Γ; ∆ ` let x be v in O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y′1)w1, . . . , (~x′s; ~y′s)ws)(v′1 . . . v′r′ ; ~w′) =
O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y
′
1)w1, . . . , (~x
′
s; ~y′s)ws)(v′1 . . . (let x be v in v
′




where x does not occur free other than possibly in v′i
(cc− 5) Γ; ∆ ` let x′ be w in O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y′1)w1, . . . , (~x′s; ~y′s)ws)(~w′;~v′) =
O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y
′






where x′ does not occur free other than possibly in vi
We refer to the type-theory with typing system Lin(O) over axiom set A as
Lin(O,A).
In considering the axioms, the least intuitive are clearly the commuting con-
versions. These can be understood by noting that we allow the let -construct to
commute into any linearly natural argument place of an operator, or into any of
the terms which are incorporated for the free assumptions, as these are not bound
by the operator.
Output Naturality
The notion of output naturality is less important than those of intuitionistic and
linear naturality, but it is still worth defining as it will prove very convenient.
In fact, every operator corresponding to an elimination rule of DILL(C) will be
output-natural, and the equalities in the definition will be precisely the commut-
ing conversions of these operators.
Definition 4.4.4 (Output-Parameterised Family)
We say that a typing system Lin(O) has an output-parameterised family of oper-
ators O if O is a set of operators indexed by the set ML, and the element of the
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set indexed by the type (or proposition) C, written OC , has arity;
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)(Br); (~Q′1; ~A′1)B′1, . . . , (~Q′s−1; ~A′s−1)B′s−1, (~Q′s; ~A′s)(C)
(~Q′′; ~A′′)(C)
where position s is distinguished and s ≥ 1. We will say that the output-
parameterised family has arity:
















Definition 4.4.5 (Output Naturality)
Given a type-theory Lin(O,A), an output-parameterised family O with arity:
















is output natural if assuming the following:
• that we have Γ~xi : ~Qi; ~yi: ~Ai ` vi :Bi for i = 1 . . . r
• that we have Γ, ~y′j : ~Q′j; ∆j, ~xj : ~A′j ` wj :Bj for j = 1 . . . s,
• that we have Γ; ∆′, x′′ :Bs ` w:C,
• that we have Γ; ∆′′i′ ` w′i′ :Q′′i′ for i′ = 1 . . . r′, where ~Q′′ = Q′′1 . . . Q′′r′,
• and that we have Γ; ∆′′′j′ ` v′j′ :A′′j′ for j′ = 1 . . . s′, where ~A′′ = A′′1 . . . A′′s′.
we have the following equality judgement:
Γ; ∆ `w{OBs((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y′1)w1, . . . , (~x′s; ~y′s)ws)(~v′; ~w′)/x′′}
= OC((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y
′









1# . . .#∆
′′
s′. We let ONat(O, O)
be the set of all such equalities for an operator O in the typing system Lin(O).
We note here that since any operator which is part of an output-parameterised
set of operators in a given typing system Lin(O) has at least one linearly-natural
argument (by definition), no such operator can be intuitionistic.
As an example of an output-natural operator, consider the set of operators
given by the ⊗ − L-rule of DILL(C). In this framework, it is an output-natural
operator set of arity:
; (;AB)( )
(;A⊗B)( )
and the equalities specified by the definition of output-naturality are just the
commuting conversions of this term construct in DILL(C).
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Chapter 5
The Semantics of Lin(O,A)
We will now give a semantics for the type theory Lin(O,A). Just as the underlying
structural rules of the logic and type-theory capture the essence of the interaction
between linear and intuitionistic behaviour, we expect the models of the underly-
ing structural rules of the type theory to have just the essential structure required
to model this interaction. In fact, the models we will use for Lin(O,A) will be
based on a cartesian category interpreting the intuitionistic types, a symmetric
monoidal category interpreting the linear types, and a monoidal functor from the
cartesian category to the symmetric monoidal category. Operators will then be
modelled as natural transformations on hom-sets, and theories will be imposed as
sets of equalities on arrows. Having given this framework, we then get soundness
and completeness results for the models, and further we get an initiality result
for an appropriate category of small models and morphisms.
5.1 The Interpretation
We refer once again to the primitive categorical definitions of appendix A.2, and
their numbered equalities.
The carrier of a Lin(O)-model is a triple (C,S, F ) such that C is a strict
cartesian category, S is a strict symmetric monoidal category and F : C → S is a
strict monoidal functor.
Definition 5.1.1 (Lin(O)-Interpretation)
An interpretation of the typing system Lin(O), which we write G, is a carrier
(C,S, F ) together with:
• primitive interpretation functions [[ ]]GMI : MI → obj(C) and [[ ]]
G
ML : ML →




• for each operator O ∈ OL having arity
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)Br ; (~Q′1; ~A′1)B′1, . . . , (~Q′s; ~A′s)B′s
(~Q′′; ~A′′)B′′
a natural transformation
[[O]]GOL :(×i=1...rS(F (=)⊗ [[ ~Qi; ~Ai]]
G, [[Bi]]GML))×
(×j=1...sS(F (=)⊗ [[ ~Q′j]]⊗ ( j)⊗ [[ ~A′j]]G, [[B′j]]GML))
→ S(F (=)⊗ [[ ~Q′′]]⊗ (⊗j=1...s( s))⊗ [[ ~A′′]]G, [[B′′]]GML)
which is natural independently in each of the s + 1 arguments (=) and
( 1), . . . , ( s), and where the interpretation [[ ]]G is extended to arbitrary
contexts in the obvious way, as given shortly,
• for each operator O ∈ OI having arity
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)Br;
(; )R
a natural transformation
[[O]]GOI :×i=1...r S(F (=)⊗ [[ ~Qi; ~Ai]]
G, [[Bi]]GML)
→ C(=, [[Q′′]]GC)
where the interpretation is again given shortly, such that for all objects X
of C and all arrows fi : F (X)⊗ [[ ~Qi; ~Ai]]→ [[Bi]] where i = 1 . . . r in S,
[[O]]GOL(X)(f1, . . . , fr) = F ([[O]]
G
OI(X)(f1, . . . , fr))
Where the particular interpretation we are referring to is clear, we will omit
the superscript G on the interpretation function [[ ]].
We now proceed to extend the definition of the interpretation function [[ ]]G to
terms for an arbitrary model G of Lin(O).
Definition 5.1.2 (The Interpretation on Contexts)
First, for a sequence of linear types A1 . . . Ar, define [[A1 . . . Ar]]G = A1⊗ . . .⊗Ar.
Further, define [[Q1 . . .Qs]]GC = Q1× . . .×Qs for a sequence of intuitionistic types
Q1 . . . Qs. Now, for a pair of a sequence of intuitionistic types and a sequence
of linear types ~Q; ~A, define [[ ~Q; ~A]]G = F ([[ ~Q]]GC) ⊗ [[ ~A]]G. Finally overload these
notations to sequences of typings and typing contexts using the function | |; for
example, for a generalised typing context Γ; ∆ define [[Γ; ∆]]G = [[|Γ|; |∆|]]G. Note
that [[Γ; ∆]]G = [[ ; Γ,∆]]G.
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~Q]]→ [[ ~Q]]⊗ [[ ~Q]]
merge∆1,∆2,∆ : [[∆]]→ [[∆1]]⊗ [[∆2]]
mmerger∆1,... ,∆r,∆ : [[∆]]→ [[∆1]]⊗ . . .⊗ [[∆r]]
str′Γ,∆1,∆2,∆ : [[Γ; ∆]]→ [[Γ; ∆1]]⊗ [[Γ; ∆2]]
mstrrΓ,∆1,... ,∆r,∆ : [[Γ; ∆]]→ [[Γ; ∆1]]⊗ . . .⊗ [[Γ; ∆r]]
as follows:
disc′~Q = F (d[[~Q]]C)
dup′~Q = F (c[[~Q]]C)
merge∆1,∆2,∆ =

idI where ∆ = ∆1 = ∆2 =
id[[A]] ⊗merge∆′1,∆2,∆′ where ∆1 = x:A,∆
′
1 and ∆ = x:A,∆′
id[[A]] ⊗merge∆1,∆′2,∆′;
s[[A]],[[∆1]] ⊗ id[[∆′2]] where ∆2 = x:A,∆
′
2 and ∆ = x:A,∆′
mmerger∆1,... ,∆r,∆ =
id[[∆]] if r = 1merge∆1,(∆2,... ,∆s+2); id[[∆1]] ⊗mmerges+1∆2,... ,∆s+2 where r = s+ 2
str′Γ,∆1,∆2,∆ = dup
′
Γ ⊗merge∆1,∆2,∆; id[[Γ]] ⊗ s[[Γ]],[[∆]] ⊗ id[[∆2]]
mstrrΓ,∆1,... ,∆r,∆ =
id[[Γ;∆]] if r = 1strΓ,∆1,(∆2,... ,∆s+2); id[[Γ;∆1]] ⊗mstrs+1Γ,∆2,... ,∆s+2 if r = s+ 2
Definition 5.1.3 (The Interpretation on Terms)
We will interpret a term Γ; ∆ ` v :A by induction over the unique derivation of
the typing judgement.
Intuitionistic Axiom In this case, we take
[[Γ, x:Q,Γ′; ` x:Q]] = disc′Γ ⊗ id[[Q]] ⊗ disc′Γ′
Linear Axiom In this case, we take
[[Γ; x:A ` x:A]] = disc′Γ ⊗ id[[A]]
The F Rule Assuming that [[Γ; ∆1 ` v :Q]] = f and [[Γ, x :Q; ∆2 ` w :A]] = g,
we take
[[Γ; ∆ ` let x be v in w:A]] = str′Γ,∆1,∆2,∆; f ⊗ id[[Γ;∆2]]; s[[Γ]],[[Q]]⊗ id[[∆2]]; g
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The Operator Rule Given an operator O of arity:
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)Br ; (~Q′1; ~A′1)B′1, . . . , (~Q′s; ~A′s)B′s
(~Q′′; ~A′′)B′′
where ~Q′ = Q′1 . . . Q′s and ~A′ = A′1 . . . A′s′, assume
• that [[Γ, ~xi: ~Qi; ~yi : ~Ai ` vi:Bi]] = fi for i = 1 . . . r,
• that [[Γ; ~x′j : ~Q′j; ∆j, ~yj;: ~A′j ` wj :B′j]] = gj for j = 1 . . . s,
• that [[Γ; ∆′i′ ` vi′ :Q′′i′]] = f ′i′ for i′ = 1 . . . r′,
• that [[Γ; ∆′′j′ ` w′j′ :A′′j′]] = g′j′ for j′ = 1 . . . s′
Now we take










; (f ′1 ⊗ . . .⊗ f ′r′ ⊗ id[[∆1,... ,∆s]] ⊗ ‘g′1 ⊗ . . .⊗ g′s′);
[[O]]OL([[Γ]]C, [[∆1]], . . . , [[∆s]])(f1, . . . , fr, g1, . . . , gs)
We can also make an auxiliary definition:
Definition 5.1.4 (The Interpretation on Intuitionistic Terms)
Define the interpretation [[ ]]GC which takes intuitionistic terms Γ; ` v :A to ar-
rows [[Γ; ]]GC → [[A]]GMI in the cartesian part of the model as follows:
Intuitionistic Axiom In this case, we take
[[Γ, x:Q,Γ′; ` x:Q]]C = πr+1+sr+1
where Γ = y1 :R1 . . . yr :Rr and Γ′ = y′1 :R′1 . . . y′s :R′s.
The Operator Rule In this case, we take
[[Γ; ` O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; )(; ):R]]C = [[O]]C([[Γ]]C)(f1, . . . , fr)
where for i = 1 . . . r we have [[Γ, ~xi: ~Qi; ~yi : ~Ai ` vi:Bi]] = fi in S.
We now define the models of the type theory Lin(O,A).
Definition 5.1.5 (Lin(O,A)-Model)
A Lin(O,A) model G is a Lin(O) interpretation such that: for each typed equality
judgement Γ; ∆ ` v = w:A in A, we have [[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]G = [[Γ; ∆ ` w:A]]G.
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5.2 Soundness
We now show that the equality judgement of Lin(O,A) is soundly mapped into
any model of the type theory Lin(O,A).
First we state two lemmas on the interpretations of the two admissible sub-
stitution rules.
Lemma 5.2.1 (Intuitionistic Substitution)
For any Lin(O,A) model G, given [[Γ,Γ′; ` v :Q]]G = f , where v is intuitionistic
and [[Γ, x:Q,Γ′; ∆ ` w:A]]G = g, we have:
[[Γ,Γ′; ∆ ` w{v/x}:A]]G = str′(Γ,Γ′),∆, ,∆; f ⊗ id[[Γ,Γ′;∆]]; s[[Q]],[[Γ]] ⊗ id[[Γ′;∆]]; g
Lemma 5.2.2 (Linear Substitution)
For any Lin(O,A) model G, given the interpretations [[Γ; ∆1 ` v :A]]G = f and
[[Γ; ∆2, x:A,∆′2 ` w:B]]G = g, we have:
[[Γ; ∆ ` w{v/x}:B]]G = str′Γ,∆1,(∆2,∆′2),∆; f ⊗ id[[Γ;∆2,∆′2]]; s[[A]],[[Γ;∆2]] ⊗ id[[∆′2]]; g
where ∆ = ∆1#(∆2,∆′2).
Theorem 5 (Soundness)
Given a Lin(O,A) model G and a provable equality Γ; ∆ ` v = w :A in Lin(O,A),
we have that:
[[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]G = [[Γ; ∆ ` w:A]]G
in the symmetric monoidal part of G.
Proof First we observe that equality of arrows is an equivalence relation, and
further that given a Γ; ∆ − A/Γ′; ∆′ − A′ context C[ ] and a term Γ; ∆ ` t :A,
the interpretation of Γ′; ∆′ ` C[t] :A′ in the internal language of the category
contains as a sub-term the interpretation of Γ; ∆ ` t :A. This implies that our
context-equality rule and equivalence rules are sound. Now by definition any
typed equality in A is soundly interpreted in G, and hence we need only to show
that the 7 axiomatic equalities of the let construct are soundly mapped into G.
Here, we give as examples the proofs for the first two equalities.
• Considering the equality Γ; ∆ ` let x be v in w = w{v/x} :A, we have that:
[[Γ; ∆ ` let x be v in w:A]]
= str′Γ, ,∆,∆; (f ⊗ id[[Γ;∆]]); s[[|Γ|]],[[Q]]ML ⊗ id[[|∆|]]; g
where [[Γ; ` v :Q]] = f and [[Γ, x :Q; ∆ ` w :A]] = g, which is precisely
[[Γ, y :Q,Γ′; ∆ ` v{y/x}:A]] according to our lemma.
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• Considering the equality Γ; ∆ ` let x be v in x = v :Q, we have that:
[[Γ; ∆ ` let x be v in x:Q]]
= str′Γ,∆, ,∆; f ⊗ id[[Γ;∆]]; s[[|Γ|]],[[Q]]ML ⊗ id[[|∆|]]; (discΓ ⊗ id[[Q]]ML )




We consider the interpretation of a constant in this semantics. By definition, a
constant O of arity A in Lin(O,A) has an interpretation in a Lin(O,A)-model G
as follows:
[[O]]GOL : {i} → S(F (=), [[A]]
G
ML)
However, natural transformations of this form are isomorphic to arrows S(I, [[A]]GML),
and so we will frequently refer to the interpretation of a constant as having this
latter form.
We now want to show completeness of Lin(O,A) with respect to its models,
which is to say that if two Γ; ∆ terms of type A have the same interpretation
in every Lin(O,A) model, then they are provably equal in Lin(O,A). This is a
familiar result for type theories and their models, and it is commonly proved
by the construction of a term model, in which the objects are types and the
morphisms are terms. In such a term model, we use the structure of the type-
theory to build the categorical structure required of the model. However, such
constructions normally depend on the existence of the appropriate functors in the
model as type constructors, for example as ⊗ occurs explicitly in DILL(C). Type-
theories such as ours which have no type-constructors as basic must therefore
be treated differently. The most one can normally hope for in these cases is
that there exists a term category in which the objects and morphisms are freely
constructed in a simple way from the types and terms of the theory; the best
example of this is the construction of a term cartesian category from sequences of
types and terms of the basic intuitionistic type-theory having only axiom and cut
rules. Operators can be added in this example, and the result extended to show
that given any operator over the objects of the free strict cartesian category on
the types of the theory, there exists a set of operators such that the term model
of the type theory over this set is isomorphic to the free strict cartesian category
with the original operator.
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This result tells us that working in the type theory without an explicit product
constructor is the same as working in the type theory with that constructor added,
even when we are allowed arbitrary operators over the types of the theory with
explicit product constructors. As an example of the method, imagine a nullary
operator (a constant) (A)B × C c in the theory with products. Clearly there is
no one operator which represents this in the theory without explicit products,
since B×C is not a type of that theory. However, we can represent the operator




, both of which
can exist in the theory without products, and prove that the resulting type theory
is equivalent to the type theory with products over the original operator c.
Unfortunately, there is no result of this kind for SMC’s and the basic linear
type theory except for the case with no operators. The problem is that given for
example a constant (A)B ⊗C c
′
in the theory with tensor, there is no equivalent
set of operators in the theory without tensors- it is not possible to represent this
as a pair since linearity demands that B and C be produced and used together.
This behaviour is inherited by our system, since it clearly incorporates the basic
linear type theory but without an explicit tensor type constructor.
The implication of this discussion is that our type theory is only expressive
enough to represent SMC’s having a certain subclass of the obvious operators, ie
those not mentioning the tensor or the unit in the outputs of either the arguments
or the results of the operator.
5.3 The Term Model
It is normal to define the term model of a type-theory using categories having as
objects and arrows elementary constructions over the types and terms of the type
theory. In particular, it is normal in the case of a linear type-theory to construct a
symmetric monoidal term category using sequences of types and terms of the type
theory. However, in this case such a construction is not rich enough in arrows, as
can be seen from the fact that any interpretation of Lin(O) has in its s.m.c. part an
arrow FX → FX⊗FX for any object X of C. The natural next step is therefore
to allow constructions of the form let x be v in ...(let y be v′ in w1 . . . wr) which
augment the sequence construction sufficiently to allow us to express the cor-
rect arrows. Unfortunately, once we have made this construction certain obvi-
ous equalities appear between constructed elements, notably the equalities which
would be commuting conversions in a type-theoretic setting. Whilst the con-
struction could be pushed through, it seems clearer to present a slightly amended
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type-theory which we can use directly to construct the term-model, and then to
relate this extended type theory to the original type theory.
We will therefore define the term Lin(O,A)-model by giving its objects and
morphisms as the types and terms of this slightly extended type theory, and then
show that this new type theory is a full and faithful extension of Lin(O,A). Hence
the completeness result follows.
Definition 5.3.1 (The Type Theory Lin
⊗(O,A))
For a signature O = (MI ,ML,OI,OL) and an axiom set A we define the type
theory Lin⊗(O,A) as Lin((M⊗I ,M⊗L ,O⊗I ,O⊗L ),A⊗), where we define M⊗I , M⊗L , O⊗I ,
O⊗L and A⊗ as follows:
• M⊗I is the set of sequences of length one each containing an element of MI ,
which we will refer to briefly as singleton sequences.
• M⊗L is the set of sequences of elements of ML. We will write a sequence ~A of
elements of ML as ⊗ ~A and may write the empty sequence of such elements
as I .
We will refer to typing contexts of Lin⊗(O,A) using the familiar Γ; ∆, and we
define a function to convert Lin(O) typing contexts to Lin⊗(O,A) typing contexts.
On sequences of linear types A1 . . .Ar, define
︷ ︸︸ ︷
A1 . . . Ar as the sequence of singleton
sequences containing A1 to Ar respectively. We extend this function to sequences
of typings and hence typing contexts by defining
︷︸︸︷
x:A = x :
︷︸︸︷
A . We also extend︷︸︸︷ to pre-terms simply by applying it to each type annotation in the pre-term,
but when we omit type annotations on pre-terms, we also omit ︷︸︸︷ on pre-terms.
Although in fact one might argue that
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆ = Γ; ∆, by identifying singletons
and the single element they contain, we retain the syntax here to help make the
distinction between the two type theories clear.
Now,



























for each operator O ∈ OL having arity:
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)Br ; (~Q′1; ~A′1)B′1, . . . , (~Q′s; ~A′s)B′s
(~Q′′; ~A′′)B′′
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with the addition of a weak tensor operator ⊗r~B of arity:
; (; )B1, . . . , (; )Br
(; )⊗ (B1 . . . Br)
for each r 6= 1, such that each Bi is a singleton sequence.
• O⊗I is the subset of O⊗L containing those operators induced by operators in
OI ⊆ OL.
• A⊗ is the set containing
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆ ` v = w :
︷︸︸︷
A for each equality Γ; ∆ ` v = w :
A in A.
It is fairly obvious that given a term Γ; ∆ ` v :A of Lin(O,A), we have that︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆ ` v :
︷︸︸︷
A in Lin⊗(O,A). We will write ⊗r(; ()v1, . . . , ()vr)(; ) as ⊗(v1, . . . , vr)
for clarity, and we define the abbreviation ⊗(v) = v, noting that there is no
instance of the operator when r = 1 by definition.
It is important to note that although we are now using arbitrary sequences
of the types of Lin(O,A) for types, the operators of Lin⊗(O,A) have arities only
involving singleton sequences, with the exception of the tensor operators. In
particular, any set of operators which is output natural in Lin(O,A) will not
be output natural in Lin⊗(O,A), since there can be no instance of the operator
family for any case where the indexing type is not a singleton sequence. This is a
consequence of our preceding discussion, where we remarked that only a certain
subclass of the operators which could be given over the type set with explicit
tensor can be given in Lin(O,A).
Now say that a pre-term of Lin⊗(O,A) is in canonical form if it is an instance
of the following inductive definition, where the v are pre-terms of Lin(O,A):
vc ::= ⊗~v | let x be v in vc
Now we can prove a crucial lemma:
Lemma 5.3.2
Given a typing judgement
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆ ` v :⊗~A of Lin⊗(O,A), v is identically in canon-
ical form with the various pre-terms of Lin(O,A) in v being terms of Lin(O,A).
Note that the typing contexts Γ′; ∆′ which the pre-terms are typable in are
uniquely determined from the typing context Γ; ∆ and the form of the pre-term.
This lemma bears some explanation before we prove it. The reason we have
defined the tensor of the theory Lin⊗(O,A) weakly is so that this lemma is prov-
able. This lemma then shows that the only terms provably of tensor type in
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Lin⊗(O,A) are simply built up from tensors of terms of Lin(O,A) with shared
intuitionistic variables. Further, an important implication of the lemma is that
in the case where ⊗ ~A is a singleton B, v is identically a Γ; ∆-term of type B in
Lin(O,A).
Proof We prove this by induction over the unique derivation of the typing
judgement
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆ ` v :⊗(A1 . . .As).
Intuitionistic Axiom In this case we must have a derivation
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ′, x′ :Q′; ` x′ :
Q′, where the sequence ⊗( ~A) must be the singleton Q, and hence the term
is in the correct form.
Linear Axiom In this case, we must have a derivation
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; x′ :A′ ` x′ :A′ and
hence again we have that the derivation is in the correct form.
F Rule In this case we must have a derivation:︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆′′1 ` w:Q′
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ, x′ :Q′; ∆′′2 ` v :⊗(A1 . . .As)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆ ` let x′ be w in v :⊗(B1 . . . Bs)
where ∆ = ∆′′1#∆′′2. However, in this case, we know by induction that there
exist terms of Lin(O,A) ~v′, ~v′′ and variables ~x such that v is:
let x1 be v′1 in . . . let xr be v
′
r in ⊗~v′′
But since w must be a Γ; ∆′′2-term of Lin(O,A) by induction, we have that︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆ ` let x′ be w in v :⊗(A1 . . .As) has the correct form.
Operator Rule In this case we need to consider first the operators of OL. Since
these are operators over the types ML, it is impossible that one should exist
with result having output of a tensor type. Hence they can be disregarded.
Now considering an instance of the tensor rule, we have a derivation:︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆′′1 ` v1 :A1, . . . ,
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆′′s ` vs :As︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆ ` ⊗~v :⊗(A1 . . .As)
where ∆ = ∆′′1# . . .#∆′′s (and the As are singletons). However, by induction
on the the
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆′′i ` vi:Ai for i = 1 . . . s, we know that these must be Γ; ∆′′i -
terms of Lin(O,A), and hence
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆ ` ⊗~v :⊗(A1 . . .As) has the correct form.

We can now define the term model of Lin(O,A), GT (O,A).
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Definition 5.3.3 (The Linear Term Category)
We define the linear term category, ST , as follows:
• The objects of ST are the sequences of linear types of Lin(O).
• ST ( ~A, ~B) = {[(~x, v) ~A, ~B]| ;
︷︸︸︷
~x: ~A ` v :⊗( ~B)}, where we write [(~x, v) ~A, ~B] to
denote the equivalence class of (~x, v) ~A, ~B under the equivalence ≡′ defined
by
(~x, v) ~A, ~B ≡′ (~y, w) ~A, ~B if ;
︷︸︸︷
~x: ~A ` v = w{~x/~y}:⊗ ~B
As in previous definitions of this sort, we write [~x, v] ~A, ~B for [(~x, v)] ~A, ~B, omit
type information where possible and assume that when writing the equi-
valence classes of arrows [~x, v] and [~y, w], the variable sequences are chosen
to make all the variables in the concatenation ~x~y distinct, unless explicitly
identified.
• id ~A = [~x,⊗~x]
• [~x, v]; [~y, w] =
[~x, let x1 be v′1 in . . . let v′r be v′r in (w{~v′′/~y})]
where by our previous lemma v is let x′1 be v′1 in . . . let x′r be v′r in ⊗~v′′.
It is easy to show that these definitions give a category. We proceed to define
a strict s.m. structure on ST . First define the tensor on objects, which are
sequences of types, as concatenation. Then define [~x, v]⊗ [~y, w] as
[~x~y, let x′1 be v
′












r′ in ⊗(~v′′ ~w′′)]
where again by our previous lemma v is let x′1 be v
′




r in ⊗~v′′ and
w is let y′1 be w
′





In order to define the intuitionistic term category, we need an auxiliary defin-
ition.
Definition 5.3.4 (Intuitionistic Equality)
We say that two intuitionistic terms Γ; ` v :Q and Γ; ` w :Q are intuitionist-
ically equal, which we write Γ; ` v =I w :Q, if they are identically equal, or if v
is O((~x1; ~y1)v′1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)v′r; )(; ), w is O((~x1; ~y1)w′1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)w′r; )(; ) and
Γ, ~xi : ~Qi; ~yi : ~Ai ` v′i = w′i :Bi
for all i = 1 . . . r.
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Definition 5.3.5 (The Intuitionistic Term Category)
We define the intuitionistic term category, CT , as follows:
• The objects of CT are sequences of intuitionistic types of Lin(O,A).
• The arrows are given:
CT (~Q, ~R) = {[(~x,~v)
~Q, ~R]|
︷ ︸︸ ︷
~x: ~Q; ` vi :Ri (where the vi are
intuitionistic for i = 1 . . . s)}
where ~R = R1 . . . Rs and we write [(~x,~v)
~Q, ~R] to denote the equivalence class
of (~x,~v)~Q, ~R under the equivalence ≡′C defined by
(~x,~v) ≡′C (~y, ~w) if ~v = v1 . . . vr, ~w = w1 . . . wr
and ~x: ~Q; ` vi =I wi{~y/~x}:Ri for i = 1 . . . r
Again, we write [~x,~v] ~Q, ~R for [(~x,~v)] ~Q, ~R, omit type information where possible
and assume that when writing the equivalence classes of arrows [~x,~v] and
[~y, ~w], the variable sequences are chosen to make all the variables in the
concatenation ~x~y distinct, unless explicitly identified.
• id ~Q = [~x, ~x]
• [~x,~v]; [~y, ~w] = [~x, ~w{~v/~y}]
We can equip CT with a cartesian structure by defining the product to be
concatenation on sequences, and giving the arrow structure as follows:
〈[~x,~v], [~x, ~w]〉 = [~x,~v ~w]
pi = [~x, xi]
This construction is familiar, as it is almost identical to that which we used for
the intuitionistic part of the term model of DILL(C). Similar proofs show that
these definitions make CT into a cartesian category.
We can now define the functor FT : CT → ST as the identity on objects of CT ,
and on arrows by:
F ([~x,~v]) = [~y, let ~x be ~y in ⊗~v]
We can easily check that this definition is functorial, and further that F is a
strict monoidal functor. We now define the term model GT (O,A) of Lin(O,A).
Definition 5.3.6 (The Term Lin(O,A)-Model)
The carrier of the term model GT (O,A) is the triple (CT ,ST , FT ), and the primitive
interpretation functions are given as follows:
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• [[ ]]GT (O,A)MI takes the intuitionistic types to the singleton sequences containing
them in CT .
• [[ ]]GT (O,A)ML takes the linear types to the singleton sequences containing them
in ST . Clearly for all Q ∈ MI we have [[Q]]GTML = F ([[Q]]
GT
MI ).
• Given an operator O ∈ OI having arity
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)Br;
(; )R
define the natural transformation [[O]]GT(O,A)OI at
~Q′ on arrows [~x′~xi~yi, vi] for
i = 1 . . . r to be the arrow
[(~x′, O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; )()]
• Given an operator O ∈ OL having arity












define the natural transformation [[O]]GT(O,A)OL to be that which when applied





j = 1 . . . s gives the arrow
[~z~x′′~z′1 . . . ~z
′
s~y
′′, O((~x1; ~y1)(v1), . . . , (~xr; ~yr)(vr); (~x′1; ~y
′






Clearly these two definitions satisfy the condition on the interpretation of
operators in the two categories.
In order to show that this is indeed a model, we need to observe that the
conditions on Lin(O)-interpretations and Lin(O,A)-models hold. This is easily
done once we have proved the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3.7
Given a term ~x: ~Q; ~y : ~A ` v :B of Lin(O,A) such that [[~x: ~Q; ~y : ~A ` v :B]]GT(O,A) =
[~x~y, w] ~Q ~A,B, we can derive the equality judgement in Lin⊗(O,A):︷ ︸︸ ︷
~x: ~Q; ~y : ~A ` w = v :B
5.4 Completeness
We now present a lemma relating Lin(O,A) to Lin⊗(O,A).
Lemma 5.4.1
Given an equality judgement
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆ ` v = w :
︷︸︸︷
A in Lin⊗(O,A), we have an
equality judgement Γ; ∆ ` v = w:A in Lin(O,A).
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Proof Firstly, we know that both v and w are Γ; ∆ terms of type A in Lin(O,A)
by the lemma 5.3.2. We prove the lemma by induction over the structure of the
proof of the equality judgement
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆ ` v = w :
︷︸︸︷
A in Lin⊗(O,A). If the last rule
was any of the reflexivity, symmetry or transitivity rules then by the induction
hypothesis the proof is easy. If the last rule was the term-context rule then it








B term context of Lin⊗(O,A) used
in the rule is also a Γ; ∆ − A/Γ′∆′ − B term context of Lin(O,A), and hence
that the result follows from the induction hypothesis. Considering the axiomatic
equalities, those generated from equalities in A are clearly the images of equalities
in Lin(O,A), the naturality equations clearly must mention the operator ⊗ and
hence are not terms in the appropriate context (since if they were they would
be pre-terms of Lin(O,A), which is a contradiction) and finally, the axiomatic
equalities which are commuting conversions for the let -construct Lin⊗(O,A) are
the images of instances of the same equalities in Lin(O,A). 
This shows that the embedding from Lin(O,A) into Lin⊗(O,A) is faithful. We
also know that it is full by virtue of lemma 5.3.2.
We can use these results to relate the term model and Lin(O,A) as follows:
Lemma 5.4.2
The arrows ~A → B in the symmetric monoidal category of the term model, ST ,
are isomorphic to the terms ; ~x : ~A ` v :B of Lin(O,A) quotiented by provable
equality.
Proof Firstly consider arrows ~A → B in ST . These are equivalence classes of
terms of Lin⊗(O,A) ;
︷︸︸︷
~x: ~A ` v :B quotiented by term equality and α-conversion
on free variables. But we know that such terms of Lin⊗(O,A) are isomorphic to
terms of Lin(O) ; ~x: ~A ` w:B by our lemmas relating the two type theories, and
hence the result follows. 
Now we can prove soundness and completeness:
Theorem 6 (Soundness and Completeness)
Given Γ; ∆ terms v and w of type A in Lin(O,A), Γ; ∆ ` v = w :A if and only if
[[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]G = [[Γ; ∆ ` w:A]]G for all Lin(O,A)-models G.
Proof This proof is largely by standard means. We already have the forward
direction thanks to our proof of soundness. To show the other direction, assume
that:
[[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]GT(O,A) = [~x~y, v′] = [~x~y, w′] = [[Γ; ∆ ` w:A]]GT(O,A)
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where Γ = ~x : ~Q and ∆ = ~y : ~B, for the particular Lin(O,A)-model GT (O,A).
Now by lemma 5.3.7 and the definition of equality in GT (O,A) we have that:︷ ︸︸ ︷









; Γ,∆ ` v′ = w′ :
︷︸︸︷
A .
From this last equality we can construct an equality judgement
︷ ︸︸ ︷











A term context , and hence by transit-
ivity we have the equality judgement
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆ ` v = w :
︷︸︸︷
A . But now using our last
lemma, we have the required equality judgement of Lin(O,A):
Γ; ∆ ` v = w:A

5.5 Initiality
We now define suitable Lin(O)-maps and prove that the term model GT (O,A) is
(strictly) initial in the category of small Lin(O,A)-categories and Lin(O)-maps.
Definition 5.5.1 (Lin(O)-Maps)
Define a Lin(O)-map F : G → G ′ for Lin(O)-interpretations G and G ′ having
carriers (C,S, F ) and (C′,S ′, F ′) respectively as a pair of functors (FC : C →
C′,FS : S → S ′) such that:
• FC is strict cartesian and FS is strict symmetric monoidal,
• the following diagram commutes:
C F - S
C′
FC
? F ′ - S ′
?
FS
• FC([[ ]]GMI ) = [[ ]]
G′
MI : MI → obj(C
′),
• FS([[ ]]GML) = [[ ]]
G′
ML : ML → obj(S
′),
• for each operator O ∈ OI with arity
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)Br;
(; )R
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object X of C and arrows fi : F (X)⊗ [[ ~Qi; ~Ai]]→ [[Bi]] for i = 1 . . . r of S,
FC([[O]]GOI(X)(f1 . . . fr)) = [[O]]
G′
OI(FC(X)(FS(f1), . . . ,FS(fr)))
• for eachO ∈ OL, objectX of C, objects Y1 . . . Ys and arrows of S fi : F (X)⊗
[[ ~Qi; ~Ai]]→ [[Bi]] for i = 1 . . . r and gj : F (X)⊗ [[ ~Q′j]]⊗ Yj ⊗ [[ ~A′j]]→ [[B′j]] for
j = 1 . . . s,
FS([[O]]GOL(X, Y1, . . . , Ys)(f1 . . . fr, g1 . . . gs)) =
[[O]]G
′
OL(FC(X),FS(Y1), . . . ,FS(Ys))(FS(f1), . . . ,FS(fr),FS(g1), . . . ,FS(gs))
Now define the category of small Lin(O,A)-models, CatLin(O,A), to be the
category having objects the small Lin(O,A)-models and morphisms the Lin(O)-
morphisms between them.
Now we will prove that each Lin(O,A)-model canonically yields a Lin⊗(O,A)-
model, simply by interpreting sequences of types as the tensor of the interpretation
and interpreting the tensor operator on a sequence of terms as the obvious tensor
of the interpretations of the terms, with the intuitionistic context duplicated.
Lemma 5.5.2
Given a Lin(O,A)-model G, we can construct a Lin⊗(O,A)-model G ′ as follows:
• The carrier of G ′ will be the carrier of G, (C,S, F ).
• The primitive interpretation function [[ ]]G′
M⊗I
, which takes singleton sequences
of elements of MI to objects of C, is just the function which takes the
singleton sequence containing Q to [[Q]]GMI .
• The primitive interpretation function [[ ]]G′
M⊗
L
, which takes sequences of ele-
ments of ML to objects of S, is just the function which takes the sequence
A1 . . . Ar to [[A1]]GML ⊗ . . .⊗ [[Ar]]
G









) over singleton sequences of intuitionistic types.
• Since [[
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆]]G′ = [[Γ; ∆]]G on objects of S, as is easily seen from the defini-
tions, the natural transformation [[O]]G
′
O⊗L
is just the natural transformation
[[O]]GOL on operators of Lin(O,A), and similarly for OI . Clearly this definition
satisfies the condition on these interpretation functions.
• For the tensor operator of Lin⊗(O,A),
; (; )A1, . . . , (; )Ar








is the function which given fi : F (X)⊗Yi → [[ ~A]]
for i = 1 . . . r, takes value:
nrX,Y1,... ,Yr ; (f1 ⊗ . . .⊗ fr)
where nrX,Y1,... ,Yr is the obvious map taking
F (X)⊗ A1 ⊗ . . .⊗ Ar → ⊗(F (X)⊗ A1), . . . , (F (X)⊗ Ar)
It can now easily be shown that G ′ is a Lin⊗(O,A)-model, and further that
on terms of Lin⊗(O,A)
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆ ` v :A which are the images of terms of Lin(O,A)
Γ; ∆ ` v :A, we have:
[[
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]G′ = [[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]G′
in the s.m. category S.
Definition 5.5.3 (Canonical Morphism)
Given a Lin(O,A)-model G, define the morphism FT G : GT (O,A)→ G as follows,
where FT G = (FT GC ,FT GS):
• On objects of CT , which are sequences of intuitionistic types of Lin(O), ~Q,
define FT C(~Q) = [[~Q]]GC .
• On arrows of CT , which are equivalence classes [~x,~v] ~Q, ~R for intuitionistic





C for i = 1 . . . r, where G ′ is the model of Lin⊗(O,A) which is gener-
ated from the Lin(O,A)-model G. Note that since the models have the same
carrier, the interpretation takes arrows of CT to arrows in the cartesian part
of G as required.
• On objects of ST , which are sequences of linear types of Lin(O), ~A, define
FT S( ~A) = [[ ~A]]G.
• On arrows of ST , which are equivalence classes [~x, v] ~A, ~B for terms v of
Lin⊗(O,A), define FT S([~x, v]) as [[ ;
︷︸︸︷
~x: ~A ` v :⊗ ~B]]G′ where G ′ is the model
of Lin⊗(O,A) which is generated from the Lin(O,A)-model G. Note that
since the models have the same carrier, the interpretation takes arrows of
ST to arrows in the s.m.c. part of G as required.





~y : ~Q; ~x: ~A ` v :⊗ ~B of Lin⊗(O,A), we have that for an arbitrary
Lin(O)-morphism (FC ,FS) : GT (O,A)→ G ′:
FS([~y′~x, let ~y be ~y′ in v]) = [[
︷ ︸︸ ︷
~y: ~Q; ~x: ~A ` v :⊗ ~B]]G′
Proof The proof proceeds by induction over the derivation
︷ ︸︸ ︷
~y : ~Q; ~x: ~A ` v :⊗ ~B.
• In the case of an intuitionistic axiom instance
︷ ︸︸ ︷
~x: ~Q, y :R,~x′: ~Q′; ` y :R, we
have that:






But all of these constructs are preserved by the fact that FT ;FS = FC ;F
and that FC strictly preserves the cartesian structure, and so we have:
FS([~x′′y′~x′′′, let ~xy~x′ be ~x′′y′~x′′′ in y]) = F (d[[~Q]]GC × id[[R]]GC × d[[~Q′]]GC )
as required.
• In the case of a linear axiom instance
︷ ︸︸ ︷
~y : ~Q; x:A ` x:A we have that:
[~y′x, let ~y be ~y′ in x] = FT (d[[~Q]]GT (O,A )C
)⊗ id[[A]]GT (O,A)
But again, these constructs are preserved since F preserves F and the mon-
oidal structure, and so we have:
FS([~y′x, let ~y be ~y′ in x]) = F (d[[~Q]]GC )⊗ id[[A]]G
• In the case of an instance of the F -rule:︷ ︸︸ ︷
~y : ~Q; ~x′ : ~A′ ` v :Q′
︷ ︸︸ ︷
~y : ~Q, y′ :Q′; ~X ′′ : ~A′′ ` w:⊗ ~B︷ ︸︸ ︷
~y : ~Q; ~x: ~A ` let y′ be v in w:⊗ ~B
(F )
where ~x: ~A = (~x′ : ~A′)#(~x′′ : ~A′′), we have that
[~y′′~x, let y′ be v in w] = str′~Q, ~A′, ~A′′, ~A; ([~y
′′~x′, let ~y be ~y′ in v]⊗ id[[~Q; ~A′′]]GT (O,A ) );
(s[[~Q]]GT (O ,A ) ,[[Q′]]GT (O ,A ) ⊗ id[[ ~A′′]]GT (O,A ) ); [~y′′y′′′, let ~yy′ be ~y′′y′′′ in w]
In this expression, the two arrows still in the form [. . . ] are preserved by
induction since they annotate the premises of the F-rule, and the rest of
the structure excepting the str′ construct is preserved by the fact that FS is
strict symmetric monoidal. It is fairly easy to show that the str′ construct
is also preserved by considering its construction.
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• In the case of an operator rule instance not due to the tensor operator, the
proof proceeds similarly, as the operator clause must be preserved.
• In the case where we have an instance of the tensor introduction rule,
︷ ︸︸ ︷
~y : ~Q; ~x1 : ~A1 ` v1 :B1, . . . ,
︷ ︸︸ ︷
~y : ~Q; ~xr : ~Ar ` vr :Br︷ ︸︸ ︷
~y : ~Q; ~x: ~A ` ⊗r(v1 . . . vr):⊗(B1 . . .Br)
⊗r
where ~x: ~A = (~x1 : ~A1)# . . .#(~xr : ~Ar), we have that:
[~y′~x, let ~y be ~y′ in ⊗r(v1 . . . vr)] =
mstrr~Q, ~A1... ~Ar , ~A; ([~y
′~x1, let ~y be ~y′ in v1]⊗ . . .⊗ [~y′~xr, let ~y be ~y′ in vr])
But now since we can show that mstrr is preserved by FS , and we know
that the tensor must be, we have the required result. 
Similarly, we can show:
Lemma 5.5.5
Given an arbitrary intuitionistic term
︷ ︸︸ ︷
~x: ~Q; ` v :R of Lin⊗(O,A), (which also
must be an intuitionistic term ~x : ~Q; ` v :R of Lin(O,A)) we have that for an
arbitrary Lin(O)-morphism (FC,FS) : GT (O,A)→ G ′:
FC([~x, v]) = [[
︷ ︸︸ ︷
~x: ~Q; ` v :R]]G′C
This is proved in an exactly analogous way, except that there are only two
cases, one for the variable which is preserved because it is a projection, and one
for the operator case which follows from the previous lemma and the preservation
of the operator interpretations by the Lin(O)-morphism.
Lemma 5.5.6 (Uniqueness)
The morphism FT G : GT (O,A) → G is a Lin(O)-map, and it is the unique such
Lin(O)-map.
Proof We prove this by considering the definition. Assume we have an arbitrary
Lin(O)-map F : GT (O,A)→ G.
On Objects of CT , which are sequences of intuitionistic types of Lin(O), we
know that FC(Q1 . . . Qr) = [[Q1]]GMI × . . .× [[Qr]]
G
MI since F strictly preserves
the cartesian structure. But we have:
[[Q1]]GMI × . . .× [[Qr]]
G
MI = [[Q1 . . . Qr]]
G
C = FT GC(Q1 . . . Qr)
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On Arrows of CT , which are equivalence classes [~x,~t] ~Q, ~R, by definition we have
FC([~x,~v] ~Q, ~R) = 〈FC([~x, v1]), . . . ,FC([~x, vs])〉 since FC strictly preserves the
cartesian structure. But now we can see by our lemma that these arrows
[~x, vi] must all be mapped according to the definition of FT C.
On Objects of ST , which are sequences of linear primes of Lin(O), we know
that FS(A1 . . .As) = [[A1]]G ⊗ . . . ⊗ [[As]]G because FS is strict monoidal.
But we have:
[[A1]]G ⊗ . . .⊗ [[As]]G = [[A1 . . .As]]G = FT GS(A1 . . .As)
On Arrows of ST , which are equivalence classes [~x, v] ~A, ~B, we use our result;
given
FS([~y′~x, let ~y be ~y′ in v]) = [[
︷ ︸︸ ︷
~y: ~Q; ~x: ~A ` v :⊗ ~B]]G′
we can easily see that in the special case of arrows in ST , this means that
FS agrees with FT S . Hence it follows that the arbitrary map F is the same
as the canonical map FT , which is therefore unique. 
This immediately implies that GT (O,A) is initial in the category CatLin(O,A).
5.6 Output Naturality
We now consider our defined notion of output naturality of a given operator in a
type theory Lin(O,A). Clearly, just as we have specified that linearly natural op-
erators be interpreted by appropriate natural transformations, we might expect
that output-natural operators be interpreted as natural transformations which
are natural in the output-place of the appropriate argument. However, it is im-
mediately obvious that not every model of Lin(O,A) interprets its output natural
operators as such natural transformations, simply because in the model we only
have candidates for the components of the natural transformations for objects
which are the interpretation of types. We now proceed by defining a sub-class of
models which do interpret output natural operators as natural transformations
of this kind, and show how they relate to the original models.
Definition 5.6.1 (Output Natural Lin(O)-Interpretation)
Given a typing system Lin(O) with an output-parameterised set of operators O
having arity:
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)(Br); (~Q′1; ~A′1)B′1, . . . , (~Q′s−1; ~A′s−1)B′s−1, (~Q′s; ~A′s)( )
(~Q′′; ~A′′)( )
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we define an output-natural-in-O interpretation of the typing system Lin(O), which
we again write G, to be an interpretation of the typing system Lin(O) with a
natural transformation
[[O]]GOL :(×i=1...rS(F (=)⊗ [[ ~Qi; ~Ai]]
G, [[Bi]]GML))×
(×j=1...(s−1)S(F (=)⊗ [[ ~Q′j]]G ⊗ ( j) ⊗ [[ ~A′j]]G, [[B′j]]GML))×
(S(F (=)⊗ [[ ~Q′s]]G ⊗ ( s)⊗ [[ ~A′s]]G, (≡)))
→ S(F (=)⊗ [[ ~Q′′]]G ⊗ (⊗i=1...s( s))⊗ [[ ~A′′]]G, (≡))
which is natural independently in each of the arguments (=),(≡) and ( 1) . . . ( s)
such that each operator OA in the set has interpretation
[[OA]]GOL = [[O]]
G
OL(=, 1, . . . s, [[A]]
G
ML)
We now note that each output-natural-in-O interpretation of a typing system
Lin(O) induces an interpretation of Lin(O) by the obvious map which forgets the
natural transformation [[O]]OL.
This enables us to map the typing system Lin(O) into an output-natural-in-O
interpretation of Lin(O).
Definition 5.6.2
Given a typing system Lin(O) with an output-parameterised set of operators O,
we define the map [[ ]]G which takes the typing system Lin(O) to an output-natural-
in-O interpretation G simply by defining it to be the map taking Lin(O) to the
underlying interpretation of G.
Given this map, we can go on to give a definition of output-natural Lin(O,A)-
model.
Definition 5.6.3 (Output-Natural-in-O Lin(O,A)-Model)
Given a typing system Lin(O) with an output-parameterised set of operators O,
we define an output-natural-in-O model of the type theory Lin(O,A), which we
also write G, to be an output-natural-in-O interpretation of Lin(O) such that for
each equality judgement Γ; ∆ ` v = w:A in A, we have
[[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]G = [[Γ; ∆ ` w:A]]G
in the s.m. part of G.




Given a typing system Lin(O) with an output-parameterised set of operators
O, and an output-natural-in-O Lin(O,A)-model G, for every provable equality
judgement Γ; ∆ ` v = w:A of Lin(O,A), we have:
[[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]G = [[Γ; ∆ ` w:A]]G
The important property of output-natural-in-O interpretations which distin-
guishes them from plain interpretations is the following:
Lemma 5.6.5
Given a typing system Lin(O) with an output-parameterised set of operators O
and an output-natural-in-O interpretation G, for every provable equality Γ; ∆ `
v = w:A of the type theory Lin(O,ONat(O,O)), we have:
[[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]G = [[Γ; ∆ ` w:A]]G
This is easily provable adapting the proof of the previous soundness lemma.
We only need to prove that the axiomatic equality judgements in the set ONat(O,O)
are soundly mapped to the output-natural-in-O interpretation, which follows by
virtue of the fact that the operators in O are all interpreted as instances of a
natural transformation.
Now we can define output-natural-in-O morphisms.
Definition 5.6.6 (Output-Natural-in-O Lin(O)-morphism)
Given a typing system Lin(O) with an output-parameterised set of operators O
having arity
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)(Br); (~Q′1; ~A′1)B′1, . . . , (~Q′s−1; ~A′s−1)B′s−1, (~Q′s; ~A′s)( )
(~Q′′; ~A′′)( )
an output-natural-in-O Lin(O)-morphism F : G → G ′ between two output-natural-
in-O Lin(O,A)-models is a Lin(O)-morphism on the underlying Lin(O)-interpretations
of G and G ′ with the additional property that for any object X of C, objects
Y1, . . . , Ys−1 and Y ′ of S, and arrows of S:
fi : F (X)⊗ [[ ~Qi; ~Ai]]→ [[Bi]] for i = 1 . . . r
gj : F (X)⊗ [[ ~Q′j]]⊗ Yj ⊗ [[ ~A′j]]→ [[B′j]] for j = 1 . . . (s− 1)
gs : F (X)⊗ [[ ~Q′j]]⊗ Yj ⊗ [[ ~A′j]]→ Y ′
we have,
FS([[O]]GOL(X, Y1, . . . , Ys, Y
′)(f1, . . . fr, g1, . . . , gs))
= [[O]]G
′
OL(FC(X),FS(Y1), . . .FS(Ys),FS(Y
′))(FS(f1), . . .FS(fr),FS(g1), . . . ,FS(gs))
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We now write CatOLin(O,A) for the category of small output-natural-in-O mod-
els and morphisms. Clearly by the forgetful map mentioned earlier from output-
natural-in-O Lin(O,A)-models to Lin(O,A)-models and its obvious extension to
output-natural-in-O morphisms, we have a functor CatOLin(O,A) → CatLin(O,A).
In the opposite direction, given an a type theory Lin(O,A) having an output-
parameterised set of operators O, there may be no candidate natural transforma-
tion to make it into an output-natural-in-O model, or there may be one or many.
However, considering the term-model in particular, it is not the case that the
term model GT (O,A) for a type-theory Lin(O,A) with an output-parameterised
set of operators O can be extended to an output-natural-in-O model simply by
picking an existing natural transformation for [[O]]GT (O,A)OL . This is simply because
there is no appropriate operator set, since no operator acts on arguments having
as outputs for example 2-element sequences. All operators of Lin⊗(O,A) act only
on arguments with singleton outputs.
The Output-Natural Term Model
Since it is not the case that the term model GT (O,A) can be extended to an
output natural model, we need to reconsider the questions of completeness and
initiality. We will sketch a variation on the construction of the term model which
will give us an output-natural term Lin(O,A)-model, and indicate how it can be
proved initial for the category CatOLin(O,A).
First consider an extension of the type theory Lin⊗(O,A).




For a signature O = (MI ,ML,OI,OL) and an axiom set A, such that the typing
system Lin(O) has an output-parameterised set of operators O with arity
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)(Br); (~Q′1; ~A′1)B′1, . . . , (~Q′s−1; ~A′s−1)B′s−1, (~Q′s; ~A′s)( )
(~Q′′; ~A′′)( )
we define the type theory Lin⊗O(O,A) as Lin((M⊗I ,M⊗L ,O⊗LO),A⊗O), where M⊗I , M⊗L
and O⊗I are as defined as for Lin⊗(O,A), and we define O⊗LO and AO as follows:
• O⊗LO is the set O⊗L augmented with new operators O⊗~C of arity
















for any non-singleton sequence ⊗~C ∈ M⊗L . Note that there already exists
instances in the case where the sequence is a singleton.
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• A⊗O is the set A⊗ augmented for each output-natural set of operators O of
Lin(O,A) with the equality judgements in the set ONat((M⊗I ,M⊗L ,O⊗I ,O⊗LO),O′),
where O′ is the set O∪(O⊗LO−O⊗L ), which is to say the set O with the extra
operator instances added in the definition of O⊗LO.
This type-theory differs from Lin⊗(O,A) in that the output-natural set of
operators O of Lin(O,A) is extended canonically to be an output-natural set of
operators in Lin⊗O(O,A). Now say that a pre-term of Lin⊗O(O,A) is in canonical
form if it is an instance of the following inductive definition, where the v are
pre-terms of Lin(O,A):
vc ::= ⊗~v | let x be v in vc | O ~A((~x; ~x)~v, . . . , (~x; ~x)~v; (~x; ~x)~v, . . . , (~x; ~x)~v, (~x; ~x)vc)(~v;~v)
We then have the following extended version of lemma 5.3.2:
Lemma 5.6.8
Given a typing judgement
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ; ∆ ` v :⊗~A of Lin⊗O(O,A), v is identically in canon-
ical form with the various pre-terms of Lin(O,A) being terms.
This is proved in a very similar way to the original version of the lemma, with
the one extension that we now have additional operators in O⊗O which may return
results having outputs of tensor type. However, we know this can only occur when
they are applied to an argument (in their output-parameterised place) which is of
tensor type, and so we can use induction to show that the term is still in canonical
form.
Given this result, we then proceed to define the term categories in much the
same way as before, and define the output-natural-in-O term model of Lin(O,A)
exactly as we do the term model of Lin(O,A) with the exception that we interpret
the output-natural set of operators O in Lin(O,A) into the appropriate natural
transformation which exists in the term model by virtue of the extension of O to
incorporate instances OA for any type A of M⊗L (which is a sequence of types of
ML) and the addition of the output-naturality equalities to A.
Similarly, the definition of the canonical morphism from the output-natural-
in-O term model to an arbitrary output-natural-in-O model is identical to the
previous one with the exception that for the output-natural set of operators O we
map the natural transformation which exists in the output-natural term model
to the natural transformation in the arbitrary model.
Given this development, we have that the output-natural-in-O Lin(O,A)-term
model, which we will call GOT (O,A), is initial in the category CatOLin(O,A).
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Multiary Output-Natural Models
Most of the leading examples of linear type-theories which we will present have
more than one output-natural set of operators, and so we briefly consider the
situation in this case. In fact, it is easy to extend all the definitions of “output-
natural-in-O” constructions into the analogous “output-natural-in-O-and. . . -and-




Action Calculi and Extensions
We now present an important example of a system having a linear structural
framework, Milner’s action calculus [Mil93c]. The action calculus is similar to our
general linear type-theory in that it is a general framework in which many different
systems can be presented, particularly process calculi. The leading example of an
action calculus is the π-calculus [MPW92], but systems ranging from petri-nets
to the λ-calculus have been shown to correspond to action calculi.
The essential idea is that we have certain underlying structure, including a
monoidal structure and a discipline of names, and in addition, for each instance
we have a signature containing a set of intuitionistically natural operators (called
controls) and associated reaction rules which depend on the particular calculus
we wish to describe. For example, there is a set of controls Kπ and a set of
reaction rules ↘π such that the action calculus AC(Kπ,↘π) is isomorphic to the
π-calculus, and there are other sets of controls and reaction rules serving the same
purpose for other languages such as petri-nets and the λ-calculus.
We will actually present a slight generalisation of Milner’s original action cal-
culi as found in [Mil96], which will incorporate a notion of linear prime arity in
addition to Milner’s primes, which have intuitionistic behaviour. This general-
isation is motivated by our discussion of general linear type-theories, which can
have both linear and intuitionistic primitive types; further, we have an example
of an action calculus of this more general form which is not isomorphic to an
action calculus as defined by Milner. This is the action calculus corresponding
to the linear λ-calculus, which we will call AC,((K). However, we note that all
Milner’s action calculi are instances of this more general form.
We will also define several higher-order extensions of the basic action calculi,
inspired variously by Milner’s higher order action calculi [Mil94b] and the higher-
order structure present in linear logic.
6.1 Action Calculi
We first assume a set PI of intuitionistic primes, ranged over by p, q . . . and a set
PL of linear primes, ranged over by l, k . . . , such that PI ⊆ PL. We can now define
the set of (tensor) arities over the set of linear primes, written M(PL), as the set
of sequences of primes in PL. We use m,n . . . for (tensor) arities (henceforth
just arities), and write (infix) ⊗ for concatenation and ε for the empty sequence.
Further, we will omit the argument PL of M where it is clear from the context.
We can now give the definition of signature:
Definition 6.1.1 (Action Calculus Signature)
An action calculus signature K is a triple (PI ,PL,K) of sets such that PI ⊆ PL
and each K in K has an arity of the form:
((m1, n1), . . . , (mr, nr))→ (m,n)
where the m’s and n’s are from the set M(PL).
Definition 6.1.2 (Intuitionistic Action Calculus Signature)
An action calculus signature K = (PI ,PL,K) is intuitionistic if PI = PL.
Intuitionistic action calculus signatures give rise to intuitionistic action calculi,
which are equivalent to Milner’s original action calculi.
In order to simplify definitions, in the following we assume that a signature
K has components (PI ,PL,K) unless otherwise stated, and similarly K′ has com-
ponents (P′I ,P′L,K′) etc.
In order to define the terms of the action calculus, we use the familiar variable
set X. However, in this context these variables are known as names, and further
it is necessary to assume that each name x has an associated intuitionistic prime
arity p; we may write xp to denote this.
Definition 6.1.3 (Terms)
Terms over an action calculus signature K, written a, b . . . , are constructed from
the basic operators identity, idm, permutation, pm,n, composition, ·, tensor, ⊗,
abstraction, (xp) , datum, 〈xp〉 and the control operators, K. A term a is assigned
an (action) arity a : m → n where m,n are tensor arities, using the following
rules:
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idm : m→ m
a : m→ m′ b : m′ → n
a · b : m→ n
a : m1 → n1 b : m2 → n2
a⊗ b : m1 ⊗m2 → n1 ⊗ n2
pm,n : m⊗ n→ n⊗m
a : m→ n
(xp)a : p⊗m→ n 〈x
p〉 : ε→ p
a1 : m1 → n1 . . . ar : mr → nr
K(a1, . . . , ar) : m→ n
K
where the control operator K from the signature K has the arity
((m1, n1), . . . , (mr, nr))→ (m,n)
We will omit arity annotations, both in terms and of terms, where these are
apparent. The construct (x)a binds the free name x in the term a, and the name
x occurs free in the term 〈x〉. We write a{b/〈x〉} to denote the usual capture-
avoiding substitution of terms for subterms of the form 〈x〉. Note that all free
occurrences of x are in subterms of this form.
Given a sequence of names xp11 . . . xprr , we write |x1 . . . xr| to denote the ar-
ity p1 . . . pr. Further, we define the constructs (x1 . . . xr)a = (x1) . . . (xr)a and
〈x1 . . . xr〉 = 〈x1〉 ⊗ . . . ⊗ 〈xr〉, where this is the left-bracketed tensor. Note,
however, that since the tensor will be strict, the choice is unimportant.
We give the equality on the terms, which is adapted slightly from that of
Milner.
Definition 6.1.4 (The Theory AC)
An equality holds between two terms of AC in the equational theory AC if it
can be proved using the following axioms, annotated with action arities, and the
obvious reflexivity, transitivity and congruence rules:
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a · (b · c) = (a · b) · c (A1)
a · idn = a = idm · a (A2)
(a · b)⊗ (c · d) = (a⊗ c) · (b⊗ d) (A3)
idm ⊗ idn = idm⊗n (A4)
a⊗ (b⊗ c) = (a⊗ b)⊗ c (A5)
a⊗ idε = a = idε ⊗ a (A6)
pm,n · (b⊗ a) = (a⊗ b) · pm′,n′ (ζ1)
pm⊗n,m′ = (idm ⊗ pn,m′) · (pm,m′ ⊗ idn) (ζ2)
pε,m = idm (ζ3)
pm,n · pn,m = idm⊗n (ζ4)
augmented with the two naming axioms:
(〈y〉 ⊗ idm) · (x)a = a{〈y〉/〈x〉} (σ)
(x)((〈x〉 ⊗ id) · a) = a, where x 6∈ fn(a) (δ)
It is an immediate consequence of these axioms that idm = (~x)〈~x〉 and pm,n =
(~x~y)〈~y~x〉, where |~x| = ~p = m and |~y| = ~q = n.
Definition 6.1.5 (Action Calculus)
The action calculus AC(K,↘) is the quotient of the terms of AC(K) by the equa-
tional theory AC, together with the reaction relation ↘, which is a transitive
relation closed under tensor, composition, abstraction and equality, and such
that there is no action a such that id↘ a.
We refer to the terms of the theory as actions. From now on we will consider
only the static case, which is to say the case in which the reaction relation is
empty. Possible extensions of these definitions and the following results to the
case with a non-empty reaction relation are discussed in chapter 10.
We now briefly show how this definition relates to Milner’s original definition,
found in [Mil96].
Definition 6.1.6 (Intuitionistic Action Calculus)
An action calculus AC(K) is intuitionistic if it is constructed over an intuitionistic
action calculus signature.
We can now show:
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Lemma 6.1.7
An intuitionistic action calculus AC(K) where K = (PI ,PI ,K) is isomorphic to
Milner’s action calculus AC(K) built over the primes PI , up to equality in the
appropriate theory.
Proof This is proved by giving inverse translations. To translate from an intu-
itionistic action calculus AC(K) to the corresponding instance of Milner’s action
calculus, the translation is the identity on terms except on pm,n, which we map
to the term (~x)(~y)〈~y〉 ⊗ 〈~x〉. Conversely, to translate from Milner’s action cal-
culus back to the intuitionistic action calculus AC(K), we simply map terms to
themselves. It is easy to show that these two translations are sound with respect
to the appropriate theories, and they are inverse simply because in the action
calculus AC(K), given sequences of intuitionistic primes m and n,
pm,n = (~x)(~y)〈~y〉 ⊗ 〈~x〉

6.2 Generalised Linear Type Theory
We now present a generalised linear type-theory which corresponds to the static
action calculus AC(K).
Definition 6.2.1 (The Type Theory Lin
A(K))
Given an action calculus signature K = (PI ,PL,K), we define the type theory
LinA(K) to be the instance Lin(OA,AA), where OA = (MAI ,MAL,OAI ,OAL) and MAI ,
MAL, OAI , OAL and AA are defined as follows:
• The set MAI is the set of all singleton sequences of elements of PI .
• The set MAL is the set of all sequences of elements of PL. For consistency
with the action calculus, we may write m,n . . . for arbitrary sequences of
elements of PL l1 . . . lr, and further we may write ⊗ for concatenation and
ε for the empty sequence.
• The set OAI is the empty set.
• The set OAL contains:
1. For each control K from K of arity
((~l1, n1), . . . , (~lr, nr))→ (~l′, n′)
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an operator OK of arity
(;~l1)n1, . . . , (;~lr)nr ;
(;~l′)n′
where we overload notation to write ~l for the sequence of singleton
sequences of the elements of ~l. We will abbreviate the general operator
form
OK((; ~x1 :~l1)v1, . . . , (; ~xr :~lr)vr; )(; ~w)
as K((~x1 :~l1)v1, . . . , (~xr :~lr)vr, ~w)
2. For each r and m1 . . .mr, an operator ⊗Rm1...mr of arity:
; (; )m1 . . . (; )mr
(; )m1 ⊗ . . .⊗mr
In terms of the type theory, we will write v1 ⊗ . . . vr or occasionally
⊗(v1 . . . vr) as an abbreviation for ⊗Rm1...mr(; (; )v1, . . . (; )vr)(; ).
3. For each r and m1 . . .mr, each of an output-parameterised set of op-
erators ⊗Lm1...mr with arity:
; (;m1 . . .mr)( )
(;m1 ⊗ . . .⊗mr)( )
In terms of the type theory, we will write let ⊗~x: ~m be ~v in w as an
abbreviation for ⊗Lm1...mr(; (; ~x)w)(; v), where ~m = m1 . . .mr.
• The set AA contains:
1. All well-formed equalities of the form:
(⊗− β) Γ; ∆ ` let ⊗~x~y be w1 ⊗ w2 in v = let ⊗~x be w1 in let ⊗~y be w2 in v :n
where Γ; ∆1 ` w1 :⊗~m, Γ; ∆2 ` w2 : ~m′, Γ; ∆′, ~x : ~m, ~y : ~m′ ` v :n and
∆ = ∆′#∆1#∆2.
2. All well-formed equalities of the form:
(⊗− η) Γ; ∆ ` let ⊗~x be v in ⊗~x = v : ⊗~m
3. All well-formed equalities of the form:
(⊗− 1) Γ; ∆ ` ⊗(⊗~v1, . . . ,⊗~vr) = ⊗(~v1 . . .~vr):n
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4. All well-formed equalities of the form:
(⊗− 2) Γ; ∆ ` ⊗(v) = v :n
5. For any r, all equality judgements in any of the sets ONat(OA,⊗Lm1...mr)
for any m1 . . .mr.
Having given this definition, it is worth noting that we could present an equi-
valent type theory without any type constructors if we used general sequents of
the form Γ; ∆ ` ∆′, where the sequence ∆′ on the right is intended to be read
as a tensor of linear prime arities, as is the sequence ∆ on the left. Given this
logic we could annotate each sequent having such a form with a term v such that
the typing Γ; ∆ ` v :∆′ would correspond to an action a : |∆| → |∆′| having free
names in Γ. This is the approach taken in [BGHP97].
6.3 The Translations
We present the translations which make LinA(K) isomorphic to the action calculus
AC(K).
Action Calculi to Type Theory
We first give a translation which will take the action calculus AC(K) to the type
theory LinA(K). We define the function ( )† which takes pairs of a sequence of
distinct variables and an action to pre-terms of LinA(K), where the sequence of
variables has the same length as the sequence of prime arities m for the action
a:m→ n.
Definition 6.3.1 (The Translation ( )†)
We define the translation over the structure of actions as follows:
(~y, idm)† = ⊗(y1 . . . yr) (where m = l1 . . . lr)
(~y, a · b)† = let ⊗~y′ be (~y, a)† in (~y′, b)†
(~y~y′, a⊗ b)† = (~y, a)† ⊗ (~y′, b)† (where ~y = y1 . . . yr and a:l1 . . . lr → n)
(~y~y′,pm,n)
† = (⊗~y′)⊗ (⊗~y) (where ~y = y1 . . . yr and m = l1 . . . lr)
(y′~y, (xp)a)† = let x be y′ in (~y, a)†
(ε, 〈xp〉)† = x
(~y′,K(a1 . . . ar))† = K((~y1)(~y1, a1)† . . . (~yr)(~yr, ar)†, ~y′)
where the y′ and yi for all i are fresh in each clause.
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We can now easily show by induction over the structure of actions the following
lemma:
Lemma 6.3.2
Given an action a : m → n with free names ~x such that |~x| = ~p, we have that
~x:~p; ~y :~l ` (~y, a)† :n in LinA(K), where ~y = y1 . . . yr and m = ~l = l1 . . . lr.
Further, we can show that this map translates equalities between terms in
AC(K) to equality judgements of LinA(K). In order to do this we first prove an
easy lemma.
Lemma 6.3.3
Given an action a :m → n with free names ~x such that |~x| = ~p and where
m = ~l = l1 . . . lr, we have that:
~x:~p; ~z :~l ` let ⊗~y be ⊗~z in (~y, a)† = (~z, a)† :n
Lemma 6.3.4 (Soundness)
Given action a :m → n and b :m → n, whose free names are included in ~x such
that |~x| = ~p, we have that if a = b in the theory of AC(K),
~x:~p; ~y :~l ` (~y, a)† = (~y, b)† :n
where ~y = y1 . . . yr and m = l1 . . . lr.
Proof We prove this simply by considering each axiomatic equality of AC(K),
since the congruence, symmetry, transitivity and reflexivity rules of AC(K) are
duplicated in LinA(K). For brevity we will write (~y, a)† as a†~y from now on, and
we assume that in all the clauses below Γ = ~x:~p.
A1) In this case, we need to show the equality











However, this is one of the output-naturality equalities for this operator.
A2) In this case, we need to show the equality:
Γ; ~y :~l ` let ⊗~y′ be a†~y in ⊗~y′ = a
†
~y :n
which is clearly just one of the η-equalities we have given for this type-
theory.
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A3) In this case, we need to show the equality:
Γ; ~y1 :~l1, ~y2 :~l2 `let ⊗~y′1 be a
†
~y1






= let ⊗~y′1~y′2 be a†~y1 ⊗ c
†
~y2




which holds via a use of ⊗− β and some commuting conversions which are
due to output naturality.
A4) In this case, we need to show the equality:
; ~y1 :~l1, ~y2 :~l2 ` (⊗~y1)⊗ (⊗~y2) = ⊗~y1~y2 :⊗(~l1~l2)
but this follows from our tensor equality.
A5) In this case we need to show the equality:
Γ; ~y1 :~l1, ~y2 :~l2, ~y3 :~l3 ` a†~y1 ⊗ (b
†
~y2







But again this follows directly from our tensor equality.
A6) In this case, we need to show the equality:
Γ; ~y :~l ` a†~y ⊗ (⊗ε) = a
†
~y :n
and its symmetric variant. However, these again follow from our tensor
equality.
ζ1) In this case we need to show the the equality:
Γ; ~y1 : ~l2, ~y2 : ~l2 ` let ⊗~y′2~y′1 be (⊗~y2)⊗ (⊗~y1) in b
†
~y′2




which is true via the α-conversion result lemma 6.3.3.
ζ2) In this case, we need to show the equality:
Γ; ~y1 :~l1, ~y2 :~l2, ~y3 :~l3 `(⊗~y3)⊗ (⊗~y2~y1) =
let ⊗~y′1~y′3~y′2 be (⊗~y1)⊗ (⊗~y3~y2) in (⊗~y′3~y′1)⊗ (⊗~y′2):⊗(~l3~l1~l2)
which is true by virtue of the tensor equality, the ⊗ − β-equality and our
result on α-conversion lemma 6.3.3.
ζ3) In this case we need to show the equality:
; ~y :~l ` ⊗(~yε) = ⊗~y :⊗~l
which is true by definition since ε is the empty sequence.
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ζ4) In this case we need to show the equality:
; ~y1 :~l1, ~y2 :~l2 ` let ⊗~y′2~y′1 be ⊗~y2~y1 in ⊗~y′1~y′2 = ⊗~y1~y2 :⊗(~l1~l2)
which follows by ⊗− β and our α-conversion result lemma 6.3.3.
σ) In this case we need to show the equality:
Γ, y :p; ~z :~l ` let ⊗z′′~z′ be y ⊗ (⊗~z) in let x be z′′ in a†~z′ = a
†
~z{y/x}:n
which follows by ⊗− β, F − β and our α-conversion result lemma 6.3.3.
δ) In this case we need to show the equality:
Γ; y′ :p, ~y :~l ` let x be y′ in let ⊗z′~z be x⊗ ~y in a†z′~z = a
†
y′~y :n
which follows by ⊗− β, cc− 4, F − η and an instance of linear naturality,
using our α-conversion result lemma 6.3.3. 
Type Theory to Action Calculi
We now give a translation which maps the type theory LinA(K) to the action
calculus AC(K). In contrast to the previous translations, we proceed in this case
by defining an action corresponding to each Γ; ∆ term.
Definition 6.3.5 (The Translation ( )‡)
We define the translation ( )‡ on Γ; ∆-terms of LinA(K) as follows, where we write
(v)‡Γ;∆ for the action which is the image of the Γ; ∆-term v.
(x)‡Γ,x:p,Γ′; = 〈x〉
(x)‡Γ;x:m = idm
(let x:p be v in w)‡Γ;∆ = perm∆,∆1∆2 · ((v)‡Γ;∆1 ⊗ id⊗|∆2|) · (x)(w)
‡
Γ,x:p,∆2
(K((~y1 :~l1)v1 . . . (~yr :~lr)vr, ~w))‡Γ;∆ = mperm∆,∆1...∆s · ((w1)
‡










(⊗(v1 . . . vr))‡Γ;∆ = mperm∆,∆1...∆r · ((v1)
‡
Γ;∆1 ⊗ . . .⊗ (v1)
‡
Γ;∆1)





where firstly, perm∆,∆1,∆2 is the canonical action with arity ⊗|∆| → (⊗|∆1|) ⊗
(⊗|∆2|), where ∆ = ∆1#∆2 and ∆1 and ∆2 are uniquely determined from the
derivation of the terms v and w, and secondly mperm∆,∆1...∆r is the multiary
version.
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We now show that this translation is sound with respect to equality judge-
ments Γ; ∆ ` v = w :n in LinA(K). This is done by induction over the structure
of equality judgements, but by familiar arguments we need only show it for the
axiomatic equalities of LinA(K). First we prove a substitution lemma.
Lemma 6.3.6
Given that Γ; ∆1 ` v :m and Γ; ∆2, y :m ` w:n, we have that:





where ∆ = ∆1#∆2.
Lemma 6.3.7 (Soundness)
Given an equality judgement Γ; ∆ ` v = w :m of LinA(K), we have that the
actions (a)‡Γ;∆ and (b)
‡
Γ;∆ are equal in the theory AC.
Proof This is proved by induction over the structure of equality judgements,
but by familiar arguments we need only show it for the axiomatic equalities of
LinA(K). Considering firstly the axiomatic equalities common to all the type-
theories Lin(O), we have:
F − βV ) In this case we need to show the equality between actions:





This is a direct consequence of the σ axiom of the action calculus, given the
fact that the permutation perm∆, ,∆ is just the identity.
F − η) In this case we need to show the equality between actions:





But this follows directly as an instance of the δ equality.
cc’s) In the case of the cc’s (1-4) and cc-5 for the linearly natural operators
⊗ and let − ⊗, the equalities are preserved by properties of tensor and
composition.
Now, considering the axiomatic equalities in the set AA, we have:
1. Considering the⊗−β equality, we need to show the equality between actions
perm∆,∆2,∆′·(id⊗|∆2| ⊗ (perm∆′,∆′1,∆′2 · (w1)
‡
Γ;∆′1
⊗ (w2)‡Γ;∆′1)) · (v)
‡
Γ;∆2,~x:~m,~y:~m′ =









where ∆′′ is the unique sequence of typings satisfying ∆ = ∆′′#∆′1. This
is true by virtue of tensor and composition properties, and the definition of
perm.
2. Considering the ⊗−η equality, we need to show the equality between terms:
perm∆, ,∆ · (idε ⊗ (v)‡Γ;∆) · id⊗~m = (v)
‡
Γ;∆
which is clear since perm∆, ,∆ = id|∆|.
3. Considering the ⊗− 1 equality, the appropriate equality holds by virtue of
the uniqueness of the multi-permutation action mperm.
4. Considering the ⊗− 2 equality, we need to show the equality on actions;
mperm∆,∆ · (v)‡Γ;∆ = (v)
‡
Γ;∆
which clearly holds since by uniqueness mperm∆,∆ must be the identity.
5. Considering the let −n equality, we need to show the following equality on
actions.




perm∆,∆′′,∆′1 · (id|∆′′| ⊗ (v
′)‡Γ;∆′1) · perm(∆′′,~x:~m),∆1,(∆′2,~x:~m)




where ∆′′ is the unique sequence of typings satisfying ∆ = ∆′′#∆′1. This
clearly holds using the substitution lemma 6.3.6.
Hence we have completed the proof. 
The Translations are Inverse
We can now show that these two translations make an inverse pair.
Lemma 6.3.8 (Inverse Pair)
The translations ( )† and ( )‡ are inverse up to provable equality, in the sense
that for any action a :m → n of AC(K) having free names ~x where m = l1 . . . lr,





holds in the equational theory AC, and for any Γ; ∆-term v of LinA(K) we have
the equality judgement:
Γ; ∆ ` ((v)‡Γ;∆)
†
~y = v :n
where n is the unique type ascribed to v in the context Γ; ∆ and ∆ = ~y : ~m.
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Proof We prove this as before by induction over the structure of actions and
terms. Assume in the following that Γ = ~x : ~p. Firstly, considering actions a :
m→ n, we have:








= mperm~y:~l,(y1:l1)...(yr:lr) · idl1 ⊗ . . .⊗ idlr
but this is clearly equal to id~l.

















but by induction we have that this is equal to a · b.

















but again by induction this is the identity.







= perm(~l1~l2),~l2,~l1 · (id~l2 ⊗ id~l1)
but by uniqueness perm(~l1~l2),~l2,~l1 is just p~l1,~l2.




= (let x′ be y′ in (a)†~y)
‡
Γ;y′:q,~y:~l




but by induction this is equal to (x′)a.
Datum In this case we have that:
((〈xp〉)†ε)‡x:p; = (x)‡x:p; = 〈x〉
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Control In this case we have:

























But again this is by induction just K(a1 . . . ar).
For the second part, we prove the result over the structure of the unique
derivation of the Γ; ∆ term.
I-Ax In this case we have:
((x)‡Γ,x:p,Γ′; )
†
ε = (〈xp〉)†ε = x
and so the appropriate equality judgement is easy by reflexivity.






and so the appropriate equality judgement is easy by reflexivity.
F-Rule In this case we have:
((let xp be v in w)‡Γ;∆)
†
~y1~y2







= let ⊗~y′2~y′1 be ~y in let ⊗~y′′2 , z be ⊗~y′2 ⊗ ((v)‡Γ;∆1)
†
~y′1
in let x be z in ((w)‡Γ;∆2)
†
~y′′2
and the required equality judgement is obtainable by induction using ⊗−η,
⊗− β and cc equalities.
Control In this case we have:
((K((~y1 :~l1)v1 . . . (~y2 :~l2)v2, ~w))‡Γ;∆′)
†
~y′
= (mperm∆′,∆′1...∆′s · ((w1)
‡
Γ;∆′1
⊗ . . .⊗ (ws)‡Γ;∆′s) · K((v1)
‡





= let ⊗~z1 . . . ~zs be ~y′ in let ⊗~z′ be ((w1)‡Γ;∆′1)
†
~y′1










and the required equality can again be obtained by induction using ⊗− β,
⊗− η and cc equalities.
133
Tensor-Intro In this case, we have:
((⊗(v1 . . . vr))‡Γ;∆)
†
~y′ = (mperm∆,∆1...∆r · ((v1)
‡





= let ⊗~y1 . . . ~yr be ~y′ in ((v1)‡Γ;∆1)
†
~y1
⊗ . . . ((vr)‡Γ;∆r)
†
~yr
and by induction using ⊗− β and our α-conversion result lemma 6.3.3 the
required equality can be deduced.
Tensor-Elim In this case, we have:
((let ⊗~y : ~m be v in w)‡Γ;∆′)
†
~y′













and the required equality can again be obtained by induction using ⊗− β,
⊗− η and cc equalities.
6.4 Extensions
We now present three extensions of action calculi, which add functional or higher-
order behaviour to the basic action calculi. Essentially, these work by adding
certain higher-order operators to the standard definition of action calculi, and
certain axiomatic equalities on them to the theory of action calculi. This idea
was first introduced by Milner in [Mil94b], where he extends the action calculus
by adding an abstraction operator and an application operator similar to the ab-
straction and application of the λ-calculus. The first higher-order action calculus
we present is just this one as amended by Hasegawa [HG], generalised to allow
linear and intuitionistic primes in the same way as we have generalised Milner’s
action calculi.
Definition 6.4.1 (Higher-Order Action Calculus)
Given a signature K = (PI ,PL,K), the higher-order action calculus AC⇒(K) is
given by extending the definition of generalised action calculi as follows:
1. the derived sets P⇒I and P⇒L of primes and the set M⇒ of arities are con-
structed from the following abstract grammars:
set of intuitionistic primes P⇒I p ::= p ∈ PI | m⇒ m
set of linear primes P⇒L l ::= l ∈ PL | p ∈ P⇒I
set of arities M⇒ m ::= l ∈ P⇒L | m⊗m | ε
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2. the terms of AC⇒(K) are generated by the rules in definition 6.1.3, plus the
rules
a : m→ n
λa : ε→ m⇒ n
ap : (m⇒ n) ⊗m→ n
3. the equational theory of AC⇒ is that generated from the axioms in defini-
tion 6.1.4, plus the axioms
((λa)⊗ idm) · ap = a (β)
λ((〈x〉 ⊗ idm) · ap) = 〈x〉 (ηV )
(λ(a)⊗ id) · (x)b = b{λ(a)/〈x〉} (σ)
The action calculus AC⇒(K) is the quotient of the terms by the equality.
Extensionality The amendment made by Hasegawa [HG] to Milner’s original
definition is the addition of a ηV -equality similar to that given here in the case of
Milner’s action calculi. If we say that the η-equality for an action a : ε→ (n⇒ m)
is the equality
λ((a⊗ idm) · ap) = a
then in AC⇒(K) we can derive η-equalities for any copyable action of AC⇒(K),
and in fact the converse is true. We can read this as saying that the functional
structure is extensional over copyable actions, which we might regard as the
intuitionistic subsystem of the action calculus. We could ask what would happen
if we replaced ηV by the η-equality for all actions a of the appropriate arities.
In [Mil94b], Milner points out that this addition collapses the structure of action
calculi by making it simply that of a cartesian closed category. We can see this in
the syntax since if we add the η rule in general, then all actions of the appropriate
arity would become copyable and hence fall into the intuitionistic subsystem, so
that this subsystem would then be the whole system.
We now present two systems based on a linear decomposition of the arrow
constructor in the previous system. The first of these has just the  operator,
which corresponds to the ! of linear logic, and which acts as a ‘coding’ operator
in this setting. This was discovered independently by the author and Masahito
Hasegawa.
Definition 6.4.2 (Action Calculus with Code)
Given a signature K = (PI ,PL,K), the action calculus with code AC(K) is given
by extending the definition of action calculi as follows:
135
1. the sets PI and PL of intuitionistic and linear primes and the set M of
arities are constructed from the following abstract grammars:
set of intuitionistic primes PI p ::= p ∈ PI |  (m)
set of linear primes PL l ::= l ∈ PL | p ∈ PI
set of arities M m ::= l ∈ PL | m⊗m | ε
2. the terms of AC(K) are generated by the rules in definition 6.1.3, plus the
rules
a : ε→ m
code(a) : ε→ (m) decode : (m)→ m
3. the equational theory of AC is that generated from the axioms in defini-
tion 6.1.4, plus the axioms
code(a) · decode = a (β)
code(〈x〉 · decode) = 〈x〉 (η)
(code(a)⊗ id) · (x)b = b{code(a)/〈x〉} (σ)
The action calculus AC(K) is the quotient of the terms by the equality.
Secondly, we introduce a system which extends AC(K) by adding the linear
function type, with abstraction and application operators.
Definition 6.4.3 (Linear Higher-Order Action Calculus)
Given a signatureK = (PI ,PL,K), the linear higher-order action calculus AC,((K)
is given by extending the definition of action calculi as follows:
1. the sets PI and PL of intuitionistic and linear primes and the set M,( of
arities are constructed as follows:
set of intuitionistic primes P,(I p ::= p ∈ PI |  (m)
set of linear primes P,(L l ::= l ∈ PL | p ∈ P
,(
I | l( n
set of arities M,( m ::= l ∈ P,(L | m⊗m | ε
2. the terms of AC,((K) are generated by the rules in definition 6.1.3 and
definition 6.4.2, plus the rules
a : m⊗ l→ n
λlLa : m→ (l( n)
where l ∈ PL aplL : (l( n)⊗ l → n
136
3. the equational theory AC,( is the set of equations upon terms generated
from the axioms in definitions 6.1.4 and 6.4.2, plus the axioms
((λlLa)⊗ idp) · aplL = a (β)
λlL((a⊗ idp) · aplL) = a (η)
λlL((x)a) = (x)(λ
l
La) where a : m⊗ p→ n (cc)
λlL(a⊗ idp · b) = a · (λlLb) (cc)
where a : m→ n and b : n⊗ p→ n′
The action calculus AC,((K) is the quotient of the terms by the equality.
Extensionality Revisited We note that in contrast to the situation with the
extended action calculus AC⇒(K), the η-equality holds in the system AC,((K)
for all actions of the appropriate arity. However, the structure does not collapse
to that of a CCC in the case of AC,((K) since it is no longer possible to prove
that any action for which the η-equality holds is copyable. Hence this theory
provides an account of extensional functions at a linear level.
We can extend the definition of the linear arrow type to arbitrary arities.
Given an arity m = l1 . . . lr, define on arities m( n = l1 ( (. . . (lr ( n)..), and
on actions λmL (a) = λ
l1
L (. . .λ
lr
L (a)..) and apmL = (ap
l1
L⊗ idl2⊗ . . . lr) · . . .·aplrL . Note
that this definition makes ε( m = m, and correspondingly on term constructs




Having presented these extensions, we can give some relationships between them.
It is clear firstly that there are trivial embeddings ι1 : AC(K) → AC(K) and
ι2 : AC(K)→ AC,((K). However, there also exist translations ι3 : AC(K)→
AC⇒(K) and ι4 : AC⇒(K)→ AC,((K).
Definition 6.4.4 (The Translation ι3)
Define the translation ι3 : AC(K) → AC⇒(K) as the obvious embedding on
shared constructs, augmented with:




Definition 6.4.5 (The Translation ι4)
Define the translation ι4 : AC⇒(K) → AC,((K) as the obvious embedding on
shared constructs, augmented with:
ι4(m⇒ n) = (m( n)
ι4(λ(a)) = code(λmL (ι4(a))) where a : m→ n













Figure 6.1: Translations between AC(K) and its extensions
We summarise the translations in figure 6.1. It can easily be shown that the
triangle at the bottom of this diagram commutes up to equality in AC,((K).
Extending LinA(K)
We now extend our generalised linear type-theory LinA(K) to provide type-theories
corresponding to the extended action calculi defined previously. We introduce
some notation for these definitions, where E denotes any extension from ,→ or
,(:
• When we say that an operator set OAEL contains all control operators we
will mean that it contains every operator OK of OAL.
• When we say that an operator setOAEL contains all ⊗Rm1...mr operators we will





• When we say that an operator set OAEL contains all ⊗Lm1...mr operators
we will mean that it contains instances of every operator in the output-
parameterised set ⊗Lm1...mr for all m1 . . .mr ∈ M
AE
L .
• When we say that an axiom set AAE contains all l-equalities, for some
identifying label l, we will mean that contains every well-formed equality
having the form of the equality l in the typing system LinA(OE).
Definition 6.4.6 (The Type Theory Lin
A
⇒(K))
We define the type theory LinA⇒(K) over a signature K = (PI ,PL,K) as the






L ) and we define
these objects as follows:
• The set MA⇒I is the set of singleton sequences of elements of P⇒I .
• The set MA⇒L is the set of sequences of elements of P⇒L .
• The set OA⇒L contains all control operators, all ⊗Rm1...mr operators and all
⊗Lm1...mr operators and also:
1. For each m and n in MA⇒L , an operator λm,n of arity:
(;m)n ;
(; )m⇒ n
We will write the general operator application λm,n((; x)v; )(; ) in the
form λx:m.v.
2. For each m and n in MAL an operator ap of arity:
;
(; (m⇒ n),m)n
We will write ap(; )(; vw) in the familiar way as vw.
• The set OA⇒I is the subset of OA
⇒
L containing for each m and n the operator
λm,n.
• The set AA⇒ contains all ⊗− β,⊗− η,⊗− 1 and ⊗− 2 equalities and also:
1. All well formed equality judgements of the form:
(λ − β) Γ; ∆ ` (λx.v)w = v{w/x}:m
2. All well formed equality judgements of the form:
(λ − ηV ) Γ, y :m⇒ n; ` λx.(yx) = y :m⇒ n
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3. All the equality judgements in the sets ONat(OA⇒ ,⊗Lm1...mr), for any
m1 . . .mr.
Definition 6.4.7 (The Type Theory Lin
A
(K))
We define the type theory LinA(K) over a signature K = (PI ,PL,K) as the type






L ) and we define these
objects as follows:
• The set MAI is the set of singleton sequences of elements of PI .
• The set MAL is the set of sequences of elements of PL .
• The set OAL contains all control operators, all ⊗Rm1...mr operators and all
⊗Lm1...mr operators and also:
1. For each m ∈ MAL an operator codem of arity:
(; )m ;
(; ) (m)
We will write the general operator application codem((; )v; )(; ) as code(v).
2. For each m ∈ MAL an operator decodem of arity:
;
(;(m))m
We will write the general operator application decodem(; )(; v) as decode(v).
• The set OAI is the subset of OA

L containing for each m the codem operator.
• The set AA contains all ⊗− β,⊗− η,⊗− 1 and ⊗− 2 equalities and also:
1. All well formed equality judgements of the form:
(− β) Γ; ` decode(code(v)) = v :m
2. All well formed equality judgements of the form:
(− η) Γ; ` code(decode(x)) = x:(m)
3. All equality judgements in the sets ONat(OA,⊗Lm1...mr), for allm1 . . .mr.
Definition 6.4.8 (The Type Theory Lin
A
,((K))
We define the type theory LinA,((K) over a signature K = (PI ,PL,K) as the







and we define these objects as follows:
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• The set MA,(I is the set of singleton sequences of elements of P
,(
I .
• The set MA,(L is the set of sequences of elements of P
,(
L .
• The set OA,(L contains all control operators, all ⊗Rm1...mr operators and all
⊗Lm1...mr operators and also:
1. For each m ∈ MAL an operator codem of arity:
(; )m ;
(; ) (m)
We will write the general operator application codem((; )v; )(; ) as code(v).
2. For each m ∈ MAL an operator decodem of arity:
;
(;(m))m
We will write the general operator application decodem(; )(; v) as decode(v).
3. For each l ∈ P,(L and each n ∈ MA
,(
L , an operator λLl,n of arity:
; (; l)n
(; )l( n
We will write the general operator application λLl,n(; (; x)v)(; ) as λLx:
l.v.
4. For each l ∈ PA,(L and n ∈ MA

L an operator apLl,n of arity:
;
(; l, (l( n))n
We will write apLl,n(; )(; vw) as vw.
• The set OA,(I is the subset of OA
,(
L containing just the codem operators
for each m ∈ MA,(L .
• The set AA,( contains all ⊗ − β,⊗ − η,⊗ − 1,⊗ − 2, − β and  − η
equalities and also:
1. All well formed equality judgements of the form:
(λ− β) Γ; ∆ ` (λx.v)w = v{w/x}:m
2. All well formed equality judgements of the form:
(λ− η) Γ; ∆ ` λx.(vx) = v :l( n
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We can see that the embeddings and translations ι1 . . . ι4 induce similar em-
beddings and translations amongst our extended type theories. We overload
notation to call these ι1 . . . ι4 as well.
We can extend our functions ( )† and ( )‡ to relate each extended action
calculus with its corresponding type theory. Here, we just summarise all of these
translations together by giving their definitions on the various arity and term
constructs.
Definition 6.4.9 (The Extended Translation ( )†)
We define the translation ( )† on the various extended action calculi as follows:
(~y,λ(a))† = λz.(let ⊗~y be z in (z~y, a)†)
(y1y2, ap)† = y1y2
(ε, code(a))† = code((ε, a)†)
(y, decode)† = decode(y)
(~y,λlL(a))
† = λLz.(~yz, a)†
(y1y2, aplL)
† = y1y2
Definition 6.4.10 (The Extended Translation ( )‡)
We define the translation ( )‡ on the various type theories corresponding to ex-


















(vw)‡Γ;∆ = perm∆,∆1,∆2 · ((v)‡Γ;∆1 ⊗ (w)
‡
Γ;∆2) · apL
We can now easily extend our results on the basic translations to these exten-
sions.
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Lemma 6.4.11 (The Extended Translations)
The extended translations ( )† and ( )‡ make AC⇒(K) and LinA
⇒(K) isomorphic,
they make AC(K) and LinA




Since the theory of action calculi itself is a relatively recent development, there
is less work on the semantics of action calculi than on that of ILL. A semantics
was first given in the form of control structures [MMP95], which are symmet-
ric monoidal categories with abstractors to represent the name-structure. A
fibrational equivalent not requiring naming structure was given by Hermida and
Power [HP95]. Then this was proved equivalent by Power to an alternative for-
mulation using an adjunction [Pow96]. These models were used as the basis for
the models of Gardner et al. [HG, BGHP97], and in this section we will use this
definition. In the higher-order case, there has been less work, but definitions of
models have been given [HG, BGHP97], which we will use in the following.
In this section, we will say “LinA(K)-model” to mean “output-natural-in-
⊗Lm1...mr -for-all-r,m1 . . .mr LinA(K)-model”.
The Basic Case
Since we are not using precisely the original definition of action calculi, we will
need to recast the definition of [HG] slightly, to take account of our linear prime
arities.
The carrier of an action model is a triple (C,S, F ), where C is a strict cartesian
closed category, S is a symmetric monoidal closed category, and F : C → S is an
injective-on-objects strict symmetric monoidal functor.
Definition 6.5.1 (Action Model)
Action models over an action calculus signature K, ranged over byA . . . , are given
by a carrier (C,S, F ) supplemented with:
• a function [[ ]]PI : PI → obj(C) and a function [[ ]]PL : PL → obj(S) such that
for p ∈ PI , we have [[p]]PI = [[p]]PL in S,





S(F ( )⊗ [[mi]], [[ni]]),S(F ( )⊗ [[m]], [[n]])
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under the obvious interpretation of arities into S given by
[[l1 . . . lr]] = ⊗([[l1]] . . . [[lr]])
Now this definition is very reminiscent of our definition of models for our
general linear logic. We can in fact prove:
Lemma 6.5.2
Every action model gives rise to a LinA(K)-model.
Proof This is easily shown; given an action model A, we will construct a
LinA(K)-model GA. Firstly, the carrier of GA is exactly the carrier of A. The
interpretation of intuitionistic prime arities in MI is exactly the interpretation of
PI given by A, since the two sets are the same, and the interpretation on elements
of ML, which are sequences of elements of PL, is simply given by the strict tensor
of the the interpretations of the elements of PL using the interpretation function
from A. Finally, the interpretation of the operators corresponding to the controls
is exactly the interpretation of the controls themselves, and the interpretation of
the ⊗R and ⊗L-operators is given in the obvious way using the tensor structure
on the s.m.c. 
We can also define action morphisms:
Definition 6.5.3 (Action Morphisms)
An action morphism over an action calculus signature K, F : A → A′ between
two action models A and A′ having carriers (C,S, F ) and (C′,S ′, F ′) respectively
is a pair (FC : C → C′,FS : S → S ′) of morphisms such that:
• FC is strict cartesian and FS is strict symmetric monoidal,
• the following diagram commutes:
C F - S
C′
FC
? F ′ - S ′
?
FS
• FC([[ ]]API) = [[ ]]
A′
PI : PI → obj(C
′),
• FS([[ ]]APL) = [[ ]]
A′
PL : PL → obj(S
′),
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• for every control K with arity ((m1, n1), . . . , (mr, nr)) → (m,n) from the
signature K, and for every element X of C and morphisms of S fi : F (X)⊗
[[mi]]→ [[ni]] for i = 1 . . . r, we have:
FS([[K]]AK(X)(f1, . . . , fr)) = [[K]]A
′
K (FC(X))(FS(f1), . . . ,FS(fr))
Given this definition, we have:
Lemma 6.5.4
Any action morphism F gives rise to a LinA(K)-morphism.
It is easy to check the necessary conditions, which are very close to those of
the definition of LinA(K)-morphism.
We can now define the category CatAC(K) of small action models and morph-
isms over a signature K. Further, call the category of small LinA(K)-models
and LinA(K)-morphisms CatLinA(K). From our results, we can see that we have a
functor CatAC(K)→ CatLinA(K).
It is clear that a general LinA(K)-model may fail to be an action model, firstly
because the functor F of the carrier may well not be injective on objects. We can,
however, use a result of Power and Robinson [PR94], in the intuitionistic case.
Lemma 6.5.5
For an intuitionistic action calculus signature K, any LinA(K)-model gives rise to
an action model.
Proof Given a LinA(K)-model G, we will construct an action model AG. First
note that by section 5, corollary 5.1 of [PR94] given that the carrier G is (C,S, F ),
we have a strict symmetric monoidal category S ′, an identity-on-objects functor
F1 : C → S ′ and a fully faithful functor F2 : S ′ → S, such that F = F1;F2. These
are unique up to unique isomorphism. Take the carrier of AG to be (C,S ′, F1).
Then take the interpretation on intuitionistic prime arities to be [[ ]]MI : PI →
obj(C) of G. Take the interpretation on linear prime arities (which because the
signature is intuitionistic are precisely the same as the intuitionistic prime arities)
to be given
[[ ]]PL = F1([[ ]]MI) : PI → obj(S ′)
Now note that using the natural transformations present in S that
[[p1 ⊗ . . .⊗ pr]]ML ' [[p1]]⊗ . . .⊗ [[pr]]
Using these isomorphisms, and the full faithfulness of F2, we can obtain natural
transformations interpreting the controls over the carrier. 
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The Higher-Order Case
We now consider the case of Milner’s higher-order extension of an action calculus,
AC⇒(K). Again, we slightly adapt the definition given in [HG] to take account of
our linear prime arities.
Definition 6.5.6 (Higher-Order Action Model)
Higher-order action models over an action calculus signature K, again ranged over
by A . . . , are action models over K such that the functor F ( )⊗X : C → S has
a right adjoint X ⇒ : S → C, where the interpretation [[ ]]PI : PI → obj(C) is
extended by saying that [[m⇒ n]]PI = [[m]]PL ⇒ [[n]]PL.
We can now prove
Lemma 6.5.7
Each higher-order action model gives rise to a LinA⇒(K)-model.
Proof This is quite easy to show since we know that the higher-order action
model is in fact an action model over signature K, and hence we know that it
gives rise to a LinA(K)-model. However, this LinA(K)-model has the required
interpretation of the new intuitionistic prime arities of LinA⇒(K) by virtue of
the functor ⇒, and the abstraction and application are interpreted using natural
transformations existing because of the adjunction. 
Definition 6.5.8 (Higher-Order Action Morphism)
A higher-order action morphism over an action calculus signature K, F : A→ A′,
between two higher-order action calculus models A and A′ is an action morphism
(FC,FS) such that functors per-serve the functor ⇒ and the adjunction (which
is to say that the following diagrams commute):









S(F (X)⊗ Y1, Y2)
( )∗ - C(X, Y1 ⇒ Y2)







S ′(F ′FC(X) ⊗′ FS(Y1),FS(Y2)) ( )∗
- C′(FC(X),FS(Y1)⇒′ FS(Y2))
As before, we have:
Lemma 6.5.9
Any higher-order action morphism gives rise to a LinA⇒(K)-morphism.
Proof The underlying action morphism gives rise to a LinA(K)-morphism, and
this is seen also to preserve the added structure of LinA⇒(K) since it preserves the
adjunction which underlies that structure. 
Now we can define the category of small higher-order action models and
morphisms, written CatAC⇒(K), and the category of small LinA
⇒(K)-models and
morphisms, written Cat⇒LinA(K). We then have a functor CatAC⇒(K)→ Cat⇒LinA(K)
as before, but we also have the obvious forgetful reducts CatAC⇒(K)→ CatAC(K)
and Cat⇒LinA(K)→ CatLinA(K).
Following the definition of higher-order action models for Milner’s higher-
order action calculus AC⇒(K), we could define models for AC(K), based on the
functor F having an adjoint, and for AC,((K), based on F having an adjoint and
S being strict symmetric monoidal closed. Then results analogous to those above
relating AC(K)-models and LinA
(K)-models and morphisms, and AC,((K)-
models and LinA,((K)-models and morphisms would hold. This development is
pursued in [BGHP97], and the reader is referred there for the details. However, we
prefer to develop a more uniform account of higher-order behaviour in the context




In this chapter we give a general higher-order (functional) version of our general-
ised linear type-theory. We see how any generalised linear type-theory gives rise
to a higher order extension, and show that the embedding of the original theory
into the higher-order extension is conservative, using a semantic argument. We
consider some consequences of this for our case study in action calculi.
Then, we introduce a higher-order type-theory which is isomorphic to our type
theory DILL(C), hence showing that the notion of higher-order extension which
we have given is well founded.
7.1 Higher-Order Type Theories
It will be the case that a higher-order generalised linear type-theory (which hence-
forth we will call just a higher-order type-theory) is an instance of a generalised
type-theory with certain higher-order operators and axioms. We will need to give
a generalised signature for this instance.
First, given type-sets MI and ML, define the higher-order type sets MHI and
MHL as follows, inductively:
Q ∈ MHI ::= Q ∈ MI | !A (for A ∈ MHL)
A ∈ MHL ::= A ∈ ML | I | A⊗ A | A( A | !A
We can now define a higher-order signature, which is essentially a signature
in which the operators may use higher-order types over the primitive types given
in the signature.
Definition 7.1.1 (Higher-Order Signature)
Define a higher-order signature, ranged over byH, to be a quadruple (MI ,ML,OI,OL)
such that (MHI ,MHL,OI,OL) is a generalised signature.
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Now, given a higher-order signature (MI ,ML,OI,OL), define the higher-order
operator sets OHI and OHL as follows, again inductively:
O ∈ OHI ::= O ∈ OI | !
O ∈ OHL ::= O ∈ OL | IR | ILA | ⊗RA,B | ⊗LA,B−C | λA,B | apA,B | !A |
!
A
for A,B,C ∈ MHL, where:
• the operator IR is a constant with arity I ,
• the output-parameterised set of operators IL have arity:
; (; )( )
(; I)( )
• for each A and B, the operator ⊗RA,B has arity:
; (; )A (; )B
(; )A⊗B
• for each A and B, the output-parameterised set of operators ⊗LA,B has arity:
; (;A,B)( )
(;A⊗B)( )
• for each A and B, the operator λA,B has arity:
; (;A)B
(; )A( B
• for each A and B, the operator apA,B has arity:
;
(;A,A( B)B
• for each A, the operator !A has arity:
(; )A ;
(; )!A




From now on, we will use standard abbreviations for these operators as follows:
∗ for IR
let ∗ be v in w for ILA(; ()w)(; v)
w ⊗ v for ⊗RA,B (; ()w, ()v)()
let x⊗ y : A⊗B be v in w for ⊗LA,B−C (; (; x:A, y :B)w)(; v)
λx:A.v for λA,B(; (; x:A)v)()
vw for apA,B(; )(; v, w)





We will write OH for the generalised signature (MHI ,MHL,OHI ,OHL), where H is
the higher-order signature (MI ,ML,OI ,OL).
Now we can define the higher-order typing-system.
Definition 7.1.2 (Higher-Order Typing System)
The higher-order typing system over a higher-order signature H, which we will
write LinH(H), is just the generalised linear typing system Lin(OH).
Say that a higher order axiom set is just an axiom set A over the higher-order
typing system LinH(H).
Definition 7.1.3 (Basic Higher-Order Axiom Set)
Define the basic higher order axiom set AH over a higher-order signature H to
be the axiom set containing the equality judgements in the sets ONat(OH , IL)
and ONat(OH ,⊗LA,B) for all A,B ∈ MHL, and every instance for types of H of the
equality judgements:
β η
Γ; ∆ ` let ∗ be ∗ in v = v :A Γ; ∆ ` let ∗ be v in ∗ = v :I
Γ; ∆ ` let x⊗ y be v1 ⊗ v2 in w = w{v1, v2/x, y}:A Γ; ∆ ` let x⊗ y be v in x⊗ y :A⊗ B
Γ; ∆ ` (λx.v)w = w{v/x}:A Γ; ∆ ` λx.(vx):A( B
Γ; ` !(!v) = v :A x :!A; `!( !x) = x :!A
We are now in a position to define the higher-order type-theory over a given
higher-order signature and axiom set.
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Definition 7.1.4 (Higher-Order Type-Theory)
Given a higher-order signature H and a higher-order axiom set A, define the
higher-order type theory over H and A, written LinH(H,A), as the generalised
linear type-theory Lin(OH,A ∪ AH).
Derived Typing Rules
Given this definition, LinH(H,A) has the following typing rules for its higher-order
operators:
Γ; ` ∗:I
Γ; ∆1 ` v :I Γ; ∆2 ` w:A
Γ; ∆ ` let ∗ be v in w:A
Γ; ∆1 ` v :A Γ; ∆2 ` w:B
Γ; ∆ ` v ⊗ w:A⊗B
Γ; ∆1 ` v :A⊗B Γ; ∆2, x:A, y :B ` w:C
Γ; ∆ ` let x⊗ y be v in w:C
Γ; ∆′, x:A ` v :B
Γ; ∆′ ` λx.v :A( B
Γ; ∆1 ` v :A( B Γ; ∆2 ` w:A
Γ; ∆ ` vw:B
Γ; ` v :A
Γ; `!v :!A
Γ; ∆′ ` v :!A
Γ; ∆′ ` !(v):A
where ∆ = ∆1#∆2.
The Higher-Order Extension of Lin(O,A)
Having defined higher-order type-theories, we can now show that we immediately
have a family of such things. Firstly, note that given any generalised signature
O = (MI ,ML,OI ,OL), we have another generalised signature (MHI ,MHL,OI ,OL).
Therefore, O is itself a higher-order signature. Further, the embedding on pre-
terms in fact maps Γ; ∆-terms of Lin(O) to Γ; ∆-terms of LinH(O).
Now, note that if A is an axiom set over the generalised linear typing system
Lin(O), then it is also one over the generalised typing system (MHI ,MHL,OI ,OL).
Hence, it is itself a higher-order axiom set. We have, therefore, that LinH(O,A) is
a higher-order type-theory, and we call this higher-order type-theory the higher-
order extension of the original type-theory. It follows easily that the embedding
on terms Lin(O,A) → LinH(O,A) is sound; later in this chapter, we will use
semantic methods to demonstrate that it is also conservative.
Operators as Higher-Order Constants
One advantage of higher-order structure is that it allows us to code general oper-
ators as constants of higher types. Unfortunately, there is a slight problem with
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encoding operators in OI, which arises since we need to make the image of any
instance of such an operator copyable in the higher-order type-theory. In general,
there is no way to give a constant encoding of the operator which will achieve
this without adding equalities to the system. However, we can prove a result:
Lemma 7.1.5
The arbitrary linear type-theory Lin(O,A) is equivalent to the linear type theory
Lin((MI ,ML, ∅,OL),A∪
⋃
O∈OI Int(O, O)), where Int(O, O) is defined as the set of
all equality judgements of the form
Γ; ∆ `let x be O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; )() in w
= w{O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr); )()/x}:A
in the typing system Lin(O).
Proof This can be seen using the translations which are the identity on types
and terms in both directions. The only issue is whether these translations preserve
provable equality, but this is easily seen since in one direction we map an instance
of the F -rule for the operator O to an equality judgement in Int(O, O), and in
the other direction we map an equality judgement in a set Int(O, O) back to an
instance of the F − β-axiom for the intuitionistic operator O. 
This result assures us that any linear type-theory is equivalent to one with no
intuitionistic operators at the level of terms and provable equality.
Given a linear operator set OL, define the operator constant set corresponding
to it, written OCL, to be the set which contains for each operator O ∈ OL having
arity:
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)Br ; (~Q′1; ~A′1)B′1, . . . , (~Q′s; ~A′s)B′s
(~Q′′; ~A′′)B′′
a constant cO with arity:
(⊗i=1...r!(⊗~Qi ~Ai( Bi))⊗ (⊗j=1...s(⊗~Q′j ~A′j ( B′j))( (⊗~Q′′ ~A′′( B′′)
where ⊗ ~A is the standard left-bracketed tensor.
Now, given a higher-order signature H = (MI ,ML, ∅,OL), we can easily see
that (MI ,ML, ∅,OCL) is another higher-order signature. Write LinHC(H) for the
higher-order typing system LinH(MI ,ML, ∅,OCL).
Having made this definition, we can give a translation from LinH(H) to LinHC(H)˙
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Definition 7.1.6 (The Translation ( ))
Define the translation ( ) from LinH(H) to LinHC(H) as the identity on types,
and on pre-terms as follows:
(x) = x
(let x be v in w) = let x be (v) in (w)
(O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y
′






cO(⊗i=1...r!(λz.let ⊗~x′′i ~yi be z in let ~xi be ~x′′i in (vi)))
⊗ (⊗j=1...s(λz.let ⊗~x′′′j ~y′j be z in let ~x′j be ~x′′′j in (wj))) (⊗(~v′ ~w′))
This translation can be shown to take Γ; ∆-terms of LinH(H) to Γ; ∆-terms of
LinHC(H).
Now, given a higher-order signature H = (MI ,ML, ∅,OL), we can define the
generalised linear type theory LinHC(H,A) to be the higher-order type-theory
LinH((MI ,ML, ∅,OCL),A). Given this definition, the translation ( ) is sound.
7.2 Higher-Order Semantics
Having given our definition of higher-order type theories, we now need to consider
the semantics of such type-theories. Since every higher-order type theory is in
fact an instance of a generalised linear type theory, we already have a definition of
model for any higher-order signature. However, this inherited definition of model
is not ideal, for example because it requires us to give a primitive interpretation of
all the new higher-order types which exist in a general higher-order type-theory.
We would much prefer that these, and indeed the operators which exists in every
higher-order type theory, were interpreted into primitive structure already present
in the models in a standard way.
We can make such a definition by considering the semantics of DILL(C). It
is no coincidence that in fact many of the operators of the higher-order type
theory have typing rules very similar to those of DILL(C), or that the models
of DILL(C) which we defined were built on a carrier having a cartesian category
with a strong monoidal functor to a symmetric monoidal category, augmented
with extra structure. In fact, we will define models of higher-order type theories
using most of the structure of DILL(C)-models.
The carrier of a LinH(H,A)-model is a quadruple (C,S, F,G) such that C is
a cartesian category, S is a symmetric monoidal closed category, F : C → S is
strict monoidal and G ` F . Note that C need not necessarily be closed, and that
neither C nor S need be strict.
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Now, the carrier of a LinH(H,A)-model easily yields a carrier for a Lin(O,A)-
model, which we call the underlying carrier; simply take the triple (C,S, F ) with
the strict cartesian structure on C given by the left-bracketed product, and the
strict symmetric monoidal structure on S given by the left-bracketed tensor, and
F as before.
Definition 7.2.1 (Higher-Order Lin
H(H)-interpretation)
A higher-order interpretation of the higher-order typing system LinH(H), which
we write H, is a carrier (C,S, F,G) together with:
• primitive interpretation functions [[ ]]HMI : MI → obj(C) and [[ ]]
H
ML : ML →
obj(S) such that for all Q ∈ MI , we have [[Q]]HML = F ([[Q]]
H
MI )
• for each operator O ∈ OL having arity
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)Br ; (~Q′1; ~A′1)B′1, . . . , (~Q′s; ~A′s)B′s
(~Q′′; ~A′′)B′′
a natural transformation
[[O]]HOL :(×i=1...rS(F (=)⊗ [[ ~Qi; ~Ai]]
G, [[Bi]]GML))×
(×j=1...sS(F (=)⊗ [[ ~Q′j]]⊗ ( j)⊗ [[ ~A′j]]G, [[B′j]]GML))
→ S(F (=)⊗ [[ ~Q′′]]⊗ (⊗j=1...s( s))⊗ [[ ~A′′]]G, [[B′′]]GML)
which is natural independently in each of the s + 1 arguments (=) and
( 1), . . . , ( s), and where the interpretation [[ ]]G is extended to arbitrary
contexts in the obvious way, as given shortly,
• for each operator O ∈ OI having arity
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)Br;
(; )R
a natural transformation
[[O]]HOI :×i=1...r S(F (=)⊗ [[ ~Qi; ~Ai]]
G, [[Bi]]GML)
→ C(=, [[Q′′]]GC)
where the interpretation is again given shortly, such that for all objects X
of C and all arrows fi : F (X)⊗ [[ ~Qi; ~Ai]]→ [[Bi]] where i = 1 . . . r in S,
[[O]]GOL(X)(f1, . . . , fr) = F ([[O]]
G
OI(X)(f1, . . . , fr))
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We can now easily extend the interpretation functions [[ ]] to higher order
types:
[[I ]] = I
[[A⊗B]] = [[A]]⊗ [[B]]
[[A( B]] = [[A]]( [[B]]
[[!A]] = FG([[A]])
[[!A]]C = G([[A]])
and to sequences of such types using the left-bracketed product and tensor
in the familiar way. Further, we can extend the interpretation of operators as
follows:
[[∗]](X) = F (dX)
[[ILA]](X;Y )(f) = liF (=)⊗ ; f
[[⊗RA,B]](X;Y1Y2)(f1f2) = admin1; (f1 ⊗ f2)
[[⊗LA,B−C]](X;Y )(f) = admin2; f
[[λA,B]](X;Y )(f) = λf
[[apA,B ]](X; ) = (F (dX)⊗ ap); ri[[B]]
[[!A]](X)(f) = F (unX ;G(f))
[[
!
A]](X) = (F (dX)⊗ nu[[A]]); ri[[A]]
[[!A]]C(X)(f) = unX;G(f)
where admin! and admin2 are the obvious morphisms in the s.m.c.:
admin1 :(FX ⊗ Y1)⊗ Y2 → (FX ⊗ Y1)⊗ (FX ⊗ Y2)
admin2 :((FX ⊗ [[A]])⊗ [[B]])⊗ Y → (FX ⊗ ([[A]]⊗ [[B]]))⊗ Y
Now, we have a lemma:
Lemma 7.2.2
Given a LinH(H)-interpretation, its underlying carrier (with the strict left-bracketed
product and tensor) and the extended interpretation functions defined above make
up all the information required for a Lin(OH)-interpretation.
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We can therefore interpret terms of LinH(H) into our model by the derived
interpretation, and henceforth we will use this derived interpretation of LinH(H)
into LinH(H)-interpretations. Given this derived interpretation, we have a lemma
on the axiom set AH .
Lemma 7.2.3
Any LinH(H)-interpretation H interprets the equality judgements in the axiom
set AH as categorical equalities in the s.m.c. part of H.
This is easily shown by analogy with soundness for DILL(C) in DILL(C)-
models, since we have the same underlying categorical structure. With this
lemma, we can now define LinH(H,A)-models.
Definition 7.2.4 (Lin
H(H,A)-model)
A LinH(H,A)-model is a LinH(H)-interpretationH such that the derived interpret-
ation given by lemma 7.2.2 maps equality judgements of the higher-order axiom
set A to equalities in the category S which is the s.m.c. part of the carrier of H.
Soundness for these models is easy to prove:
Lemma 7.2.5 (Soundness)
Given a LinH(H,A)-model H, and equality judgement Γ; ∆ ` v = w : A of
LinH(H,A), we have that:
[[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]H = [[Γ; ∆ ` w:A]]H
Proof The equality rules are soundly interpreted since categorical equality is a
congruence, the basic axioms of the generalised linear type-theory are soundly in-
terpreted by virtue of the fact that the interpretation is derived from a generalised
linear type-theory interpretation for which we already have soundness, the axioms
in the set AH are soundly interpreted by lemma 7.2.3 and finally the axioms in
the set A of the higher-order signature are soundly interpreted by definition. 
We now consider completeness. As usual, we will proceed by defining a term
model.
Definition 7.2.6 (The Linear Term Category)
We define the linear term category, HST , as follows:
• The objects of HST are linear types of LinH(H,A).
• HST (A,B) = {[(x, v)A,B]| ; x :A ` v :B}, where we write [(x, v)A,B] as
normal to denote the equivalence class of (x, v)A,B under the equivalence
≡′′ defined by
(x, v)A,B ≡′′ (y, w)A,B if ; x:A ` v = w{x/y}:A
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As before, we omit type annotations where convenient and write [(x, v)] as
[x, v].
Identities and composition are defined as for the term model of DILL(C), and
further, the closed monoidal structure is also defined as for the term model of
DILL(C).
Definition 7.2.7 (The Intuitionistic Term Category)
We define the intuitionistic term category, HCT , as follows:
• The objects of HCT are sequences of intuitionistic types of LinH(H,A).
• HCT ( ~A, ~B) = {[(~x,~v) ~A, ~B ]|~x : ~A; ` vi :⊗Bi and each vi is intuitionistic},
where we write [(~x,~v) ~A, ~B] to denote the equivalence class of ( ~X, ~V ) ~A, ~B under
the equivalence ≡′′C defined by:
(~x,~v) ~A, ~B ≡′′C (~y, ~w)
~A, ~B
if the sequences ~v and ~w are the same length, the sequence ~x and ~y are the
same length, and for each i, we have ~x: ~A; ` vi =I wi{~x/~y}:Bi.
As before, we omit type information where convenient, abbreviate [(~x,~v)]
to [~x,~v] and assume that in such an arrow, all the variables in ~x are distinct.
We define identities, composition and a strict cartesian structure over this just
as for the term model of DILL(C).
Now we define FT on objects of HCT as the left-bracketed tensor, and on
arrows as
FT ([~x,~v]) = [y, let ⊗~x′ be y in let ~x be ~x′ in ⊗~v]
This can be seen to be functorial. Define GT on objects of HST to take A to
the intuitionistic type !A. On objects, define
GT ([x, v]) = [y, !(v{
!
y/x})]
Now we can define the term model:
Definition 7.2.8 (Higher-Order Term Model)
Define the higher-order term model, writtenHT , to have carrier (HCT ,HST , FT , GT ),
with interpretation functions given in the obvious way.
It is a straightforward exercise to give these interpretation functions and show
that the definitions given make HT into a LinH(H,A)-model.
We can also easily show that
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Lemma 7.2.9
Given a Γ; ∆-term v of LinH(H,A) having type A, we have:
[[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]HT = [z, let ⊗~x′~y be z in let ~x be ~x′ in v]
where z and ~x′ are fresh, Γ = ~x: ~Q and ∆ = ~y : ~A.
Now we can prove completeness by the standard method.
Lemma 7.2.10 (Completeness)
Given two Γ; ∆-terms v and w of type A in LinH(H,A), we have a provable equality
judgement Γ; ∆ ` v = w:A iff in all LinH(H,A)-models, we have:
[[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]] = [[Γ; ∆ ` w:A]]
This is proved as normal.
We can define LinH(H)-morphisms as follows:
Definition 7.2.11 (Lin
H(H)-morphisms)
A LinH(H)-morphism is a pair of functors (FC : C → C′,FS : S → S ′) such that:
• FC is strict cartesian and FS is strict monoidal closed,
• the following diagrams commute:
C F - S
C′
FC
? F ′ - S ′
?
FS









• (FC,FS) is a Lin(OH)-morphism.
It is easy to see that the third of these conditions can be replaced by the
weaker condition that the pair of functors preserve the primitive interpretations
on MI ,ML,OI and OL, as the condition as stated can be deduced from the fact
that they preserve the structure of the carrier of the LinH(H)-interpretation.
Define CatLinH(H,A) to be the category of small LinH(H,A)-models and morph-
isms. Further, define CatLinHC(O,A) to be the category of small LinHC(O,A)-
models and morphisms
It is now possible to define a LinH(H,A)-morphism from HT to any arbitrary
LinH(H,A)-model H using the interpretation.
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Definition 7.2.12 (Initiality Morphism)
Given a LinH(H,A)-modelH, we have a LinH(H,A)-morphism FT = (FT C ,FT S) :
HT → H. Define FT C on objects of HCT as the left-bracketed product of the
interpretations of the sequence of types, and on arrows [~x,~v] as the pairing of the
[[~x: ~A; ` vi]]HC .
Further, define FT C on objects just as their interpretation, and on arrows
[x, v] as the interpretation [[ ; x:A ` v :B]]H.
Now we can show that this initiality morphism is a LinH(H,A)-morphism and
is unique up to isomorphism.
It is now worth noting that since we know that every LinH(H,A)-model gives
rise to a Lin(OH ,A ∪ AH) model and similarly for morphisms, we have a functor
from CatLinH(H,A) to the category of Lin(OH,A ∪ AH)-models and morphisms.
7.3 Conservativity
In this section we will use the Yoneda Lemma to prove that the translation of
the Lin(O,A) into its higher-order extension LinHC(O,A) is sound and conservat-
ive. Since we know by lemma 7.1.5 that every generalised linear type-theory is
isomorphic to one without any intuitionistic operators, for the remainder of this
section we only consider generalised signatures of this form.
Summary of the Proof To show conservativity of the translation, the basic
procedure is as follows. Given the term model of Lin(O,A), we can construct via
the Yoneda lemma a new Ĉ, Ŝ and F̂ derived from the carrier of the term model
such that Ĉ is a cartesian closed, Ŝ is s.m. closed, and F̂ has a right adjoint
G : Ŝ → Ĉ which is symmetric monoidal. These elements can be used to construct
a LinHC(O,A)-model ϕ(GT (O,A)), and further this LinHC(O,A)-model induces a
Lin(O,A)-model κ(ϕ(GT (O,A))). But the Yoneda lemma also tells us that there
exist a fully faithful cartesian functor YC : C → Ĉ and a fully faithful s.m. functor
YS : S → Ŝ such that YC ◦ F̂ ' F ◦ YS up to monoidal natural isomorphism.
These can be used to construct a Lin(O)-morphism GT (O,A)→ κ(ϕ(GT (O,A)))
which is fully faithful in its s.m. component.
Now, assume that the translations from Lin(O,A) to LinHC(O,A) of two Γ; ∆-
terms of type A are provably equal in LinHC(O,A). Then by soundness their
interpretations must be equal in ϕ(GT (O,A)). Now we use the fact that their
interpretations in the s.m.c. part of this model must be the same as the inter-
pretation of the original Γ; ∆ terms of Lin(O,A) in the s.m.c. part of the induced
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model κ(ϕ(GT (O,A))). But by initiality we know that the fully faithful Lin(O)-
morphism we constructed must be the canonical Lin(O)-morphism from the term
category, which takes each term arrow to its interpretation. Hence the interpret-
ations of our two terms in the induced Lin(O,A)-model are the images under the
morphism of their interpretations in the term model GT (O,A), but since their
interpretations are equal in the induced category by faithfulness their interpret-
ations in the term model will be equal, and hence by completeness the terms
themselves are equal.
The outline of the proof is simple, but there are a number of problems to be
overcome which we have glossed over in this account under the phrase “can be
used to construct”. These include size problems and strictness issues.
Preliminaries
We now give some type-theoretic results which will be used in the proof of con-
servativity.
Definition 7.3.1
We define an embedding of categories κ : CatLinHC(O,A)→ CatLin(O,A) as follows:
Given a LinHC(O,A)-model G with carrier (C,S, F,G) and interpretation functions
[[ ]]G, let κ(G) have carrier (C,S, F ) with the strict left-bracketed product and
tensor, interpretation functions on types those of G, and finally the interpretation





!(⊗~Qi ~Ai( Bi)⊗ (
⊗
j=1...s




S(F (=)⊗ [[ ~Qi; ~Ai]], [[Bi]])×
∏
j=1...s
S(F (=)⊗ j ⊗ [[ ~Q′j; ~A′j]], [[B′j]]),
S(F (=)⊗ 1 ⊗ . . .⊗ s ⊗ [[ ~Q′′; ~A′′]], [[B′′]]))
Having defined this embedding, we give a lemma on interpretations in Lin(O,A)-
models.
Lemma 7.3.2
For any Γ; ∆-term v of type A in Lin(O,A), and any Lin(O,A)-model G, [[Γ; ∆ `
v :A]]G = FT G([[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]), where FT G : GT (O,A)→ G is the unique initiality
map.
This is easily seen from the definition of the canonical morphism (definition




Given a LinHC(O,A)-model G and a Γ; ∆-term v of type A in Lin(O,A), then
[[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]G = [[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]κ(G) in the s.m. category which is common to G
and κ(G).
In order to see this, we need to note firstly that the structure used by both
interpretations is all on the carrier and hence shared apart from the primitive
interpretation of the operators, and it is straightforward isomorphism-chasing to
show that the interpretation of any operator instance is the same when it is first
mapped to LinHC(O,A) as it is when interpreted directly from Lin(O,A) into κ(G).
Given this last result, we can now show soundness of the translation ( ) using
our semantic results.
Lemma 7.3.4 (Soundness)
If Γ; ∆ ` v = w:A in Lin(O,A), then Γ; ∆ ` (v) = (w) :A in LinHC(O,A).
Proof Assume that we have an arbitrary LinHC(O,A)-model G, and two terms
Γ; ∆ ` v = w :A in Lin(O,A). Now by soundness of the Lin(O,A)-interpretation
we must have that [[Γ; ∆ ` v : A]]κ(G) = [[Γ; ∆ ` w : A]]κ(G) in the induced Lin(O,A)-
model, and also by our lemma [[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]G = [[Γ; ∆ ` w :A]]G under the
interpretation of LinHC(O,A) in the arbitrary LinHC(O,A)-model. But then by
completeness of LinHC(O,A), we must have that Γ; ∆ ` v = w :A as required.

The Yoneda Construction
We now consider the details of the Yoneda construction which we will use to obtain
a LinHC(O,A)-model ϕ(G) from any given Lin(O,A)-model G, and also to show
that the unique Lin(O)-morphism FT κ(ϕ(GT (O,A))) : GT (O,A) → κ(ϕ(GT (O,A)))
has a fully faithful s.m. part. As we noted at the beginning of this section, there
are some technical problems which we must consider carefully. First we state the
Yoneda lemma in the form that we will use it.
Lemma 7.3.5 (Yoneda)
Given a locally small category C, define Ĉ to be the functor category SetCop, and
define YC : C → Ĉ to be the functor which takes any object of C, X, to the
hom-functor C( , X) and which takes any arrow of C, f : X → Y , to the natural
transformation C( , f) : C( , X)→ C( , Y ) with the obvious compositional action.
This construction has the following properties [Day70a, Day70b, Day73]:
• If C is symmetric monoidal, then Ĉ is symmetric monoidal closed, and YC is
strong symmetric monoidal.
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• If C is cartesian, then Ĉ is cartesian closed, and YC is strong cartesian.
• Given a strong symmetric monoidal functor F : C → S, we have a strong
symmetric monoidal functor F̂ : Ĉ → Ŝ which is unique up to isomorphism,
has a right adjoint and such that we have a symmetric monoidal natural
isomorphism F̂ ◦ YC ' YS ◦ F .
As we have previously said, given this lemma there are some technical dif-
ficulties to overcome before we can achieve our aim, which is to find a small
LinHC(O,A)-model, based on the Yoneda construction over the term model, such
that the initiality morphism to κ of this model in the category CatLin(O,A) is
faithful in its s.m. part.
The first problem is a size problem. The categories yielded by the Yoneda
construction are not small in general, and hence no model we construct directly
using them will be in any of our categories of models. However, we can avoid this
by taking full subcategories of the categories Ĉ containing (the image of) C and
closed under the relevant operations.
The second difficulty is that although models of Lin(O,A) have strict tensor
structure and strict cartesian structure, the Yoneda construction yields categories
which have corresponding structure which may not be strict. We therefore present
our first proposition:
Proposition 7.3.6 (Strictness)
Given a symmetric monoidal category C, there exists a strict symmetric monoidal
category Cs which is equivalent to C. Similarly, given a cartesian category C,
there exists a strict cartesian category Cs which is equivalent to C. Also, given a
symmetric monoidal functor F : C → C′, there exists a strict symmetric monoidal
functor Fs : Cs → C′s such that the following diagram commutes, where UC and
SC are the fully faithful functors witnessing the equivalence:











The final difficulty is that given a Lin(O,A)-model G with carrier (C,S, F ),
the candidate carrier for a LinHC(O,A)-model, (Ĉs, Ŝs, F̂ , G) has the property
that YC ; F̂ ' F ;YS, where we will want to use the Yoneda functors YC and YS to
construct a Lin(O,A)-map from G to the LinHC(O,A)-model based on the Yoneda
construction. Hence we recall the following proposition:
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Proposition 7.3.7 (Skeleton)
Given a category C, there exists a category sk(C) which is equivalent to C such
that any two objects of sk(C) which are isomorphic are equal and any two arrows
of sk(C) which are isomorphic in the arrow category of sk(C) are equal, where
the arrow category of a category S has objects the arrows of S and as arrows
(f : X → Y ) → (g : X ′ → Y ′) pairs of arrows of S, (h1, h2) where h1 : X → X ′
and h2 : Y → Y ′ and the obvious diagram commutes.
Note that the fully faithful functors K : S → sk(S) and I : sk(S)→ S given
by this proposition are strict symmetric monoidal under the obvious (strict) s.m.
structure over the skeleton. Given this machinery, we can now define a small
LinHC(O,A)-model using the Yoneda construction over a small Lin(O,A)-model.
Lemma 7.3.8
Given a small Lin(O,A)-model G, we can define a small LinHC(O,A)-model ϕ(G).
Proof For the purposes of this proof, we will assume that the categories Ĉ and
Ŝ are the small categories obtained by taking full subcategories of the Yoneda
constructions as mentioned earlier.
Firstly, we consider the carrier. Given that the carrier of G is (C,S, F ), we
make the following definitions. Let SC : Ĉ → Ĉs and UC : Ĉs → Ĉ be the fully
faithful cartesian functors given by the equivalence of Ĉ and Ĉs, such that S;U '
: Ĉ → Ĉ. Also, let SS : Ŝ → Ŝsand US : Ŝs → Ŝ be the fully faithful
symmetric monoidal functors given by the equivalence of Ŝ and S. Finally, let
K : Ŝs → sk(Ŝs) and I : sk(Ŝs) → Ŝs be the fully faithful strict symmetric-
monoidal functors given by the equivalence of Ŝs and sk(Ŝs).
Now, let the carrier of ϕ(G) be (Ĉs, sk(Ŝs), F̂s;K, I ;Gs) where F̂ a G. In order
to show that this has the right form we need just to show that F̂s;K a I ;Gs, but
this follows from the original adjunction via the diagram of proposition 7.3.6 and
the properties of K and I .
We will now define Y ′C : C → Ĉs as YC ;SC and Y ′S : S → sk(Ŝs) as YS ;SS ;K.




















and define [[ ]]ϕ(G)MHI as follows:












) = [[ ]]ϕ(G)MHL : M
H
I → Ŝs
by virtue of the natural isomorphism:
Y ′C ; F̂s;K ' YC ;SC; F̂s;K ' YC ; F̂ ;SS;K ' F ;YS;SS ;K ' F ;Y ′S
and the fact that since any two isomorphic objects or arrows in sk(Ŝs) are equal,
Y ′C; F̂s = F ;Y ′S.
Finally, we need to give the operator interpretation on elements of OL. Since




!(⊗~Qi ~Ai( Bi)⊗ (
⊗
j=1...s








sk(Ŝs)(F (=)⊗ j ⊗ [[ ~Q′j; ~A′j]], [[B′j]]),
sk(Ŝs)(F (=)⊗ 1 ⊗ . . .⊗ s ⊗ [[ ~Q′′; ~A′′]], [[B′′]]))
holds given the interpretations we have already defined, it suffices to show that
for each operator we have an instance of the second natural transformation. By





Ŝ(F (=)⊗ [[ ~Qi; ~Ai]], [[Bi]])×
∏
j=1...s
Ŝ(F (=)⊗ j ⊗ [[ ~Q′j; ~A′j]], [[B′j]]),
Ŝ(F (=)⊗ 1 ⊗ . . .⊗ s ⊗ [[ ~Q′′; ~A′′]], [[B′′]]))




S(F (=)⊗ [[ ~Qi; ~Ai]], [[Bi]])×
∏
j=1...s
S(F (=)⊗ j ⊗ [[ ~Q′j; ~A′j]], [[B′j]]),
S(F (=)⊗ 1 ⊗ . . .⊗ s ⊗ [[ ~Q′′; ~A′′]], [[B′′]]))
Hence we have given the model ϕ(G). 
Lemma 7.3.9 (Fully Faithful)
The initiality map FT κ(ϕ(GT (O,A))) : GT (O,A) → κ(ϕ(GT (O,A))) is fully faithful
in both its component functors.
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Proof We can prove this by showing that the pair of the two fully faithful
functors Y ′C and Y ′S is a Lin(O)-morphism with the appropriate domain and codo-
main. This will then imply the result since the initiality map is unique and hence
must be this map. In order to check that (Y ′C , Y
′
S) is a Lin(O)-morphism, we need
simply to check that it has the right behaviour with respect to the primitive in-
terpretation and the functor F of the model, both of which hold by virtue of the
equality Y ′C; F̂s = F ;Y
′
S for a general Yoneda construction, and with respect to the
operator interpretation, the result is given by the isomorphisms of lemma 7.3.8.

Theorem 7 (Conservativity of ( ))
If, given two Γ; ∆-terms v and w of type A in Lin(O,A), we can derive the equality
judgement Γ; ∆ ` v = w :A in LinHC(O,A), then we must be able to derive the
equality judgement Γ; ∆ ` v = w:A in Lin(O,A).
Proof Consider the (small) LinHC(O,A)-model ϕ(GT (O,A)). Given the deriv-
able equality judgement Γ; ∆ ` v = w :A in LinHC(O,A), we know that
[[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]ϕ(GT(O,A)) = [[Γ; ∆ ` w :A]]ϕ(GT(O,A))
in ϕ(GT (O,A)).
Now this means that [[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]κ(ϕ(GT(O,A))) = [[Γ; ∆ ` w :A]]κ(ϕ(GT(O,A)))
in κ(ϕ(GT (O,A))), by lemma 7.3.3. But since we know by lemma 7.3.9 that the
s.m. part of the initiality Lin(O)-morphism FT κ(ϕ(GT (O,A))) is faithful, this implies
that [[Γ; ∆ ` v :A]]GT(O,A) = [[Γ; ∆ ` w :A]]GT (O,A) . This then gives the result by
completeness. 
7.4 Corollaries
We note some simple consequences of this result in general. Firstly, we give a
lemma:
Lemma 7.4.1
For any linear type theory Lin(O′,A′) such that the following diagram commutes:
Lin(O,A)







and θ1 and θ2 are sound, θ1 is conservative.
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Proof Given θ1(Γ; ∆) ` θ1(Γ; ∆ ` v :A) = θ1(Γ; ∆ ` w :A):θ1(A) in Lin(O′,A′),
we have that
θ2(θ1(Γ; ∆)) ` θ2(θ1(Γ; ∆ ` v :A)) = θ2(θ1(Γ; ∆ ` w:A)):θ2(θ1(A))
and hence Γ; ∆ ` (v) = (w) :A. But by the conservativity of ( ), this means
that Γ; ∆ ` v = w:A. 
This then gives us the most important corollary; that our conservativity result
implies that for the more primitive embedding:
Corollary 7.1
The trivial embedding Lin(O,A)→ LinH(O,A) is conservative for any generalised
signature O.
Proof First note that since the map ( ) : LinH(O,A) → LinHC(O,A) is sound
for signatures having no intuitionistic operators, by our lemma the trivial embed-
ding Lin(O,A) → LinH(O,A) is conservative for such signatures. But now note
that any generalised type theory is isomorphic to one having no intuitionistic
operators, and furthermore that the following square commutes, where O′ and A′










This implies that the trivial embedding is also conservative in the general
case where the signature may have intuitionistic operators, since isomorphisms
are conservative. 
Output Natural Operators
We now use this result to show how we can represent any output-natural set of
operators in a linear type-theory as a single constant in the higher-order exten-
sion of the type-theory. The idea behind this is best seen through an example.
Consider the output-natural set of operators O with arity











We claim that this can be represented in a higher-order setting by the constant
cO with arity:
!(⊗~Q~A( B)⊗ (⊗~Q′1 ~A′1 ( B1)( (⊗~Q′′ ~A′′( ⊗~Q′2 ~A′2)
In order to see how this works, consider the translation of a general operator
instance:








7→let ⊗ z~y′2 be (cO!(λz′.let ⊗~x′′~y be z′ in let ~x be ~x′′ in v)⊗
(λz′.let ⊗~x′′~y′1 be z′ in let ~x′1 be ~x′′ in w1)(⊗~v′ ~w′))
in w2
We can clearly see that this term has output-natural behaviour inherited from
that of the let -construct. Now consider the arity of the constant cOC which
represents the operator OC in the standard encoding given earlier in this chapter:
!(⊗~Q~A( B)⊗ (⊗~Q′1 ~A′1 ( B1)⊗ (⊗~Q′2 ~A′2 ( B2)( (⊗~Q′′ ~A′′( C)
We can now express cn in terms of this set of constants as follows:
cn 7→ λx.cO⊗ ~Q′2 ~A′ (x⊗ (λy.y))
and also, when we compose the mappings taking the output-natural set of operat-
ors to the (system with the) constant cn and taking the (system with the) constant
cn to the (standard higher-order system with) constants cOC , the results are the
same up to provable equality, by a simple application of the output-naturality
axioms.
To state this formally, given a higher-order signature (MI,ML, ∅,OL∪O) where
the set of operators O is output-parameterised over the set ML and has arity:
(~Q1; ~A1)B1, . . . , (~Qr; ~Ar)(Br); (~Q′1; ~A′1)B′1, . . . , (~Q′s−1; ~A′s−1)B′s−1, (~Q′s; ~A′s)( )
(~Q′′; ~A′′)( )
we say that the output-natural-in-O operator constant set, written (OL ∪O)OC is







(⊗~Q′j ~A′j ( B′j))( (⊗~Q′′ ~A′′( ⊗~Q′s ~A′s)
Now, we have as before that given a higher-order signatureH = (MI ,ML, ∅,OL)
such that OL contains an output-parameterised-in-ML set of operators,
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HOCO (MI ,ML, ∅,OOCL )
is another higher-order signature. Write LinHCO (H) for the higher-order typing
system over this higher-order signature HOCO .
Definition 7.4.2 (The Translation ( ))
Define the translation ( ) from LinH(MI ,ML, ∅,OL) to LinH(MI ,ML, ∅,OOCL )as
the identity on types and on pre-terms as follows:
(x) = x
(let x be v in w) = let x be (v) in (w)
(O′((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y
′






cO(⊗i=1...r!(λz.let ⊗~x′′i ~yi be z in let ~xi be ~x′′i in (vi)))
⊗ (⊗j=1...s(λz.let ⊗~x′′′j ~y′j be z in let ~x′j be ~x′′′j in (wj))) (⊗(~v′ ~w′))
on operators O′ 6∈ O
(OC((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . , (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y′1)w1, . . . , (~x′s; ~y′s)ws)(~v′; ~w′)) =
let ⊗ ~z~y′s be cn(⊗i=1...r!(λz.let ⊗~x′′i ~yi be z in let ~xi be ~x′′i in (vi)))
(⊗j=1...(s−1)(λz.let ⊗~x′′′j ~y′j be z in let ~x′j be ~x′′′j in (wj)))
(⊗(~v′ ~w′))
in let ~x′s be ~z in ws
We can extend the typing system LinHCO (MI ,ML, ∅,OL) to a type theory by
letting LinHCO ((MI ,ML, ∅,OL),A) be defined as the higher-order type theory
LinH((MI ,ML, ∅,OOCL ), (A))
This translation can be shown to be easily invertible.
7.5 Action Calculi
We now consider the action calculi we have defined in the light of our conser-
vativity result. First we need to define another translation.
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Definition 7.5.1 (The Translation ι5)
Define the translation ι5 : LinA
,((K)→ LinH(OA,AA) as follows:
ι5(m) =!(ι5(m))
ι5(l( m) = ι5(l)( ι5(m)
ι5(m⊗ l) = ι5(m)⊗ ι5(l)
ι5(x) = x
ι5(let x be v in w) = let x be ι5(v) in ι5(w)
ι5(⊗(~v)) = ⊗ι5(~v)
ι5(let ⊗~x be v in w) = let ⊗~x be ι5(v) in ι5(w)







This translation is easily shown to be sound. Further, we have the following
translation lemma:
Lemma 7.5.2 (AC Translations)





















Now we can use our conservativity result as follows:
Corollary 7.2
The maps ι1 : LinA(K) → LinA
(K), ι1; ι2 : LinA(K) → LinA
,((K) and ι1; ι3 :
LinA(K)→ LinA⇒(K) are all conservative. Equivalently, the embeddings AC(K)→
AC(K), AC(K)→ AC,((K) and AC(K)→ AC⇒(K) are all conservative.
Proof The first statement is immediate by lemma 7.4.1, the diagram of the pre-
vious lemma and corollary 7.1 of the conservativity theorem. The second follows
by the isomorphisms between the various action calculi and the corresponding
linear type theories. 
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7.6 Linear Logic
We now show that we can present the type theory of linear logic, in the form
of DILL, as an instance of our higher-order generalised linear type theory. This
demonstrates that our notion of general linear type theory captures at least the
notion of linearity found in the canonical example, linear logic.
Consider an arbitrary DILL-signature C = (PL, C). Let OCL be the set of
operators just consisting of the constants C and their types. Now define the
higher-order signature HC = (∅,PL, ∅,OCL). We claim that the higher-order type
theory LinH(HC , ∅), which we will refer to as LinD(C), is isomorphic to DILL(C).
Having now defined the type-theory LinD(C), we proceed to translate the type-
theory DILL(C) into LinD(C), and show the soundness of this translation.
Translating DILL(C) to LinD(C)
We define a map ( )◦ which will take a pair of a sequence of variables and a
pre-term of DILL(C), and return a pre-term of LinD(C). The intuition behind this
translation is that whenever the pre-term t is a Γ; ∆-term such that Γ = ~y : ~A,
the translation on that pre-term and sequence ~y and the pre-term t will give a
~y :! ~A; ∆-term of LinD(C).
Definition 7.6.1 (The Translation ( )◦)
We define the translation ( )◦, which takes pairs of a sequence of distinct variables




(~y, x)◦ = x if x 6∈ ~y
(~y, c)◦ = c
(~y, ∗)◦ = ∗
(~y, let ∗ be t in u)◦ = let ∗ be (~y, t)◦ in (~y, u)◦
(~y, t⊗ u)◦ = (~y, t)◦ ⊗ (~y, u)◦
(~y, let x⊗ x′ be t in u)◦ = let x⊗ x′ be (~y, t)◦ in (~y, u)◦
(~y, λx.t)◦ = λx.(~y, t)◦
(~y, tu)◦ = (~y, t)◦(~y, u)◦
(~y, !t)◦ =!(~y, t)◦
(~y, let !x be t in u)◦ = let x be (~y, t)◦ in (~yx, u)◦
It is now easy to show that for terms ~x :Γ; ∆ ` t :A of DILL(C), we have the
typing judgement ~x :!Γ; ∆ ` (~x, t)◦ :A in LinD(C). We give two lemmas to show
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the action of the translation on substitutions.
Lemma 7.6.2 (Intuitionistic Substitution)
Given a Γ; -term t of type A in DILL(C) and a x :A,Γ; ∆-term u of type B in
DILL(C), we have the following derivable equality judgement in LinD(C):
~y :! ~A′; ∆ ` (~y, u{t/x})◦ = (~yx, u)◦{!(~y, t)◦/x}:B
where Γ = ~y : ~A′.
Proof This is proved by induction over the structure of the x :A,Γ; ∆-term u
of type B in DILL(C). We give the key cases.
Firstly assume that u is an intuitionistic variable x (and hence that A = B).
Then (~yx, x)◦ =
!
x, and so
(~yx, x)◦{!(~y, t)◦/x} = !!(~y, t)◦
and ~y : ~A′; ` (~y, t)◦ = !!(~y, t)◦ :!A, so that the result holds.
Secondly assume that u is a linear variable y′. Then (~yx, y′)◦ = y′, and so
(~yx, y′)◦{!(~y, t)◦/x} = y′
and ~y : ~A′; y′ :C ` (~y, y′{t/x}) = y′ :C so that we have the result. The inductive
cases follow easily. 
Lemma 7.6.3 (Linear Substitution)
Given a Γ; ∆1-term t of type A in DILL(C) and a Γ; ∆2, x:A-term u of type B in
DILL(C), we have the following derivable equality judgement in LinD(C):
~y :! ~A; ∆ ` (~y, u{t/x})◦ = (~y, u)◦{(~y, t)◦/x}:B
where Γ = ~y : ~A and ∆ = ∆1#∆2.
The proof of this lemma is very similar to that of the last, but simpler. It
again goes by induction over the term u.
We can now prove that the translation is sound:
Lemma 7.6.4 (Soundness of ( )◦)
Given an equality judgement ~y :Γ; ∆ ` t = u :A of DILL(C), we have an equality
judgement ~y :!Γ; ∆ ` (~y, t)◦ = (~y, u)◦ :A in LinD(C).
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Proof The proof is by considering the structure of equality judgements in
DILL(C). Clearly the reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry and context rules are
translated to the corresponding rules of LinD(C). The βη-equalities of DILL(C)
are translated to the corresponding equalities of LinD(C), which is clear except in
the case of the !-βη equalities; in the case of !− β, we have the typed equality in
DILL(C):
~y :Γ; ∆ ` let !x be !t in u = u{t/x}:B
In LinD(C), we have (~y, let !x be !t in u)◦ = let x be !(~y, t)◦ in (~yx, u)◦. If (~y, t)◦ =
v and (~y, u)◦ = w, then we can derive the equality judgement:
~y :!Γ; ∆ ` let x be !v in w = w{!v/x}:B
since ! is intuitionistic, but now by our lemma we have the equality judgement:
~y :!Γ; ∆ ` (~y, u{t/x})◦ = w{!v/x}:B
In the case of !− η, we have the typed equality in DILL(C):
~y :Γ; ∆ ` let !x be t in !x = t :!A
In LinD(C), we have (~y, let !x be t in !x)◦ = let x be (~y, t)◦ in !
!
x . Now using the
!− η equality of LinD(C) and the let -rule, we have the equality judgement:
!Γ; ∆ ` let x be (~y, t)◦ in ! !x = (~y, t)◦ :!A
as required.
Finally, we have to consider the commuting conversions. These are provable
using output-naturality and lemma 7.6.3. 
Translating LinD(C) to DILL(C)
We now define a map ( )• from the type-theory LinD(C) into the type theory
DILL(C), along exactly the same lines as in the previous subsection.
Definition 7.6.5 (The Translation ( )•)
As before, we define the translation ( )•, which takes a pair of a sequence of




(~y, x)• = x if x 6∈ ~y
(~y, let x be v in w)• = let !x be (~y, v)• in (~yx, w)•
(~y, c)• = c
(~y, ∗)• = ∗
(~y, let ∗ be v in w)• = let ∗ be (~y, v)• in (~y, w)•
(~y, v ⊗w)• = (~y, v)• ⊗ (~y, w)•
(~y, λx.v)• = λx.(~y, v)•
(~y, vw)• = (~y, v)•(~y, w)•
(~y, !v)• =!(~y, v)•
(~y,
!
v)• = let !x be (~y, v)• in x
We can now easily show that if ~y :!Γ; ∆ ` v :A in LinD(C), we have the typing
judgement ~y :Γ; ∆ ` (~y, v)• :A in DILL(C).
We have the following lemmas on substitution:
Lemma 7.6.6 (Intuitionistic Substitution)
Given a Γ; -term v of type A in LinD(C) and a Γ, x :A; ∆-term w of type B in
LinD(C), we have the derivable equality judgement:
~y : ~A′; ∆ ` (~y, w{v/x})• = (~yx, w)•{(~y, v)•/!x}:B
where Γ = ~y; ! ~A′.
We can see from the definition of the translation that the variable x always
occurs in a subterm of the form !x in the pre-term (~yx, v)•.
Lemma 7.6.7 (Linear Substitution)
Given a Γ; ∆1-term v of type A in LinD(C) and a Γ; ∆2, x :A-term w of type B in
LinD(C), we have the derivable equality judgement:
~y : ~A; ∆ ` (~y, w{v/x})• = (~y, w)•{(~y, v)•/x}:B
where ∆ = ∆1#∆2 and Γ = ~y :! ~A.
Now we can prove that the translation is sound.
Lemma 7.6.8 (Soundness of ( )•)
Given an equality judgement ~y :!Γ; ∆ ` v = w :A in LinD(C), we have an equality
judgement ~y :Γ; ∆ ` (~y, v)• = (~y, w)• in DILL(C).
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Proof Again the proof is by considering the structure of equality judgements
if LinD(C). Again, the symmetry, reflexivity, transitivity and context rules are
easily seen to be sound under the translation. Further, the F − βv rule is sound
since firstly, if the intuitionistic term is a variable, we have:
(~yy′, let x be y′ in w)• = let !x be !y′ in (~y, w)•
and secondly, for the case where the intuitionistic term is an instance of !, we
have that
(~y, let x be !v in w)• = let !x be !(~y, v)• in (~yx, w)•
But then we have that in DILL(C),
Γ; ∆ ` let !x be !(~y, v)• in (~yx, w)• = (~yx, w)•{(~y, v)•/x}
However, the image of the right-hand side of the σ-equality is (~yx, w)•{!(~y, v)•/!x}
and since x always occurs in a subterm of the form !x in the image of (~yx, w),
this is equal to the translation of the left-hand side.
Now for the F − η rule we have that
(~y, let x be w in x)• = let !x be (~y, w)• in !x
and from these definitions the required typed equality judgements can be shown.
The other let -rules are instances of commuting conversions which hold of the
let !x be t in u-construct in DILL(C).
As for the output naturality equalities for the operators IL and ⊗LA,B , these
are soundly mapped into DILL(C) by virtue of the commuting conversions of
let ∗ be t in u and let x⊗ y be t in u.
This leaves us just with the βη-equalities. Those for I , ⊗ and λ are translated
directly to their counterparts in DILL(C). For the ! − β equality of LinD(C), we
have:
~y :!Γ; ∆ ` !!v = v :A
Now (~y,
!
!v)• = let !x be !(~y, v)• in x and so we have the required equality
judgement:
~y :Γ; ∆ ` let !x be !(~y, v)• in x = (~y, v)• :A
by virtue of the !− β equality of DILL(C). For the !− η equality of LinD(C), we
have:
x :!A; `!( !x) = x :!A
Now (x, !(
!
x))• =!(let !x be !x in x) and so we have the required equality judge-
ment:
x:A; `!(let !x be !x in x) =!x :!A
again by virtue of the !− β equality of DILL(C). 
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The Translations are Inverse
Having given translations relating LinD(C) and DILL(C), we now show that they
form an inverse pair.
Lemma 7.6.9 (Inverse Pair)
The translations ( )◦ and ( )• are inverse up to provable equality, in the sense
that for any term of DILL(C) ~y :Γ; ∆ ` t:A, we have the equality judgement:
~y : Γ; ∆ ` (~y, (~y, t)◦)• = t:A
and for any term of LinD(C) ~y :!Γ; ∆ ` v :A we have the equality judgement:
~y :!Γ; ∆ ` (~y, (~y, v)•)◦ = v :A
Proof We prove this by considering the structure of the pre-terms of the source
type theory. Considering firstly (~y, (~y, t)◦)•, we have:
(~yx~y′, (~yx~y′, x)◦)• = (~yx~y′,
!
x)• = let !x be !x in x
(~y, (~y, x)◦)• = (~y, x)• = x
(~y, (~y, c)◦)• = (~y, c)• = c
(~y, (~y, ∗)◦)• = (~y, ∗)• = ∗
(~y, (~y, let ∗ be t in u)◦)• = (~y, let ∗ be v in w)• = let ∗ be t′ in u′
(~y, (~y, t⊗ u)◦)• = (~y, v ⊗ w)• = t′ ⊗ u′
(~y, (~y, let x⊗ y be t in u)◦)• = (~y, let x⊗ y be v in w)• = let x⊗ y be t′ in u′
(~y, (~y, λx.t)◦)• = (~y, λx.v)• = λx.t′
(~y, (~y, tu)◦)• = (~y, vw)• = t′u′
(~y, (~y, !t)◦)• = (~y, !v)• = !t′
(~y, (~y, let !x be t in u)◦)• = (~y, let x be v in (~yx, u)◦)• = let !x be t′ in (~yx, (~yx, u)◦)•
where v = (~y, t)◦, w = (~y, u)◦, t′ = (~y, v)• and u′ = (~y, v)•. Now we can easily
prove the result by induction over the unique derivation of the typing judgement
~y : Γ; ∆ ` t :A of DILL(C), using the ! − β rule in the case of an intuitionistic
axiom, and reflexivity in all other cases.
Now considering (~y, (~y, v)•)◦, we have:
(~yx~y′, (~yx~y′, x)•)◦ = (~yx~y′, !x)◦ =
!
!x
(~y, (~y, x)•)◦ = (~y, x)◦ = x
(~y, (~y, let x be v in w)•)◦ = (~y, let !x be t in (~yx, w)•)◦ = let x be v′ in (~yx, (~yx, w)•)◦
(~y, (~y, c)•)◦ = (~y, c)◦ = c
(~y, (~y, ∗)•)◦ = (~y, ∗)◦ = ∗
(~y, (~y, let ∗ be v in w)•)◦ = (~y, let ∗ be t in u)◦ = let ∗ be v′ in w′
(~y, (~y, v ⊗ w)•)◦ = (~y, t⊗ u)◦ = v′ ⊗ w′
(~y, (~y, let x⊗ y be v in w)•)◦ = (~y, let x⊗ y be t in u)◦ = let x⊗ y be v′ in w′
(~y, (~y, λx.v)•)◦ = (~y, λx.t)◦ = λx.v′
(~y, (~y, vw)•)◦ = (~y, tu)◦ = v′w′
(~y, (~y, !v)•)◦ = (~y, !t)◦ = !v′
(~y, (~y,
!




where v′ = (~y, t)◦, w′ = (~y, u)◦, t = (~y, v)• and u = (~y, v)•. Now again we can
prove the result by induction over the unique derivation of the typing judgement
~y :!Γ; ∆ ` v :A in LinD(C), using the ! − β rule for the intuitionistic axiom case




Since we have given semantics for both DILL(C) and LinD(C), it is natural to ask
how these may be related. Since LinD(C) is a higher-order theory, its models are
closely related to those of DILL(C). In fact, it is a trivial observation that;
Lemma 7.6.10
Any LinD(C)-model H yields a DILL(C)-model.
Proof Clearly we can take the carrier of the DILL(C)-model to be the carrier
of the LinD(C)-model. Further, the interpretation function on the primitive types
PL is given directly by [[ ]]ML. Finally, the operator interpretation of the Lin
D(C)-
model gives the interpretation of the constants. 
Before extending this to morphisms, we need to define the concept of morph-
ism between two DILL(C)-models.
Definition 7.6.11 (DILL(C)-Morphism)
A DILL(C)-morphism F : L → L′ between two DILL(C)-models is a pair of
functors (FC : C → C′,FS : S → S ′) such that:
• FC is strict cartesian and FS is strict monoidal closed,
• the following diagrams commute:
C F - S
C′
FC
? F ′ - S ′
?
FS









• FS([[ ]]LPI ) = [[ ]]
L′
PI : PI → obj(S
′),
• FS([[c]]LC) = [[c]]L
′
C for each c:A in C.
We now call the category of DILL(C)-models and morphisms CatDILL(C).
Now we can extend our previous result to morphisms:
Lemma 7.6.12
Any LinD(C)-morphism F between two LinD(C)-models yields a DILL(C)-morphism
between the resultant DILL(C)-models.
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Proof Again, it is clear that the LinD(C)-morphism has the right form to be
a DILL(C)-morphism, and it is only necessary to show that it preserves the in-
terpretation functions, which it must do by virtue of their derivation from the
LinD(C)-interpretations. 
Now, call the category of LinD(C)-models and morphisms CatLinD(C). In
fact, we can show also that any DILL(C)-morphism between two DILL(C)-models
arising from LinD(C)-models itself arises from a LinD(C)-morphism, which implies
that we have a functor CatLinD(C)→ CatDILL(C) which is an embedding.
Further, using our translation results we can see that the term LinD(C)-model
yields the term DILL(C)-model defined in chapter 3, and hence that the term
DILL(C)-model is initial up to isomorphism in the full subcategory of DILL(C)-
models which arise from LinD(C)-models.
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Chapter 8
Normal Forms for Lin(O,A)
Having introduced a general linear type-theory, given its semantics and shown how
it has interesting systems as instances, we are now motivated to look more closely
at the properties we can prove of the framework in general. In our conservativity
result of the previous chapter, we have made one step in this direction, and in
this chapter and the next we want to discuss another, larger issue.
The aim of our general linear type-theory is to provide a framework in which
the ‘programs’ (or processes, or functions, etc) of a particular language can be
written and equipped with as much typing information as required, and also in
which definitional equality between programs can be proved. What we mean by
‘definitional equality’ is very basic, for example the associativity of sequential
composition would be a definitional equality, whereas any kind of β-evaluation of
a function would not. Given that the idea of definitional equality is so basic, it
seems imperative that we be able to decide whether two terms are definitionally
equal or not, and yet with the machinery we have so far this is certainly not
generally provable.
We present in this chapter and the next a system of normal forms for the
terms of the type-theory Lin(O,A) which will decide the equality of the system
in the particular case when the axiom set A is empty. We will further extend the
system to show that the equality of any system of the form Lin(O,ONat(O,O))
for some O can be decided, as can the higher-order system LinH(H, ∅).
These results then have as simple corollaries the decidability of DILL(C) and
of the higher-order action calculi.
8.1 Proof Nets
One of the innovations associated with the introduction of linear logic by Gir-
ard [Gir87] was the definition of proof nets, which have since become objects
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of study in their own right. One key property of proof nets is that two proofs
which are equivalent by commuting conversions, which we have already seen in
the various linear type-theories we have introduced, are mapped to equal proof
nets. Further, many familiar equalities in type-theories such as the βη-equality
of LinD(C) can be presented as the the symmetric transitive closure of a set of
local rewrites, which can then be shown to be confluent.
In this chapter we will define relations, which are a syntactic presentation of
proof-nets. Proof-nets have shown themselves to be a very natural language for
the proofs of linear logic in particular, as mentioned in the introduction. However,
as they are a graphical syntax, it is difficult to formulate and prove rigidly the
delicate lemmas involved in proving normalisation and confluence, as we wish to
do. Hence rather than working directly with proof-nets, we will briefly present
the theory of proof-nets, but present our development in the language of relations,
which are a non-graphical syntax for proof-nets.
First we outline the theory of nets for the particular case of LinD(C), which
raises most of the issues.
Fundamentals
Proof-nets for the type-theory LinD(C) differ from those for ILL(C), just as the
type-theories do. The most significant difference is that to reflect the distinction
between the linear context and the intuitionistic context, we will define proof-nets
for LinD(C) using two “colours” of wire, linear and intuitionistic, which in this
monochrome environment will be represented by full and dashed lines respectively.
As a convention, where we want to indicate an arbitrary number of wires at
some point in a net, we will use a short dash across the line, as in figure 8.1,
which represents a number of intuitionistic wires.
Figure 8.1: Multiple Wires
Now, proof-nets are built out of basic components, which in the case of the
type-theory LinD(C) are as given in figure 8.2. Note that each input and output
of a component is typed with a type of DILL(C), except for the unit elimination
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which has a possibly unexpected output labelled v. This can be seen as a kind
of zero width multiple wire; we call it a vestigial, and its rôle will be discussed
shortly.
































Note that the replicator also has a vestigial in the case when it has no outputs.
Figure 8.2: The Elementary Components
A net for LinD(C) is a finite set of components which are connected with
wires. Nets correspond to pre-terms in the sense that so far we have imposed
no restrictions on the typings of wires, or their colours. Now, a path in a net is
simply a sequence of components each of which is connected to the next by a wire
or a vestigial which is not a binding wire (one which is connected to the output
port labelled A of an abstraction A( B). A maximal path is one which cannot
be extended, and the length of the path is the number of wires it contains. Now,
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a proof-net for LinD(C) is a net for LinD(C) which satisfies a number of conditions:
Colouring Wires must be well-coloured, ie they must be connected to inputs
and outputs of the same colour.
Linearity Wires must be linear, ie they be must connected to at most one output
and at most one input. If a wire is connected to one output only, then we
say it is a free output, and if it is connected to one input only, we say it is
a free input.
Typing Wires must be well-typed, ie they must connect inputs and outputs of
the same type.
Intuitionistic The net must have only one free output wire, which must be
linear.
Boxing Any collection of components occuring inside a box must be a proof-net
having no linear free inputs.
Acyclicity There must not exists two components c and c′ in the net such that
there exist a path from c to c′ and a non-zero length path from c′ to c.
Abstraction For each abstraction component in the net, all maximal paths
starting from the binding output of the abstraction must include the in-
put wire of the same abstraction component.
Most of these conditions are self-explanatory, and we will consider a couple of
examples of proof-net constructions to demonstrate their motivation. We assume
a function Φ which maps terms of LinD(C) to proof-nets for LinD(C). Firstly
consider the proof-net corresponding to an application Γ; ∆ ` vw :B, where we
have Γ; ∆1 ` v :A ( B and Γ; ∆2 ` w :A, and ∆ = ∆1#∆2. The proof net
corresponding to the application is seen in figure 8.3.
The key elements are common to many of the constructions. We use a replic-
ator to copy the intuitionistic context for both sub-nets corresponding to v and
w, and bind the output wires of both subnets, creating a new free output wire
which has the type of the application instance.
Now we can consider the proof-net corresponding to the abstraction Γ; ∆ `
λx.v :A( B with the obvious derivation, which is seen in figure 8.4.
In this case, the interesting feature is that we have bound the input labelled
x of the subnet corresponding to v using an output of the λ-component. This


















Figure 8.4: Abstraction in Proof Nets
and the acyclicity condition on proof-nets is not violated since such outputs are
specifically excluded from being part of paths. Notice that the linear naturality
of the λ-operator in LinD(C) is achieved simply by not binding the other linear
inputs of the subnet corresponding to v.
Finally, consider the net corresponding to the derivation Γ; `!v :!A, which
can be seen in figure 8.5. The key points about this construction are firstly that
we enclose the entire subnet corresponding to v in a ‘box’ since the !-operator
of LinD(C) is not linearly natural with respect to this argument, and secondly
that we represent the fact that the !-operator is intuitionistic by allowing it to
return an intuitionistic wire as its result. We then need to regain intuitionistic
naturality by allowing certain components (intuitionistic operator instances and
replicators) to permeate into the box.








Figure 8.5: !-Introduction in Proof-Nets
enclose all the arguments in which it is not linearly natural in a box, as motivated
in the above example, and bind only the variables in the bound positions of those
arguments which it is natural in. Finally, if the operator is intuitionistic, then we
let the box which necessarily exists have an intuitionistic output.
Vestigials
Having given a brief account of proof nets for this specific case, we have still
to explain the role of vestigials. Vestigials are wires which do not correspond
to assumptions and have no types, but which are necessary to establish the
scoping of elimination constructs having no other outputs. Consider the two
derivations Γ; ∆, x : I ` λy : A.(let ∗ be x in v) : A ( B and Γ; ∆, x : I `
let ∗ be x in (λy : A.v) : A ( B. If we used no vestigials, both of these terms
would map to the proof-net in figure 8.6, and hence the scope of the unit-
elimination construct would be lost.
Now this particular case is not a problem because in fact the two derivations
we have given are equal up to commuting conversion equality. However, there
are cases in which this loss of scope causes two terms which are not equal by
commuting conversions to have equal images under Φ. One example, which we
present, is derived from the coherence problem for symmetric monoidal closed
categories, and is due to Kelly and MacLane.
In [KM72] a diagram of natural transformations is presented which does not
commute in every symmetric monoidal category. Hence, by virtue of our com-











Figure 8.6: Abstraction without vestigials
mute in the term-model, and in particular that the two terms which correspond
to the two possible unequal morphisms are not made equal by the type-theory
DILL(C). The first of these two terms is (where we abbreviate B ( I as BI):
; x:AI
II ` λy1 :AI
I






The second of the two terms is:
; x:AI
II ` λy1 :AI
I











, as we would expect since one of the morphisms in the Kelly-













































Figure 8.7: Kelly and MacLane’s Counterexample
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Now, the left-hand proof-net of figure 8.7 represents the first term, and the
right-hand one the second. They are not equal as they stand, with vestigials, but
we can see that if we were to erase the vestigials from each of the I-elimination
boxes, they would be identical. Hence we can see that vestigials are necessary in
this framework, to distinguish the proof-nets of unequal proofs.
This result shows that we need vestigials in order to distinguish separate nets.
However, one problem with vestigials is that proof-nets with different vestigial
positionings (such as the two in figure 8.7) may represent terms which are equal
via commuting conversions. Hence we must reintroduce a vestigial equality on
nets. This will be decidable.
Proof-Net Rewrites
One of the key properties of proof-nets is that we can give local rewrites over them
which will be confluent and normalising. We show as an example in figure 8.8







Figure 8.8: The λ-β and η-Rewrites
An interesting point here is that we use an expansionary η-rewrite, following
Ghani [Gha95]. If we use η-reductions, we cannot obtain confluence due to a
problem with the unit rewrites.
8.2 Relations
We now introduce relations, which are non-graphical analogues of proof-nets for
a general linear typing system Lin(O). Although proof-nets are a very intuitive
language for proofs, and capture very effectively the intuitions involved especially
in proof equivalence, to prove delicate lemmas relating proof-nets to terms is
clumsy, because it involves extended case analysis of graphical situations. In
particular, it is easy to overlook unfamiliar cases. Hence, we have chosen to use a
non-graphical syntax which, however, closely mirrors the behaviour of proof-nets.
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First consider some simple examples. The proof net (for LinD(C)) is given in
figure 8.2.
A B C
A   (B    C)
A    C B
B    C
Figure 8.9:
This corresponds to the term
; x′ :A⊗ C, y :B ` let x1 ⊗ x2 be x′ in x1 ⊗ (y ⊗ x2):A⊗ (B ⊗ C)
and the relation
R(x′, y, z) = ∃x1 :A, x2:C, y′:B ⊗ C.(z = x1 ⊗ y′) ∧ (y′ = y ⊗ x2) ∧ (x1 ⊗ x2 = x′)
where by convention we let the (unique) output variable be the last parameter of
the relation, in this case z.
As we can see, each rule instance in the proof is reflected in the proof net
by a component, in the term by a constructor, and in the relation by a clause.
Intuitively, we obtain relations from nets by giving a clause for each component
of the net, conjoining them and binding the variables corresponding to internal
wires. Now consider the term
; x′ :A⊗ C ` λy :B.let x1 ⊗ x2 be x′ in x1 ⊗ (y ⊗ x2):B( (A⊗ (B ⊗ C))
which has the relation
S(x′, z′) = ∀y :B.∃z :(A⊗ (B ⊗C)).(z′y = z) ∧R(x′, y, z)
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The only extension to our intuition is that in this case the binding variable
of the term is bound in the relation using a universal quantifier rather than the
existential. This will hold for all binding variables of binding operators.
Now, we can make some simplifications to our syntax. Firstly, note that
because of the associativity of the ∧-operator on relations, and the familiar prenex
normal forms of the expressions we have written, in general a relation can be
written as a sequence of quantifiers followed by the conjunction of a set of clauses:
Qx1. . . . Qxr.c1 ∧ . . . ∧ cs
Clearly, not all relations of this form represent valid proof-nets. We can exactly
characterise those that do, however, as the relations satisfying a certain set of
conditions based on the net conditions of page 181.
Note in particular that all relations corresponding to proof nets will mention
a variable twice exactly iff it is bound, and once exactly iff it is free. Hence we
can decide whether a variable is bound, and since precisely the binding variables
of operator clauses are universally quantified, we can reconstruct the sequence
of quantifiers from the set of clauses. This procedure may seem to introduce
scoping concerns, but we will show by translating our relations soundly to terms
(up to commuting conversion equality) that suitable scopes for all binders can be
inferred from the clause set.
Therefore, from now on we will give relations as sets of clauses. We will work
with the variable set X as usual. Firstly, we construct pre-relations as follows:
Definition 8.2.1 (Pre-Relations)
We define pre-relations and clauses over a generalised signatureO = (MI ,ML,OI ,OL)
mutually inductively as follows:
• Pre-relations, ranged over by D,E . . . are finite sets of clauses, and
• clauses, ranged over by d, e . . . have one of the following forms, where M is
a nonempty finite set of variables and D is a pre-relation:
d ::=( =x:A x:Q) | (M :Q = x:Q) | (x:Q = F (x:Q)) | (F (x:Q) = x:Q)
| x:A = (~x: ~Q; ~x: ~A)O((~x: ~Q; ~x: ~A)D(x:A), . . . , (~x: ~Q; ~x: ~A)D(x:A);
(~x: ~Q; ~x: ~A)(x:A), . . . , (~x: ~Q; ~x: ~A)(x:A))
where we allow the operator clauses respectively for any operator O ∈ OL. We
will refer to the variable x in the clause ( =x:A y :Q) as a vestigial.
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In this definition, the form (~x : ~Q; ~y : ~A)D(z :B) binds the inputs ~x and ~y and
the output z in the pre-relation D. The form (~x : ~Q; ~y : ~A)(z :B) is similar except
that the variables are bound not in a particular pre-relation but in the whole
pre-relation containing the clause. To further clarify the operator clause, which is
the most complex of the definition, we use two familiar examples. First consider
the case where we have an operator ! of arity:
(; )A ;
( ; )!A
The operator clause in this case is (x :!A = ()!(()D(y : A); ). In this, we take a pre-
relation D with output y :A and apply the operator to it to give the pre-relation
with the same intuitionistic inputs and the one output x :A. Now consider the
operator ⊗R having arity:
; ( ; )A ( ; )B
( ; )A⊗B
The operator clause here is (x :A⊗ B = () ⊗ (; ()(y1 :A), ()(y2 :B))), and in this
case because the operator is linearly natural in the arguments, we do not ‘box’
them in the syntax but instead, as in proof-nets, allow the operator clause to bind
variables elsewhere in the body of the pre-relation it occurs in.
We henceforth omit type information except where necessary, in the familiar
way, and further where it is convenient we will omit some details of a general
operator clause for brevity; for example, we might write





′′), . . . ; . . . ))




Clauses are equipped with inputs and outputs (which we will call polarities)
and typings similarly to the components of proof nets. Each variable in a clause
will either occur as an input, an output, a binding occurrence or a vestigial,
and will have an associated type (except in the case of vestigials). Intuitively,
clauses are analogous to term constructors or equivalently to rules. The first
and second clauses in the inductive definition are exceptions to this, in that they
correspond to the admissible weakening and contraction rules respectively. We
will discuss the need for such explicit syntax later. The third and fourth clauses
in the definition correspond respectively to the intuitionistic axiom and I-L rule,
and the fifth corresponds to the general operator rule.
Preliminary Definitions
First we define what it means for a pre-relation D to contain a clause.
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Definition 8.2.2
We say that a pre-relation D contains a clause c (at depth r) if c ∈ D (and r = 0)
or if for some operator clause:
(y = (~y′1; ~y
′





′(x′′) . . . ; . . . )) ∈ D
where D′ contains c (at depth r − 1).
Note that for any pre-relation there is an upper bound on the depth of clauses
contained within it.
Having referred informally to clauses having inputs and outputs, we now need
to define these notions.
Definition 8.2.3 (Input)
A variable x is an input of the clause c if
• either c is ( =z x), (M = x), (y = F (x)) or (F (y) = x),
• or c is (y = (~x1; ~x2)O(. . . )) where x ∈ ~x1~x2,
• or c is (y = (~y′1; ~y′2)O(. . . ; . . . (~x′1; ~x′2)(x) . . . ))
• or c is (y = (~y′1; ~y′2)O(. . . (~x′1; ~x′2)D′(x) . . . ; . . . )).
Further, we will say that x occurs as an input in a pre-relation D if D contains
a clause c of which x is an input.
Definition 8.2.4 (Output)
A variable x is an output of the clause c if
• either c is (M = y) where x ∈M , is (F (x) = y), or is (x = F (y)),
• or c is (x = (~x1; ~x2)O(. . . ; . . . )),
Similarly, we will say that x occurs as an output in the pre-relation D if a
clause c having x as an output is contained in D.
We also define the notion of binding occurrence:
Definition 8.2.5 (Binder)
A variable x is a binder in a clause c if
• c is (x = (~x′1; ~x′2)O(. . . ; . . . (~y1; ~y2)(x′′) . . . )) where x ∈ ~y1~y2,
• or c is (y = (~y′1; ~y′2)O(. . . (~x′1; ~x′2)D′(x′′) . . . ; . . . )) where x ∈ ~x′1~x′2.
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Again, a variable x occurs as a binder in a pre-relation D if there is a clause
contained in D which has x as a binder.
A variable x occurs as a vestigial in a pre-relation D if D contains a clause
( =x y), and we may say that the clause has vestigial x. A child of a variable
x is a clause which has an input occurrence of x. A clause c has a dependent x
if c has vestigial x or c has an output x. Note that every clause has exactly one
dependent.
Definition 8.2.6 (Connectedness)
Two clauses c and c′ are connected by a variable x in a pre-relation D if x is a
dependent of c and has child c′.
We must now define a notion of path over a pre-relation, which will be central
to our development. Intuitively, a path through a pre-relation is analogous to
a path through the corresponding net. For the following definitions, we fix a
particular pre-relation D.
Definition 8.2.7 (Path)
A path between two clauses c and c′ in a pre-relation D is a pair of sequences
(c1 . . . cr, x1, . . . xr−1) such that c1 = c, cr = c′ and xi connects ci and ci+1 for
i = 1 . . . r − 1.
Paths may be concatenated in the obvious way, so that a path from c to c′ and
one from c′ to c′′ yield a path from c to c′′. A complete path from a clause c to
another c′ in a pre-relation D is a path such that c′ has a dependent which occurs
only as an output. Complete paths cannot be extended by post-concatenation.
Now we need to define linear and intuitionistic occurrences.
Definition 8.2.8 (Intuitionistic Occurrence)
A variable x occurs intuitionistically in a pre-relation D if
• D contains a clause ( =z x) or a clause (M = y) where x ∈M or y = x,
• or D contains a clause:
– (y = F (x)),
– (F (x) = y),
– (y = (~y1; ~y2)O(. . . (~x; ~y′)D′(x′) . . . ; . . . )) where x ∈ ~x,
– (y = (~y1; ~y2)O(. . . ; . . . (~x; ~y′)(x′) . . . )) where x ∈ ~x,
– (x = (; )O((~x1; ~y1)v1 . . . (~xr; ~yr)vr; )) where O ∈ OI,
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We now say that a variable occurs linearly in a pre-relation if it has an occur-
rence in a clause which is not intuitionistic.
Definition 8.2.9 (Free Variable)
A variable x is a free input of a pre-relation D if it occurs as an input in D but
does not occur as an output or a binder. Similarly, a variable x is a free output
of the pre-relation if it occurs as an output in D but does not occur as an input.
With this grounding, we can now define relations. Note that rather than being
a construction-based definition like the definition of terms (a term is a pre-term
that can be typed using these rules) it is a definition based on global properties.
Definition 8.2.10 (Relation)
Given a generalised typing context Γ; ∆ and a type A ∈ ML, a Γ; ∆-relation D of
type A over O is a pre-relation over O having the following properties:
Linearity Each variable must occur in D at most once as an input, and at most
once as an output or binder.
Colouring Each variable occurring twice must do so both times intuitionistically
or both times linearly.
Typing Each variable occurring twice must do so both times with the same type
annotation.
Boxing Each pre-relation D that occurs in a clause of D
(y = (~x′1; ~x
′
2)O(. . . (Γ
′; ∆′)D′(y′ :A′) . . . ; . . . ))
must be a Γ′; ∆′-relation of type A′ with result variable y′.
Output There must be at most one variable x which occurs in D only as an
output. If such a variable exists, it must occur linearly and with type A. If
not, there must exist a unique variable x of type A in ∆ but not occurring
as an input, output or binder in D. We refer to the unique variable picked
out by this requirement as the result variable of D for the typing context
Γ; ∆.
Inputs Γ must type at least the intuitionistically-occurring free inputs with the
types they are annotated with in their occurrences. Also, if the result
variable x is not a free output of D, then ∆ must type exactly each free
input of D with the type annotating it in D and x : A. If x is a free output of
D, then ∆ must type exactly each free input of D with the type annotating
it in D.
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Binding For any variable y which occurs as a binder in D in a clause c of the
form
(y′ = (~x′1; ~x
′





′′) . . . ))
where y ∈ ~y′1~y′2, either y = x′′, or any complete path from a child of y must
contain the clause c as its i+ 1th with the ith wire being x′′.
Acyclicity No clause in D may have a path starting and ending at itself which
is not the trivial path (c, ε).
Vestigial If D contains a clause of the form ( =y x′), then y must be the result
variable of D or must occur linearly as an input in D.
Although this definition seems circular, because of the references to relations
occuring within the intuitionistic arguments of an operator clause, it is easy to
decide whether any given pre-relation is a relation. This can be done by induction
on the depth of operator clauses, since for any pre-relation there must be a bound
on the depth of operator clauses contained in it.
Having defined relations over a generalised signature, we will let the set of all
relations over the generalised signature O be denoted by Rel(O).
Basic Results
We now prove some useful lemmas about relations.
Lemma 8.2.11 (Properties of Relations)
Children In a Γ; ∆ relation D of type A, any variable has precisely one child
except the result variable, which is childless.
Complete Paths I The last clause in any complete path from any clause c must
have the result variable as a dependent.
Complete Paths II In a Γ; ∆ relation D of type A, for any clause c there is at
least one complete path from c to some other clause.
Unique Typing Given a generalised typing context Γ; ∆ and a pre-relation D,
there is at most one type A such that D is a Γ; ∆-relation of type A.




Children To prove this, note that the output property specifies that every vari-
able except the result variable x must not be a free output, and hence must
occur as an output and also as an input. Therefore any such variable must
occur as the input to some clause which is then its child. However, such a
variable must only occur once as an input, so there must be precisely one
such clause. Since x is a free output, it cannot be the input of any clause,
and hence it must be childless.
Complete Paths I This is obvious since the result variable is the only possible
variable only occurring as an output.
Complete Paths II To show this, we need to demonstrate that every path
which is not complete can be extended. Note first that every clause has
at least one dependent. Now given a path from c to c′ in a relation D, if c′
has as a dependent the result variable we are done. If not, take a dependent
of c′ and its unique child; these extend the path.
Unique Typing Consider the two possibilities in the output condition of the
definition of relations. If the result variable occurs as an output in D, then
it must occur with a typing and for every typing context Γ; ∆ it must have
the same typing given as an annotation in D. If on the other hand the
result variable does not occur in D but is typed in ∆, then it clearly follows
that given the typing context there can only be one type assigned to the
result variable.
Result Variable There are efficient ways to do this, but to see that it is true
simply take the finite number of variables occurring linearly in D or typed
in ∆, and for each test whether it occurs as an input in D, which is effective.
Precisely one will not and this is the result variable.
We will now define a useful abbreviation. Abbreviate the pre-relation D con-
taining the clauses (M1 = x1), . . . , (Mr = xr) by removing these clauses and
replacing them with the form (M1 . . .Mr = x1 . . . xr) which we will henceforth
call a clause, overloading notation insignificantly. Further, we will in the same
way abbreviate a pre-relation D containing the clauses ( =y x1), . . . , ( =y xr)
by removing them and replacing them with the form ( =y x1 . . . xr), which we
will again call a clause.
Now define the family of a variable x occuring as a dependent in a relation
D to be the set of clauses c such that every complete path in D from c contains
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the variable x. We will write this fam(x,D), omitting the relation D where it is
obvious. Intuitively the family of a variable in a relation corresponds its maximal
sub-relation which has x as its result variable.
We now prove two results on families.
Lemma 8.2.12
Given a relation D, if a clause c is in two families fam(x,D) and fam(y,D), then
either the variable x must have a child in fam(y,D), or y must have a child in
fam(x,D).
Proof We know if a clause c is in two families fam(x,D) and fam(y,D), then
we have that every complete path in D from c contains both x and y. Note that
both x and y must occur as inputs and as dependents since otherwise they could
not occur in a path. Now it must be the case that the unique children cx and
cy respectively of x and y must both occur in every complete path from c in D.
Now assume that in some complete paths from c in D the clause cx occurs before
cy and in others cy occurs before cx. Then, by taking appropriate sub-paths of
these paths we can construct a cyclic path from cx to itself in D, which is a
contradiction. Therefore, one occurs first in every complete path from c in D.
Say w.l.o.g. that it is cx. Then every complete path from cx in D must be part
of a complete path from c in D, and further it occurs in that path before cy, so
that y is in any complete path from cx in D. Therefore, cx is in fam(y,D). 
Lemma 8.2.13
Given a Γ; ∆-relation D and a variable x which occurs linearly in D, fam(x,D)
is a Γ′; ∆′-relation for some Γ′; ∆′.
Proof We can prove this by considering each clause in turn. Clearly linearity,
colouring, typing, boxing and acyclicity are inherited from D.
Of those that are left, first consider the output condition. Note that either
x does not occur as an output in fam(x,D) because it is the empty relation, or
because it occurs only as an output. This is trivial since if it were to occur as
an input it would imply that the child of x, cx, had a complete path in D which
contained x, which would induce a cycle in D. Further, if any clause c is contained
in fam(x,D) then a clause having x as dependent must, since each complete path
in D from c must contain x as a connection between a dependent of x and its
child. Now, having established that x is an appropriate candidate for the result
variable, we must show that there can never be another variable y occuring only
as an output in fam(x,D). For a contradiction, assume there is such a y. Then
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y must occur as the output of a clause c′ in fam(x,D). Now if y has a child cy
in D then there must be a complete path from c′ in D containing y, which is the
completion of the path (ccy, y). But there is some complete path from cy in D
not containing x, or cy would be in fam(x,D) and y would occur also as an input.
Hence we can construct a complete path from c′ in D which does not contain x.
So y must be childless in D, and hence the result variable of D. But then the
empty path from c′ by definition must contain x, which is a contradiction. Hence
the result variable of D cannot occur only as an output in fam(x,D), and x is
the only such possible variable.
Considering the input condition, we can take Γ′ to be the typing sequence that
types all the intuitionistically occuring variables with the types they are annotated
with, and ∆′ to be the typing sequence which types all the linearly occuring ones
with the types they are annotated with, and types the result variable x with any
type A if it does not occur in fam(x,D). This will make fam(x,D) a Γ′; ∆′-relation
of some type.
Considering the binding condition, we can see that if an operator clause c
with a binder y occurs in fam(x,D), then any complete path in D from a child
of y must contain the clause c, and must therefore contain a complete path from
c in D as a final segment. But this final segment must contain x, and so every
complete path from the child of the binder must contain x and the child of the
binder must be in fam(x,D), and the condition must be satisfied.
Considering the vestigial condition, assume we have a clause ( =y y′) such
that y is not the result variable of fam(x,D) and does not occur as an input in
it. But if this clause occurs in fam(x,D), then it must be the case that there is a
complete path from the clause in D, and such a path must contain x, implying
that the child of y is in fam(x,D), which is a contradiction. 
Now define a Γ′; ∆′ sub-relation E of a Γ; ∆-relation D to be a subset of D
which is a Γ′; ∆′ relation. A fundamental property of subrelations which we will
need is the following:
Lemma 8.2.14
Given a relation R with a subrelation R′ ⊆ R, any complete path in R from
a clause c ∈ R′ must pass through a clause c′ having as dependent the result
variable of R′.
Proof Assume not. Now take the maximal non-zero initial segment of the path
which is within R′. The last clause in this segment must have a dependent which
is not the input of a clause in R′. If the dependent is a vestigial, the vestigial
195
condition on R′ implies that the dependent is the result variable of R′, which is
a contradiction. If it is not a vestigial, then it is a variable which does not occur
as an input in R′ and does occur as an output (of the last clause in the initial
segment) and hence it must be the output variable of R′. 
8.3 Relational Equality
We now define the various parts of the equality over relations. Since we are
interested in proving that term equality is decidable via a translation into the
full relational equality, we will need to make sure that each part of the equality
is decidable. This will often be achieved by making a part of the equality the
transitive reflexive closure of a confluent terminating rewrite.
Vestigial Moves
First, we introduce the concept of vestigial moves on a relation. As we shall see,
the vestigial x in a clause of the form ( =x y) gives us essential information
about scoping in the derivations corresponding to the relation. If we do not have
this information, then two relations representing derivations not of provable equal
terms may be the same. However, there is redundancy in that several relations
with different vestigials may correspond to several provably equal terms. Hence
we need to give an equality between such relations. We call this equality =vm,
and we make a definition:
Definition 8.3.1 (Vestigial Moves)
The Γ; ∆-relations D ∪ {( =x y)} and D ∪ {( =x′ y)} of type A are one-step
equal via vestigial moves, if
1. There exists a path in D∪{( =x y)} from the child of x to a clause having
dependent x′. Note that such a path cannot contain the clause ( =x y) or
a cycle would result.
2. For any clause c of the form
(y′ = (~x′1; ~x
′





′′) . . . ))
with z ∈ ~y1~y2 such that there is a path from the child of z to ( =x y) in
D ∪ {( =x y)}, all complete paths from the dependent of x′ must contain
the clause c as their i+ 1th and the variable x′′ as their ith.
We now say that D =vm D′ if these two relations are shown to be equal by a
finite sequence of one-step vestigial moves.
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Having given this definition, it is imperative that we show that it is decidable.
Lemma 8.3.2 (Decidability)
Vestigial equality is decidable.
Proof We can prove this by considering the following effective procedure:
Given any finite set of relations, pick any relation, pick any vestigial
and make any valid vestigial move. If the result is not in the set,
add it and continue until no relation in the set has a vestigial move
resulting in a new relation.
First we show that this is effective; note that determining whether a vestigial
move is valid is a matter of considering a finite number of paths in a relation, and
hence is effective. Since we start out with a finite set of relations, each of which
have a finite number of vestigials, it is effectively possible to check whether any
relation has a vestigial move on a particular vestigial.
Now, given this effective procedure, start it with the singleton set containing
any relation. Since there are only a finite number of variables which may be
used as each vestigial (by the vestigial condition, since the variable must occur
elsewhere in the body of the relation not as a vestigial), there are at most a finite
number of relations which may be equal by a vestigial move to any given relation.
Since there must be a finite sequence of one-step vestigial moves relating any two
relations which are equal via vestigial moves (since an infinite sequence would
of necessity repeat in the finite set of vestigially-equal relations), this procedure
must result in the finite set of all relations vestigially equal to the relation we
initially considered. Since the set is finite, we can now simply check to see if the
relation is vestigially equal to another relation by checking to see if it is in the
finite set resulting from the procedure. 
The ∆-rewrite
We now recall that our system includes clauses corresponding not only to the rules
of our logic, but also to its admissible weakening and contraction rules. This is
to ensure that we can express the equality of the system using local rewrites.
Consider DILL(C). Recall from page 41 that in the presence of admissible cut
rules for equality, the equality of DILL(C) is given by axioms which do not involve
substitutions (the substitutions which appear in the η-rules can be equivalently
rewritten as side-conditions on the equalities). However, there is still an infinite
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set of these axiomatic equalities parameterised over terms, for example as in the
equality Γ; ∆ ` let ∗ be x in t{∗/x} = t :A. It is possible in the presence of the
commuting conversions to derive these equalities from a finite set of axioms not
parameterised over terms. Our rewrites on the system of relations for DILL(C)
will be suitable orientations of these.
However, this still leaves us with the problem of giving rewrites verifying the
the admissible cut rules for equality. To do this in a local way for intuition-
istic substitution we need to give a low-level implementation for the copying and
discarding of intuitionistic relations, which is provided by the rewrite →∆.
Definition 8.3.3 (The Rewrite →∆)
We define the rewrite→∆ firstly over pre-relations as the transitive closure of the
following one-step rewrites, where M and M ′ may be any non-empty sets:
D ∪ {( =x y′), (M ∪ {z′, y′} = z)} →∆ D ∪ {(M ∪ {z′} = z)}
D ∪ {({x} = y)} →∆ D{y/x}
D ∪ {(M ′ = y), (M ∪ {z′, y} = x)} →∆ D ∪ {(M ∪ {z′} ∪M ′ = x)}
We call the clauses which are explicitly mentioned in the redex the key clauses of
the rewrite.
Now it is easy to show that if D →∆ D′, where D is a Γ; ∆-relation of type A,
then D′ is a Γ; ∆-relation of type A. We note here that→∆ is clearly terminating
since in each one-step rewrite the number of clauses is reduced. Given this result,
we now also need to prove the confluence of →∆ over =vm.
Lemma 8.3.4 (Confluence)
The rewrite →∆ is confluent over the equality =vm on Rel(O).
Proof First we note that if D1 →∆ D2 by a one-step ∆-rewrite and D′1 =vm D1,
then D′1 →∆ D′2 by a one-step ∆-rewrite of the same kind, and D′2 =vm D2. We
can see this in the case where the vestigial moves are one-step by noticing that
since no linear variables are involved in any ∆-rewrite (as all the variables in the
key clauses are occurring intuitionistically), any such rewrite is independent of
the vestigial move. It is also trivial to see that the effect of the ∆-rewrite on
paths cannot disrupt the vestigial move.
Given this, in order to prove the result it suffices to show that if one relation
D has two ∆-rewrites to D1 and D2 respectively, that there exist ∆-rewrites
D1 →∆ D′1 and D2 →∆ D′2 such that D′1 and D′2 are equal via vestigial moves.
This is trivial by inspection except in the case where D is
D′ ∪ {( =x y1), ( =x
′
y2), ({y1, y2} = y)}
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In this case D1 is D′ ∪ {( =x y)} and D2 is D′ ∪ {( =x
′
y)}. Hence we need to
show that these two are equal via vestigial moves. Consider an arbitrary binding
clause in D′ ∪ {( =x y1), ( =x
′
y2), ({y1, y2} = y)} having a binding variable z
with a path from the child of z to the clause ( =x′ y2). Clearly there must also
exist a path from the child of z to the clause ( =x y2). Hence any binding clause
must contain both discard clauses in its scope or either. Now, by virtue of this
any complete path from either of the vestigial clauses must contain all the binding
clauses that bind them both, and furthermore in each path they must occur in
the same order (or else we could construct a path which omitted one). Take the
binding clause which occurs first in an arbitrary complete path from either clause,
and call it c. We know further that there is an input to c, say x′′, which equally
must be in every complete path. Now we claim that D1 and D2 are both equal
by a one-step vestigial move to D′ ∪ {( =x′′ y)}. To show this note that the
second part of the requirement is satisfied by virtue of our earlier discussion. The
first part, that there exists a path from a child of x or x′ respectively to a clause
having x′′ as dependent in both D1 and D2, can be shown since in each case, any
complete path from the vestigial clause, including the one passing through the
child of x or x′, must contain c and x′′. 
Having defined these two equalities, we will refer to the system of relations
quotiented by the equality generated by the transitive closure of the rewrite →∆
over the equality =vm as Rel(O,=vm,∆).
8.4 Terms to Relations
We now map Lin(O) to Rel(O,=vm,∆) in such a way that when we quotient Lin(O)
by the subset of the provable equality judgements constructed using only the cc-
axioms, it will be isomorphic to Rel(O,=vm,∆).
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Definition 8.4.1 (The Translation ρ)
The translation ρ takes Γ; ∆-terms of type A in Lin(O) to Γ; ∆-relations of type
A in Rel(O) as follows, where Γ = y1 :R1 . . . yr′′ :Rr′′:
ρΓ(x) = {( =x ~y)} (where x is not typed in Γ)
ρΓ,x:Q(x) = {(x′ = F (x)), ( =x
′
~y)}




(On O ∈ OI) ρΓ(op) = {(M1 . . .Mr′′ = ~y), (x′ = F (x′′))} ∪
{(x′′ = (; )O((~yv1~x1; ~y1)D1, . . . , (~yvr~xr; ~yr)Dr)}









E′i′) ∪ {(M ′1, . . .M ′r′′ = ~y)} ∪
{(x′′ = (~z′; ~z′′)O((~yv1~x1; ~y1)D1, . . . , (~yvr~xr; ~yr)Dr; (~x′1; ~y′1)(zw1), . . . , (~x′s; ~y′s)(zws)))}













Dj′ = ρΓ,~xj′ :~Qj′ (vj′)
~z′ = zv′1 . . . zv′r′
~z′′ = zw′1 . . . zw′s′
Mi = {yv11 , . . . , yvr1 }
M ′i = {yv11 , . . . , yvr1 , yw11 , . . . , yws1 , y
v′1









op = O((~x1 : ~Q1;~y1 : ~A1)v1, . . . , (~xr : ~Qr; ~yr : ~Ar)vr; )()
op′ = O((~x1 : ~Q1;~y1 : ~A1)v1, . . . , (~xr : ~Qr; ~yr : ~Ar)vr;
(~x′1 : ~Q
′; ~y′1 : ~A
′)w1, . . . , (~x′s : ~Q
′; ~y′s: ~A




1, . . . , w
′
s′)
and where we write zv for the result variable of ρΓ(v) and similarly for the terms
w, ~v, ~w, ~v′ and ~w′.
We need to show that definition is well-formed, ie that ρ applied to a term is
always a relation. We can do this by induction over derivations of terms. Consider
the conditions on relations in turn.
Linearity To show that each variable only occurs at most once as an input and
at most once as an output or binder, first consider the axiom clauses. The
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result obviously follows in this case since x and ~y must be distinct, and
x′ is fresh. Now consider the inductive clauses. In each of these, when
we refer inductively to another instance of the translation ρΓ(v), we only
introduce another occurrence of free variables in the translation instance,
and in fact we only introduce new occurrences of variables which are free
inputs of ρΓ(v) as outputs and vice versa. Hence this property is satisfied.
Colouring We can show in a very similar way that the translation preserves
colouring.
Typing Again, we need only to show firstly that the base clauses of the definition
satisfy the typing property, which is obvious since in each case there is only
ever one reference to each variable, which has an obvious type, and secondly
by showing that in the inductive clauses we only ever refer twice to variables
which are free in an instance ρΓ(v) of the translation, and in this case since
all the free variables in the instance of the translation are typed in the
typing context Γ; ∆ of the term v, we can see that they are assigned the
correct types in their other occurrence.
Boxing This clearly follows by induction, since we only ever use instances of the
translation in boxed clauses.
Output Consider the base cases. In these, the unique result variable is clear;
it is x in the first and x′ in the second. We can then show that the result
variables of the two inductive cases are zw and x′′ respectively.
Inputs This condition is easy to establish in the base cases, and in the induct-
ive cases it can be shown by observing that we bind precisely the correct
variables of the operator arguments using the binding occurrences of the
operator clause.
Binding In order to show this, we consider the only situation in which we in-
troduce a binder, which is in the operator clause of the definition. But we
can easily see that we only introduce binders which are bound variables in
the ith argument of an operator term. Now we know by induction that
in the image of a term under ρ, which is a relation, there must exist a
complete path from any child of a free input. Also, because we know that
no variable in the image of the argument apart from its free variables is
referred to elsewhere in the translation of the operator instance, the only
paths from a child of a binder must contain as initial sequences complete
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paths of the translation of the argument. But we can easily show that every
complete path of the translation can only be extended in the translation of
the operator term by adding the ith output variable and the operator clause
itself, and further that each complete path through the translation of the
argument can be extended in this way in the translation of the operator
term.
Acyclicity This is again seen by induction; in the base cases is is clear that
there is no cyclic path, in the let case if there is no cycle in the inductive
instances of the translation then we can show by inspecting the form of the
definition that there is no cycle possible in the image, and finally in the
operator clause we can do the same thing.
Vestigial This is easy to see by considering the base case, which is the only point
at which we add a vestigial. Clearly in that case it is the result variable of
the image of the translation. 
Now we can show that the fragment of the provable equality defined by the
c-axioms and the rules of Lin(O,A) is mapped soundly by this translation into
relational equality up to =∆.
Lemma 8.4.2 (Soundness)
If two terms are provably equal Γ; ∆ ` v = w :A in the fragment of Lin(O,A)
using just the cc axioms and the symmetry, reflexivity, transitivity and congruence
rules, then their images ρΓ(v) and ρΓ(w) are equal up to =vm,∆ on relations.
Proof We prove this by considering the structure of a derivation of an equality
judgement in this fragment of the theory. Since the rewrite is congruent, and we
are taking the transitive reflexive closure of it, we have that the equality =∆ is a
congruence. Hence we need only check that the cc equalities are soundly mapped
to relations. We consider some sample cases.
cc− 1) In this case, the image of the left hand side easily reduces using the free
variable condition to the relation
ρΓ,y:Q(w′){~y′/~x′}∪ρΓ,x:R(v){~y′′/~x′} ∪ ρΓ(w){~y′′′/~x′}
∪ {({y′1, y′′′1 }, . . . {y′r, y′′′r } = ~x′′), ({y′′1 , x′′1}, . . . {y′′r , x′′r} = ~x′)}
where Γ = x′1 :Q
′




r. But this reduces to
ρΓ,y:Q(w′){~y′/~x′} ∪ ρΓ,x:R(v){~y′′/~x′} ∪ ρΓ(w){~y′′′/~x′}
∪ {({y′′1 , y′1, y′′′1 }, . . .{y′′r , y′r, y′′′r } = ~x′)}
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and the image of the right-hand side easily reduces using the free variable
condition to the relation
ρΓ,y:Q(w′){~y′/~x′} ∪ ρΓ,x:R(v){~y′′/~x′} ∪ ρΓ(w){~y′′′/~x′}
∪ {({y′′1 , y′′′1 }, . . .{y′′r , y′′′r } = ~x′′), ({y′1, x′′1}, . . . {y′r, x′′r} = ~x′)}
which has the same reduct as the left hand side.
cc− 2) This is almost identical to the previous case.
cc− 3) and cc− 4) These cases follow the same principle as that of cc− 1 since
we have a union of the sets ρΓ(v) and ρΓ(v′i).
cc− 5) This is the crucial case, since it shows that our relational equality handles
linear naturality correctly. In order to make the process clearer, we only
prove this in the case we there are no intuitionistically natural arguments
(since these are peripheral to the equality) and precisely two linearly nat-
ural arguments. The more general case is proved using exactly the same
techniques. In the restricted case, the equality is as follows:
Γ; ∆ `let x′ be v in O(; (~x1; ~y1)w1, (~x2; ~y2)w2)(~v′; ~w′)
= O(; (~x1; ~y1)w1, (~x2; ~y2)(let x′ be v in w2))(~v′; ~w′)
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But in a similar way the right-hand side has precisely this reduct. 
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8.5 Relations to Terms
Having given the sound translation from terms to relations, we now need to
give a translation in the reverse direction. In fact, this is a complex procedure,
largely because relations are not inherently a sequential syntax, whereas terms
are. Hence the problem of inverting ρ is a version of what is historically known
as the sequentialisation problem, first stated for proof-nets. As we already know,
there is no one canonical proof derivation associated with a particular relation,
although each relation does have an associated equivalence class of derivations
(under the fragment of equality we are considering).
It is not clear how to give a direct translation from relations to terms, as we
have no direct inductive characterisation of relations, and although we do for pre-
relations, not all pre-relations can be mapped to terms in a uniform way. Hence,
the way we will define the inverse translation is non-standard. First we define a
class of intermediates, which are as the name suggests half-way houses between
relations and terms, and then we define a rewrite on these which is confluent and
terminating up to an equality on these intermediates. Such a rewrite defines a
function on intermediates, and we use it in conjunction with a map from relations
to intermediates and a map from intermediates to terms to give a function from
relations to terms.
First we define intermediates.
Definition 8.5.1 (Intermediates)
A Γ′; ∆′-intermediate of type A over a signature O is a triple (v,D, (Γ; ∆)) such
that v is a Γ; ∆-term of type A, D is a finite set of clauses, (the clause set),
ρΓ(v)∪D is a Γ′∆′ relation of type A, all the variables occuring only as outputs
in D are typed in Γ; ∆ and there are no clauses in D having dependents variables
occuring as outputs in ργ(v).
We will write the set of intermediates over a signature O as Int(O), ranged
over by I . . . , and identify intermediates up to permutation on the linear and
intuitionistic parts of the typing context.
Now we define a rewrite on intermediates,→S:
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Definition 8.5.2 (The Sequentialisation Rewrite)
We define the one-step sequentialisation rewrite →S on intermediates as follows:
1) (v,D ∪ {( =x y :Q)}, (Γ; ∆, x:A))→S (v,D, (Γ, y :Q; ∆, x:A))
2) (v,D ∪ {(M = x:Q)}, (Γ,M :Q; ∆))→S (v{x/M}, D, (Γ, x:Q; ∆))
3) (v,D ∪ {(x = F (y):Q)}, (Γ; ∆, x:Q))→S (v{y/x}, D, (Γ, y :Q; ∆))
4) (v,D ∪ {(F (x) = y :Q)}, (Γ, x:Q; ∆))→S (let x be y in v,D, (Γ; ∆, y :Q))
5a) (v,D ∪ {op}, (Γ, x:Q; ∆))→S (v{w/x}, D, (Γ,Γ′′; ∆)
5b) (v,D ∪D′1 ∪ . . . ∪D′s ∪ {op′}, (Γ; ∆, y :B′′))→S (v{w′/y}, D, (Γ,Γ′; ∆,∆′))
where this last rewrite holds if D has no clauses ( =x′′ y′′) for x′′ occurring as an
output in D′1 . . .D
′
s, for all i = 1 . . . r and all j = 1 . . . s, we have:
(zvi , Di, ( ; zvi :Bi))→S (vi, ∅, (Γvi, ~xi : ~Qi; ~yi: ~Ai))
(zwj , D
′
j , ( ; zwj :B
′
j))→S (wj, ∅, (Γwj , ~x′j : ~Q′j; ∆wj , ~y′j : ~A′j))
and given Γvi = ~xvi : ~Avi for i = 1 . . . r, we abbreviate:
op = (y = (; )O((~xv1~x1; ~y1)D1, . . . , (~xvr~xr; ~yr)Dr; ))
op′ = (y = (~x′′; ~y′′)O((~xv1~x1; ~y1)D1, . . . , (~xvr~xr; ~yr)Dr; (~x′1; ~y
′





w = O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . (~xr; ~yr)vr; )(; )
w′ = O((~x1; ~y1)v1, . . . (~xr; ~yr)vr; (~x′1; ~y
′






Γ′′ = Γv1 , . . . ,Γvr
Γ′ = Γv1 , . . . ,Γvr ,Γw1 . . . ,Γws
∆′ = ∆, ~x′′ : ~Q′′, ~y′′ : ~A′′,∆w1, . . . ,∆ws
We specify further that a one-step rewrite of type 3 or 5b removing a variable
x from the linear typing context here can only occur when there is no clause
( =x y) for some y which could be rewritten by a rewrite of type 1.
We need to check that this definition is well-formed, ie that the reduct of an
intermediate is still an intermediate. This can be seen using simple properties of
relations and of the translation ρ.
Intuitively, a sequentialisation rewrite on Γ′′; ∆′′-A-intermediates
(v,D, (Γ; ∆))→S (v′, D′, (Γ′; ∆′))
moves structure from the relation part of the intermediate to the term part in a
sound way. By this we mean that the Γ′′; ∆′′-A-relations ρΓ(v)∪D and ρΓ′(v′)∪D′
will be equal up to =∆,vm.
We can now start to prove the results which we need about this rewrite. First
note that each rewrite reduces the clause set by at least one clause. In the case
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of rewrites 1 − 4 this is the obvious one, in 5a it is op, and in 5b it is op′. We
call this clause the active clause in a rewrite. Further, note that any rewrite
may only occur if all the output variables of its active clause are present in the
typing context. This is not a sufficient condition because of the 1st rewrite and
the restriction on rewrite order. We will refer to the rewrites which are given
as conditions for the 5bth rewrite as subsidiary rewrites of that main rewrite.
Similarly, we will call the intermediates which are rewritten by the subsidiary
rewrites the subsidiary intermediates.
Now since ρΓ(v) ∪ D must be a Γ′; ∆′-relation of type A, we know that no
variable in D can occur more than once as an output, and hence we know that it
may only be the output variable of one clause. This implies that any two instances
of rewrites with a shared output variable must have the same active clause. In
the cases of rewrites 2− 4 this implies that they are the same. We also note that
variables are only added to the typing context when they are the inputs of active
clauses in rewrites. This is clear except in the case of rewrite 5b, but can be seen
by induction even in that case.
We can also easily see that the only way of removing a clause from the clause
set is via a rewrite of which it is an active clause, or equivalently via a rewrite
which removes its output variables from the typing context. We will say that
an intermediate rewrites totally if it rewrites to an intermediate with an empty
clause set.




For all D containing fewer than n clauses, if (v,D, (~x : ~Q; ~y : ~A)) has
a clause c with all its dependents in ~x~y, then it has a sequence of
one-step rewrites whose last rewrite has active clause c.
we can show that any intermediate with a clause set having less than n elements
rewrites totally.
Proof To show this, we prove that any intermediate with a non-empty clause
set has at least one rewrite. Then note that given any intermediate since the
clause set must be finite, the result follows. Firstly, take any intermediate with
clause set having less than n elements. If it has no elements then we are done. If
it has at least one then take one arbitrarily. This clause then must have at least
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one dependent, and these dependents are either all free output variables, in which
case they are all in ~x~y and by the assumption there exists a rewrite, or there is
one dependent of the clause which is the input of another clause c′. Using this
clause we can then either find a rewrite or a third clause, and this procedure if
continued will give us a rewrite with active clause the ith clause we select, or it
will give us an infinite sequence of clauses such that each has as input a dependent
of the previous one. However, since the clause set must be finite, such a sequence
of clauses must contain a cycle, and it is easy to see that from the clauses and
the dependents we can therefore construct a cyclic path in the clause set, which
is a contradiction. 
Having proved this conditional result, we now go on to prove the main lemma,
which is also the assumption of the conditional in the general case:
Lemma 8.5.4
If (v,D, (~x : ~Q; ~y : ~A)) has a clause c with all its dependents in ~x~y, then it has a
sequence of one-step rewrites whose last rewrite has active clause c.
Proof We will prove this by induction over the size of the clause set. If the
clause set D is empty the lemma is vacuous. If the clause set has n+ 1 elements,
then assume it has a clause c satisfying the premise of the lemma. There are
now three possible cases. Firstly we may have that this clause has the form
( =x y), in which case the assumption implies that the rewrite (of type 1) can
proceed. Secondly we may have that this clause is not an operator clause and is
not a clause ( =x y), in which case we know that the assumption must allow the
rewrite unless there is a possible rewrite of type 1 which may take precedence.
Note however that if there are such rewrites, there can only be finitely many of
them, and note also that they merely increase the size of the typing context, and
therefore do not block the rewrite removing the clause c. Hence we can perform
the sequence of rewrites of type 1 followed by the rewrite having active clause c.
The third and most complex case is when the clause is an operator clause. In
this case the assumption is that the sole output variable of the operator is in ~x~y,
but we also need to know that there exists suitable subsidiary intermediates and
rewrites on them. However, since such intermediate must have smaller clause sets
than D, we know that any subsidiary intermediate of the appropriate form must
rewrite totally. Hence it suffices to show that suitable subsidiary intermediates
exist. However, since we know that the family of any variable is a relation, we can
simply take as subsidiary intermediates (zwj , fam(zwj , D∪ρΓ′ (v)), ( ; zwj)). These
are disjoint since we know that no clause can be in the families of two distinct
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variables unless one is in the family of the other, and this is clearly impossible
since the active clause of the operator rewrite cannot be in any family of the zwj .
Further, they are all subsets of D since any complete path in D ∪ ρΓ′(v) from a
clause in ρΓ′(v) cannot contain zwj or it would induce a cycle. Hence we have
appropriate subsidiary intermediates and the rewrite can occur, and so the result
follows by induction. 
Now using our previous lemma, we can see that we have the consequence:
Proposition 8.5.5
Any intermediate rewrites totally.
This is clear since we know that for any intermediate with a clause set having
n elements, it follows from the result we have just proved, for intermediates with
clause sets of n or fewer elements. However, we have just proved this last result
for all n, and hence the proposition holds.
We now proceed to prove confluence of→S up to the cc-fragment of provable
equality on the term part of intermediates.
Lemma 8.5.6 (Relative Confluence)
If an intermediate I has two rewrites, I →S I1 and I →S I2, then I1 and I2
respectively have rewrites I1 →S I ′1 and I2 → I ′2 such that I ′1 and I ′2 differ only
on their term part, and if I ′1 has term part v1 and I
′
2 has term part v2, these two
terms are provably equal in the fragment of the equality theory having only the
cc axioms and the rules.
Proof We prove this by considering all possible pairs of one-step rewrites in
turn. Note that some combinations are prohibited by the restriction on the order
of rewrites.
1 and 1 If we have two different rewrites of type 1, then clearly the resultant
intermediate forms are the same up to exchange on the intuitionistic part
of the typing context, and hence we have the result.
Any choice of two from {2, 3, 5a} In these cases the result follows again by
exchange on the typing context and by commutation of independent sub-
stitutions.
2 and 4, 3 and 4 In these cases the result follows by exchange and since the
substitutions go through the let -construct.
4 and 4 In this case the result follows by the commuting conversion which allows
two let -constructs to commute under appropriate free-variable restrictions.
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5b and 2, 5b and 3, 5b and 4 Say that the rewrite 2, 3 or 4 is I →S I1, called
rewrite a, and that the other rewrite I →S I2 of type 5b is called rewrite
b. Now, we know that the active clause of rewrite a is the only clause
containing any output variables of the clause, because any other occurrence
in D would have to be an input occurrence, which is not possible by our
earlier discussion. Now if we consider the subsidiary rewrites of rewrite b,
we can see that the output variable of the active clause of the rewrite a
can never be introduced into the typing context, and hence the rewrite a
can never take place as part of a subsidiary rewrite of rewrite b. This then
means that after rewrite b, rewrite a is still possible since its output variable
is still in the typing context and the clause is still in the clause set. On the
other hand, if we first do rewrite a, clearly we can still do rewrite b since the
active clause of rewrite a was not involved, and we have merely altered the
typing context in a way which will not affect rewrite b. Having established
that the rewrites can be done in either order, the equality of the resultant
intermediate forms is given by the commutativity of substitution.
5b and 5b This is the most complex case, since there are two subcases. The first
is the case in which the two rewrites of type 5b have different active clauses,
and the second is the case in which the active clauses are the same but the
sets D′i are different. First consider the case in which the active clauses are
different.
In this case we first note that no clause in one of the sets Di for one rewrite
can be in any of the corresponding set for the other rewrite. This is because
any two such sets are sub-relations of the relation D ∪ ρΓ(v), and hence by
lemma 8.2.14 any maximal path in D ∪ ρΓ(v) from such a shared clause
must pass through one clause having dependent the result variable of the
first subrelation and another having dependent the result variable of the
second subrelation. If these clauses are the same, then both active clauses,
which are the children of the respective result variables, are the same, which
is a contradiction. Otherwise, we must have that there is a path from the
clause having dependent the result variable of (say) the first subrelation to
that having dependent the result variable of the second subrelation. But this
then implies that there exists a path from the child of the result variable of
the first subrelation to the child of the result variable of the second relation,
or in other words a path from the active clause of the first rewrite to that
of the second rewrite. This then implies that the first rewrite cannot occur
until the second has, which is again a contradiction. Thus it follows that the
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two rewrites are independent as they do not affect any of the same clauses
or variables, and so they can be performed in either order. The resulting
intermediates in each case are the same, by virtue of the commutativity of
substitution.
Now consider the second case, in which the active clauses of the two rewrites
are the same. In order for the two rewrites to be distinct, it must be the case
that one of the sets D′j differs from its counterpart E′j. Note that for this to
be the case, at least one of the sets must contain a clause having dependent
zwj or else both sets would be empty and hence equal. Now we can see that
both the sets D′j and E
′
j must be subsets of fam(zwj ) since if not, we would
have that some clause having a complete path from itself not including
zwj would be rewritten in the subsidiary rewrite of the 5b-rewrite. This is
impossible since we know that for a rewrite to occur all its dependents must
be in the typing context, and inductively this is only possible for variables
whose children are in the family of the initial variable. Given this and the
fact that since fam(zwj), it suffices to show that the two rewrites using D′j
and using fam(zwj) respectively have a common reduct. This follows by
observations on substitution, however, since any clause which is not in D′j
but in fam(zwj) must be rewriteable after the 5b-rewrite using D′j because
we simply add the typing context present after the subsidiary rewrite to the
main typing context. 
Now we can define a function based on the rewrite→S. Note that for any Γ; ∆-
relation D of type A with result variable x, (x,D, ( ; x :A)) is an intermediate and
hence rewrites totally.
Definition 8.5.7 (The Translation σ)
Given a Γ; ∆-relation D such that
(x,D, ( ; x:A))→S (v, ∅,Γ′; ∆′)
define σΓ;∆(D) = v.
This is a total function by the earlier remarks. Further, we can easily show that
v is a Γ; ∆-term of type A by considering the structure of the sequentialisation
rewrite.
We now need to show that this translation is sound with respect to the equality
=vm,∆. In order to do this we will first prove a lemma:
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Lemma 8.5.8
Given an intermediate (v,D ∪ D′, (Γ, ~x : ~Q; ~y : ~A,∆)) which has a one-step se-
quentialisation rewrite to another intermediate (f(v), D, (Γ, ~x′ : ~Q′; ~y′ : ~A′,∆)), we
have for any other intermediate (w,E ∪D′, (Γ′, ~x: ~Q; ~y : ~A,∆′)) a rewrite:
(w,E ∪D′, (Γ′, ~x: ~Q; ~y : ~A,∆′))→S (f(w), E, (Γ′, ~x′ : ~Q′; ~y′ : ~A′,∆′))
if E has no clause with a vestigial occurrence of any variable in ~y, where f is a
function constructed from substitutions of terms for variables and the primitive
function which takes v to let x be y in v.
Proof We can prove this by simple consideration of the form of the one-step
rewrite. In the case of the first to 5ath rewrite, the set D′ must consist of the
single clause which is the active clause of the relevant rewrite. Further, the typing
sequences ~x : ~Q and ~y : ~A must be precisely the output variables of the active
clause. Now given that the intermediate (w,E ∪ D′, (Γ′, ~x : ~Q; ~y : ~A,∆′)) also
has the active clause and the output variables of the active clause in the typing
context, the only reason the required rewrite might not take place is because of
the restriction that a rewrite of type 1 must take precedence over a rewrite of
type 3 or 5a on the same output variable. But since the ~y are the linear output
variables of the active clause, the condition on the lemma makes sure this cannot
happen. 
Lemma 8.5.9 (Soundness)
If two Γ; ∆-relations of type A, D1 and D2 are equal under the equality =vm,∆,
then Γ; ∆ ` σΓ;∆(D1) = σΓ;∆(D2) :A using just the cc-fragment of the provable
equality.
Proof In order to show this there are two proof obligations, firstly to show that
the rewrite →S is mapped to a provable equality and secondly to show that the
equality =vm is preserved by σΓ;∆.
For the first, taking each rewrite in turn, we first take the starting intermediate
of a relation, (x,D, (Γ; ∆)), and rewrite until the first dependent of a key clause
of the rewrite appears in the typing context. Now the result of rewriting the
redex and the result of rewriting the reduct at this point are the same, modulo
the α-conversion in one case. Therefore the result holds in this case.
The second is much more complex. Imagine that two Γ; ∆-relations of type
A, D ∪ { =x y)} and D ∪ {( =x′ y)} are equal via a one-step vestigial move.
Without loss of generality, suppose that the path that exists by the first clause of
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the definition of vestigial move is from the child of x to a clause having dependent
x′. Now consider the Γ; ∆-intermediates (z,D ∪ { =x y)}, ( ; z :A)) and (z,D ∪
{( =x′ y)}, ( ; z : A)) of type A, where z is the result variable of both the relations.
Taking the second of these, we first claim that there must exist a sequence of
rewrites not containing any rewrite with an active clause having output variable
x and not containing any rewrite with active clause ( =x′ y) as follows:
(z,D ∪ {( =x′ y)}, ( ; z :A))→∗S (f(z), D′ ∪ {( =x
′
y)}, (Γ′; x′ :A′,∆′))
We first note that since the vestigial clause ( =x′ y) cannot rewrite unless the
variable x′ is present in the typing context, any rewrite sequence to an interme-
diate with empty clause set must pass through an intermediate with the variable
x′ present in the typing context and the vestigial clause ( =x′ y) in the clause
set.
We can now prove by induction over the size of the part of the clause set D
of the intermediate that given a path from a child of x to a clause having x′ as a
dependent, there must either be a rewrite of the intermediate not having active
clause with output x, or the typing context contains x′.
Firstly, if the set D is empty, then since any intermediate with non-empty
clause set has a rewrite and the only possible rewrite is the one having active
clause the only clause in the clause set ( =x′ y), and this means that x′ must be
in the typing context, or the rewrite would not be possible.
Secondly, if the set D has r+ 1 elements, it suffices to find one rewrite which
satisfies the criteria, as then the resulting intermediate must have a smaller set
D. Now since there exists a rewrite by the termination of →S, assume that
this rewrite has active clause with output x. Then x must occur in the typing
context of the intermediate. But we can see from this that if the intermediate is
(v,D∪{( =x′ y)}, (Γ; x :B,∆′)) every path from x in ρΓ′;x:B,∆′(v)∪D∪( =x
′
y)}
must be entirely within ρΓ′;x:B,∆′(v) and hence cannot contain x′, which is a
contradiction.
But now we need only check the vestigial condition of the previous lemma to
see that by repeated applications of it, we have that there exist rewrites:
(z,D ∪ { =x y)}, ( ; z :A))→∗S (f(z), D′ ∪ { =x y)}, (Γ′; x′ :A′,∆′))
The vestigiality condition is guaranteed by the existence of the rewrites on the
intermediate (z,D∪{ =x′ y)}, ( ; z :A)) for all variables except x. So we need to
check that at no point in the sequence of rewrites does a rewrite occur which has
an active clause with the output variable x. But we already know this.
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Now we have a one-step rewrite:
(f(z), D′ ∪ {( =x′ y)}, (Γ′; x′ :A′,∆′))→ (f(z), D′, (Γ′; x′ :A′,∆′))
Also, we have a sequence of rewrites
(f(z), D′, (Γ′; x′ :A′,∆′))→S (f ′(f(x)), D′′, (Γ′′; x:B,∆′′))
and hence by our previous lemma we also have a sequence of rewrites:
(f(z), D′ ∪ { =x y)}, (Γ′; x′ :A′,∆′))→S (f ′(f(x)), D′′ ∪ { =x y)}, (Γ′′; x:B,∆′′))
The vestigial condition on that lemma is satisfied obviously. Now we have a
rewrite
(f ′(f(x)), D′′ ∪ { =x y)}, (Γ′′; x:B,∆′′))→S (f ′(f(x)), D′′, (Γ′′; x:B,∆′′))
and therefore we have that both (z,D ∪ { =x y)}, ( ; z :A)) and (z,D ∪ {( =x′
y)}, ( ; z :A)) rewrite to (f ′(f(x)), D′′, (Γ′′; x :B,∆′′)) so that they must rewrite
by confluence to the same intermediate with empty clause set, which then implies
that σ is sound with respect to vestigial moves. 
We can now prove that σΓ;∆(ρΓ(v)) = v by straightforward calculation on each
term construct.
Lemma 8.5.10 (Inversion)
Given a Γ; ∆-term v of type A, σΓ;∆(ρΓ(v)) = v.
This then shows by standard arguments that:
Lemma 8.5.11
Γ; ∆ ` v = w : A using the cc-fragment of provable equality if and only if ρΓ(v) =∆
ρΓ(w)
We can go further and show that relations under the equality =vm,∆ are exactly
equivalent to terms quotiented by the provable cc-equality. First we prove a
lemma:
Lemma 8.5.12 (Invariant)
Given a Γ; ∆-intermediate of type A, (v,D, (Γ′; ∆′)), such that (v,D, (Γ′; ∆′))→S
(w,E, (Γ′′; ∆′′)), we have that:
ρΓ′;∆′(v) ∪D =vm,∆ ρΓ′′;∆′′(w) ∪E
as Γ; ∆-relations of type A.
This is easily proved by considering each sequentialisation rewrite in turn.
This then allows us to prove the following result:
Lemma 8.5.13 (Inversion II)
Given a Γ; ∆-relation D of type A, ρΓ;∆(σΓ;∆(D)) =vm,∆ D.
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Proof First note that we have a rewrite:
(x,D, ( ; x:A))→S (σΓ;∆(D), ∅, (Γ; ∆))
where D has the result variable x in the context Γ; ∆. But then by the invariant
lemma, we have that
ρ ;x:A(x) ∪D =vm,∆ ρΓ;∆(σΓ;∆(D)) ∪ ∅
which immediately gives us the required result. 
Hence we have that Rel(O,=vm,∆) is isomorphism to Lin(O) quotiented by the
provable equality built from the cc axioms and the rules. In the next chapter




Normal Forms and Decidability
In this chapter we continue the study of relations as normal forms for linear
type-theories, showing that we can extend the results proved in the previous
chapter to allow us to decide the linear typing system with F − βV η-axioms and
further to decide the system with output-naturality equalities ONat(O,O) for
some signature O having an output-parameterised set of operators O. However,
to do so will involve some delicate proofs.
9.1 Proof-Nets
As in the previous chapter, we motivate our definitions and proofs using proof-
nets, in which we can raise all the problems we will face in a more understandable
way.
In modelling not only the provable equality built over Lin(O) from the com-
muting conversions, but the full provable equality of Lin(O,A), we need to consider
the F −βV and F −η axiomatic equalities. However, there are three issues which
are immediately raised.
Firstly, we have the issue of orientation of the rewrites that we shall give.
It is by no means certain that the conventional reductive rewrite orientation is
the correct one in general, and in fact we will be using a rewrite in which the
βv-rewrites are taken as reductions and the η-rewrites as expansions (see Ghani’s
thesis [Gha95]). Secondly, the F −βV -equality contains within its right-hand side
an intuitionistic substitution of an intuitionistic term for a variable, and in order
for our relational system to model this, we will need to augment the rewrites
of the replicators to copy intuitionistic operators, amongst other administration.
The techniques we will use to do this are based in a number of proof–net-like
systems, notably those inherited from nets for the λ-calculus.
Thirdly, and perhaps most substantially, we need to take account of the
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output-naturality equalities which hold of the ⊗L and IL operators. In order
to do this we adopt a different approach, which is based on the observation that
in modelling the linear naturality of operators in proof-nets, we simply leave wires
which are not bound by the operator. The intuition behind output-natural oper-
ators is that the output wire (or result) is not bound by the operator application,
and so our new proof nets proceed by not binding them; for example, a repres-
entation of the DILL(C)-term let x⊗ y be t in u which does not bind the result
wire is seen in figure 9.1.
C





Figure 9.1: Proof-Nets for Output Naturality
Given this approach, output-naturality equalities map to identities on proof-
nets, which is one of their major virtues. However, there is a slight complication
in the treatment of operators with no binding behaviour, as for example in IL.
As explained in section 8.1 on page 183, such a non-binding operator requires a
vestigial, since otherwise too many proof-nets would be identified.
9.2 The F -Equalities
We now introduce an additional rewrite on relations, the F -rewrite, which models
the effect of the F -equalities of Lin(O,A). We proceed to extend the result of
the previous section to show that the derivable equality judgement of Lin(O, ∅)
soundly and completely maps to relations under the equality =vm∆F generated in
the obvious way from the rewrites→F and →∆ and the equality =vm. First we
make a definition:
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Definition 9.2.1 (Resolved Variable)
Say a variable x of type Q ∈ MI is resolved in the relation D if it is linear and
is not the input of a clause (F (z) = x) or the output of a clause (x = F (z)).
Conversely, if a variable is linear and is not resolved, call it unresolved.
We must define the concept of common variable. A common variable for a
clause in a relation is a linear variable which occurs in any complete path from the
clause. Each clause has at least one common variable unless it has dependent the
result variable, because the result variable will be a common variable. Further, for
any clause having an input which occurs as a vestigial elsewhere in the relation,
we can always find a common variable which is a valid vestigial move away. This
holds simply by taking the common variable which occurs first in each complete
path (it must always be the same one since if not a cycle would occur).
Now we define the rewrite on relations which we will use:
Definition 9.2.2 (The Rewrite →F )
Define the one-step rewrite →F on relations using the following rules, where the
F − η-rule is only permitted on unresolved variables x:
D ∪ {(F (x′) = y), (y = F (x))} →F−β D{x/x′, z/y}
D{x/x′} →F−η D ∪ {(F (y) = x), (x′ = F (y))}
where in the second of these, y is fresh, and in the first, z is the first common
variable in every complete path from (F (x′) = y) in the relation D ∪ {(F (x′) =
y), (y = F (x))}.
Now we need to extend the rewrite ∆ in order to deal with intuitionistic
operators. We will overload notation to refer to the extended rewrite also as→∆.
We now introduce some substitution notation; for any relation D let Dσ(1) be
D with all its variables replaced by fresh variables, such that if i 6= j then Dσ(i)
and Dσ(j) share no variables. We extend this to intuitionistic operator clauses,
meaning that each relation within the operator instance has the substitution
applied to it, with corresponding α-conversion for the binding instances.
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Definition 9.2.3 (The Rewrite →∆)
Let the one-step rewrite→∆ be given by the following cases, extending the rewrite
→∆ of the previous chapter:
D ∪ {( =x y), (M ∪ {z′} ∪ {y′} = z)} →∆−1 D ∪ {(M ∪ {z′} = z)}
D ∪ {({x} = y)} →∆−2 D{y/x}
D ∪ {(M ′ = y), (M ∪ {z′} ∪ {y} = x)} →∆−3 D ∪ {(M ∪ {z′} ∪M ′ = x)}
D ∪ {(z = (~x; ~y)O(. . . (~x′; ~y′)D′ ∪ {(M = y′′)}(x′′) . . . ; . . . ))} →∆−4
D ∪ {(z = (~x; ~y)O(. . . (~x′; ~y′)D′(x′′) . . . ; . . . )), (M = y′′)}
D ∪ {(z = (~x; ~y)O(. . . (~x′; ~y′)D′(x′′) . . . ; . . . )), (z′ = (; )O′(. . . ; ))} →∆−5
D ∪ {(z = (~x; ~y)O(. . . (~x′; ~y′)D′ ∪ {(z′ = (; )O(. . . ; ))}(x′′) . . . ; . . . ))}
where O′ ∈ OI and z′ occurs as an input only in D′
D ∪ {(M = z), (z = (; )O′(. . . ; ))} →∆−6
D ∪ {(z′1 = (; )O′(. . . ; )σ(1)), . . . , (z′r = (; )O′(. . . ; )σ(n)), (M ′1 . . .M ′r = ~x)}
where in this last rewrite, the free intuitionistic variables occurring as inputs in
(; )O′(. . . ; ) are ~x , we have M ′i = ~xσ(i) and M = {z′1, . . . , z′r}.
We will now define the equality =vm∆F in the obvious way as the reflexive
transitive closure of the union of the one-step rewrites →∆ and →F over the
equality =vm.
We can now start to extend the results of the previous chapter to these new
rewrites.
9.3 Deciding the Equality
Confluence
It is straightforward to check confluence for our rewrite by considering all possible
critical pairs.
Lemma 9.3.1 (Confluence)
The transitive closure →∆F of the union of the rewrites→F and→∆ is confluent
over the equality =vm.
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Proof As before, the key to the proof is the locality of the rewrites. However,
since we now have rewrites which manipulate operator clauses, we have to also
allow for the possibility that redexes may occur inside the relations which are in
the operator clause. We consider pairs of rewrites case by case.
Any of {∆− 1, 2, 3} with F − β In this case we can clearly see that there is
no possibility of these two rewrites sharing a clause. Hence the rewrites are
independent.
Any of {∆− 1, 2, 3} with F − η In this case we can see that an F − η-rewrite
can never occur on any variable in a ∆− 1, 2, 3-redex, since F − η can only
occur on linear variables and all those occurring in the rewrites ∆− 1, 2, 3
are intuitionistic. Hence the rewrites are independent.
Either of ∆− 4 or ∆− 5 with either of F − β or F − η In this case we can
see that the only interaction between these two redexes can be if the F -redex
occurs in an operator instance occurring in the ∆-redex. But no F -clause or
linear variable in such an operator instance is affected, and so the rewrites
are independent.
The ∆− 6-rewrite and either the F − β or F − η-rewrite In both these cases
we can see that the F -redex may be copied any number of times (including
none, when it is deleted). The result of doing the F -rewrite and then the
∆− 6 rewrite is the same as that of doing the ∆− 6-rewrite and then some
number of copies of the F -rewrite.
Any combination of two from {∆− 1, 2, 3} This case was dealt with in the
previous proof.
∆− 4 and itself In this case clearly the redexes are non-overlapping unless the
two duplicators are leaving the same operator construct, in which case they
are still independent.
∆− 4 and any of {∆− 1, 2, 3} This case is easily seen, with the rewrites only
interacting if the duplicator which leaves the operator construct in the ∆−4-
rewrite is also involved in the ∆−1, 2, 3-rewrite. If the rewrites do interact,
the reducts will themselves have a common reduct using more instances of
the same rewrites.
∆− 6 and and any of {∆− 1, 2, 3} This is very similar to the previous case,
we the added possibility that the ∆− 1, 2, 3-rewrite might be duplicated.
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∆− 6 and ∆− 5 These rewrites interact only if the copied operator construct
is the operator construct which is the active one in the ∆− 5 rewrite, or in
the case where the ∆−6-rewrite copies the ∆−5 redex. In the second case
the two reducts can easily be shown to have a common reduct by repeated
∆−5 rewrites, and in the first case another instance of ∆−6 and a number
of instances of ∆− 5 are needed.
∆− 6 and F − βη These rewrites can only interact if the F − βη-redex occurs
in the operator construct duplicated by the ∆−6 rewrite, and we can easily
rewrite the reducts to a common form using a number of F − βη-rewrites
and a∆ − 6-rewrite.
Any two of F − βη These rewrites may share a clause, but if they do the result
of performing either rewrite first is the same form.
∆− 5 and ∆− 1, 2, 3 These rewrites must be independent, as they share no
clause and no rewrite in the body of the operator clauses is affected by
the ∆− 5 rewrite.
∆− 5 and ∆− 4 In this case the rewrites may interact in two interesting ways,
one for each operator construct in the ∆− 5 rewrite. In the case where the
∆ − 4-rewrite places a replicator between the two operator clauses of the
∆− 5rewrite, the two reducts have a common reduct using a ∆− 6-rewrite
and possibly several ∆−5-rewrites. In the other case, the required rewrites
to form a common reduct are simply two ∆− 5 rewrites.
∆− 5 and ∆− 5 In this case, the only interesting interaction between the two
instances of the rewrite can be resolved simply using more instances of ∆−5.
Normalisation
Having established the confluence of this rewrite, we need to show that it is nor-
malising, which is to say that every one-step rewrite sequence is finite. Although
this is not as hard as it is for the higher-order case, because of the presence of
the expansionary rewrites F − η and ∆ − 6 it is not trivial. However, it can be
shown by defining a measure on terms which we will now present.
First consider the action of our rewrites on an arbitrary replicator in a relation.
In each of the rewrites ∆−1, 2, 3 and ∆−6 the tendency is for a replicator to move
further away from the result variable of a relation, or to disappear altogether. The
problem is that in the case of the ∆−6-rewrite, this is accomplished at the cost of
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increasing the number of clauses, which in the previous chapter was the measure
which ensured termination. This is the key to the measure we will define, but
there are complexities due to the ∆− 4 and ∆− 5 rewrites.
In the case of the F − η-rewrite, we notice that the rewrite cannot occur
unless the variable is unresolved. Since all the variables introduced by a F − η-
rewrite are resolved, we can make such rewrites reduce the measure by weighting
each unresolved variable more heavily than the subnet which replaces it after the
rewrite.
First we introduce some theory. We will be using polynomials of a single
variable, which we will write p(x), q(x) . . . for the variable x; polynomials will only
be used in this section, so this slight overloading of notation will be transparent.




ci are (possibly negative) integer coefficients. We can then define addition and
subtraction (and the product of two polynomials) in the obvious way We can also
define an ordering on polynomials of a single variable by saying p(x) > q(x) iff
the coefficient of the largest power of x in p(x)− q(x) is strictly positive.
We now need to make some definitions formalising our earlier discussion of
the measure. Recall that a path from c to c′ in a relation D is a pair of sequences
(c1 . . . cr, x1 . . . xr−1) such that c1 = c, cr = c′ and i connects ci and ci+1 for all
i = 1 . . . r − 1. Now say that a total path in a relation D is a path which cannot
be extended by prepending or appending a pair (c, x) to it. Intuitively, the total
paths go from free inputs or inputs bound by an operator clause to a clause having
dependent the result variable of either the relation D, or some relation D′ in an
operator clause contained in D. Write the set of all total paths in a relation D
as TPath(D), and let φ . . . range over paths for this chapter only. Clearly there
exists a total path containing any clause contained in D.
Definition 9.3.2 (Complexity I)
Given a path φ, define the first complexity of it, written Com1(φ) inductively:
Com1(c, ε) = 1
Com1(~cc′, ~xx′) =

2Com1(~c, ~x) if c′ is a replicator clause and x′ is resolved
2Com1(~c, ~x) + 4 if c′ is a replicator clause and x′ is unresolved
Com1(~c, ~x) + 1 if c′ is not a replicator clause
and x′ is resolved
Com1(~c, ~x) + 4 if c′ is not a replicator clause
and x′ is unresolved
Define the first complexity polynomial as follows:
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Definition 9.3.3 (First Complexity Polynomial)






Now the intuition is that all our rewrites will at worst replace one path of a
certain complexity with many of lower complexity, but because in the polynomial
ordering one xc of higher coefficient outweighs many xc′ of lower coefficient, the
complexity polynomial will still strictly decrease. We can now show that the
one-step ∆ − 1, 2, 3, 6-rewrites and one-step F − βη-rewrites decrease the first
complexity polynomial of a relation.
Lemma 9.3.4
If D → D′ by a one-step ∆− 1, 2, 3, 6-rewrite or a one-step F − βη-rewrite, then
p1C(D)(x) > p1C(D′)(x).
Proof We will refer to the form of the rewrites given on page 217. Consider the
rewrites separately:
∆− 1 In this case, any total path in D′ yields a total path in D simply by
replacing any occurrence of the new replicator clause added by the rewrite
with the replicator clause in D which has as output the required variables.
Further, the first complexity of the generated path in D is the same as that
of the original path in D′, since we have just replaced a replicator clause
with another one. We can see easily that any two distinct total paths in D′
give rise to distinct total paths in D via this procedure. Moreover, there
exists a total path in D which is not a total path in D′, namely that which
passes through the replicator clause deleted by the rewrite. Call this total
path φ. Now we know that the first complexity polynomial of D must have
coefficients greater than or equal to those of the first complexity polynomial
of D′. But the coefficient of xCom1(φ) must be strictly greater in the first
complexity polynomial of D, so that this polynomial must be strictly greater
than the first complexity polynomial of D′.
∆2 In this case we can see that any total path of D′ arises from a total path of D
either identically, or by replacing the subsequence of the variable sequence
yx with y and removing the replicator clause in the clause sequence. This
procedure obviously yields total paths of less than or equal first complexity
in general, and in the case where the replicator clause is removed yields
total paths of strictly lesser first complexity. Note that there exists at least
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one total path which has strictly lesser first complexity by this argument
since at least one total path passes through the replicator clause. This
correspondence gives a one-to-one mapping of total paths and hence since
it is strictly reducing on the first complexity of at least one total path, the
first complexity polynomial of the reduct D′ must be strictly less than that
of D.
∆− 3 This argument proceeds similarly to the previous one simply by construct-
ing the obvious correspondence between total paths, which turns out to be
strictly reducing of first complexity on total paths passing through the rep-
licator clause which is deleted.
∆− 6 This is the key case. It is easy to see that given any total path in D
which is not a path of D′, we can give a total path of D′ which has strictly
lesser first complexity. Further, although there are many such candidate
total paths, these all have strictly lesser first complexity, and the only total
paths of D′ which are not paths of D are these paths of lesser first com-
plexity. Consider the total path φ that we know must exist in D passing
through the replicator, and which is therefore not a path of D′. The first
complexity polynomial of D has strictly greater xCom1(φ) coefficient than the
first complexity polynomial of D′, and although by our discussion it may
have strictly lesser coefficients of smaller powers of x, this is still enough to
make the first complexity polynomial of D strictly greater than that of D′.
F − β In this case, there is a straightforward correspondence between total paths
of D and D′, which strictly reduces the first complexity of any path that
passes through either of the clauses which are deleted. Hence by standard
reasoning the first complexity polynomial of D is strictly greater than that
of D′.
F − η This is a more complicated case since the obvious correspondence between
paths increases the length of paths. However, it can be shown that because
the paths contain one fewer unresolved variable, the first complexity of paths
is strictly reduced by going from D to D′ and hence the first complexity
polynomial of D is strictly greater than that of D′. 
This forms the major part of our proof. We can proceed to consider the only
two remaining rewrites, the ∆ − 4 and ∆ − 5-rewrites. First we note that the




If D → D′ by a one-step ∆ − 4 or ∆ − 5-rewrite, there is a first-complexity-
preserving correspondence between the total paths of D and D′.
Proof The first-complexity-preserving correspondence is the identity. 
Let Op(D) be the set of operator clauses contained inD, and define the nesting
level of a clause as follows:
Definition 9.3.6 (Nesting Level)
Given a clause c ∈ D, define the nesting level of c in D, written Nest(D)(c),
inductively as follows:
Nest(D)(c) = 0 if c ∈ D
Nest(D)(c) = Nest(D′)(c) + 1
if (y = (. . . )O(. . . , , (~x′1; ~x′2)D(x′′), . . . ; . . . )) ∈ D
and c is contained in D′
Now we can define the nesting polynomial.
Definition 9.3.7 (Nesting Polynomial)





Clearly, we can now prove:
Lemma 9.3.8
If D → D′ by a one-step ∆− 5-rewrite, then pN (D)(x) > pN (D′)(x).
Proof This is quite easy to see since the rewrite reduces by one the coefficient
of x−Nest(D)(c) where c is the intuitionistic operator clause which is moved inside
the other operator clause in the rewrite, and no other operator clause of lesser
nesting (which means higher power of x in the nesting polynomial) is affected.
Also, we can quite easily see that since the one-step ∆ − 4-rewrite does not
affect the nesting level of any operator clause, it must preserve the nesting poly-
nomial. Hence, we have almost completed the details of normalisation. Finally,
let Rep(D) be the set of replicator clauses occurring in the relation D. We have;
Lemma 9.3.9







Proof Again, this is easily seen, since the rewrite precisely decreases the nesting
level of the replicator clause involved by one, and leaves all other replicators as
they are. 
We can now put all these pieces together to prove:
Lemma 9.3.10 (Normalisation)
The transitive closure →∆F of the union of the rewrites →F and →∆ over the
equality =vm is normalising.
Proof Consider the set of triples (p(x), q(x), r) consisting of two polynomials
and an integer, ordered by the lexicographic ordering inherited from the polyno-





forces the →∆−F -rewrite to terminate.
In order to show this we need to show that the measure is bounded below in
the ordering for all relations, and that every one-step rewrite strictly reduces the
measure according to the given ordering. We can see firstly that the measure is
bounded below by the element (0, 0, 0) of the measure set, where the polynomial
0 is that polynomial having all zero coefficients. This is the case since clearly the
two polynomials must have nonnegative coefficients which are just the sizes of sets
in each case (the set of total paths of complexity n and the set of operator clauses
of nesting level n), and the nesting level of any clause must be nonnegative.
Secondly, to show that the measure is reduced by each one-step rewrite note
that the ∆ − 1, 2, 3 and F − βη-rewrites strictly reduce the first measure by
lemma 9.3.4, that the ∆− 5 one-step rewrite preserves the first measure and re-
duces the second by lemma 9.3.8, hence reducing the measure in the lexicographic
order, and finally that the ∆ − 4 one-step rewrite preserves the first-complexity
polynomial and the nesting polynomial, and reduces the final component of the
triple by lemma 9.3.9. Hence there can only be a finite number of rewrites in any
sequence of one-step ∆− 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,−F − βη-rewrites. 
Hence we have that:
Theorem 8 (Decidability)
The equality =vm∆F is decidable.
Proof This is easy to see since any rewrite sequence on any two relations will
terminate, and by confluence we must have that if the reducts are equal, then
they are equal by =vm, which is also decidable. 
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Relations and Terms
Now we must show that the extended rewrite we have defined over terms is
soundly mapped to and from term equality. We start by considering the transla-
tion ρ.
First we need a lemma on intuitionistic substitution.
Lemma 9.3.11 (Intuitionistic Substitution)
Given an intuitionistic term Γ; ` v :Q of Lin(O,A), for any term Γ, x :Q; ∆ `
w:A, we have
ρΓ;∆(let x be v in w) = ρΓ;∆(w{v/x})
The proof is by induction on the derivation of the term w. However, we note
that if the intuitionistic term w is simply some intuitionistic variable y, then
ρΓ;∆(let x be v in w) is
ρ~z1:~R,y:Q,x:Q;∆(w) ∪ {({~z1, ~z2} = ~z), ({} =
y′ ~z2), (y′ = F (y)), (F (x) = y′)}




If Γ; ∆ ` v = w:A in Lin(O, ∅), then ρΓ;∆(v) and ρΓ;∆(w) have a common reduct
in the transitive closure of →∆F .
This is again easily shown by calculation.
Now considering the translation σ, we have
Lemma 9.3.13
Given Γ; ∆-relations D and D′ of type A, if D rewrites to D′ by a one-step F - or
∆-rewrite, then
Γ; ∆ ` σΓ;∆(D) = σΓ;∆(D′):A
in Lin(O, ∅).
This is proved by considering suitable rewrite sequences and the term parts
of the resulting intermediates.
Given these results, we have the following corollary of theorem 8:
Corollary 8.1 (Decidability)
Given two Γ; ∆-terms v and w of type A, we can decide whether or not they are
provably equal in the type-theory Lin(O, ∅).
This follows easily since we can see that the two terms are equal iff their
images under ρ are equal, and this latter statement is decidable.
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9.4 The Higher-Order Case
We now need to consider decidability in the higher-order case. We will consider
the system of relations for the higher-order type-theory constructed in chapter 7.
We will then give a confluent and normalising rewrite system for it built on the
one we have just presented for a general linear type-theory.
Intuitively, we will take the expected β-reductions and η-expansions on un-
resolved variables, where we will extend the definition of unresolved variables
appropriately. Then we will be able to extend the definition of complexity of a
path, and define a revised version of the complexity polynomial which will still
enjoy the same properties.
Firstly, however, we need to consider the system of relations for higher-order
type-theories.
Higher-Order Relations
The system of higher-order relations for LinH(H) is the same as the system of
relations for the generalised linear type-theory which defines LinH(H), with the
one exception that we change the syntax for the output-natural sets of operators
⊗LA,B and IL.
First consider the system Rel(OH). We will use the following abbreviations:
write (x = ∗) for (x = (; )IR(; ))
write (z = x⊗ y) for (x = (; )⊗R (; (; )(x)(; )(y)))
write (z = λx.y) for (z = (; )λ(; (; x)(y)))
write (z = xy) for (z = (; xy)ap(; ))
write (z =!(~x)D(y)) for (z = (; )!((~x; )D(y); ))
write (y =
!
x) for (y = (; x)
!
(; ))
Now we need to define the relational system RelH(H), in which the IL and
⊗L sets of operators are captured using different syntax. Essentially, this is given
by replacing every occurrence of a tensor elimination operator (z′ = (; x′) ⊗L
(; (x1x2)(z))) with a clause (x1 ⊗ x2 =z x′) and replacing z′ by z in the rest of
the relation, and similarly for the IL operator. The intuition is that the output-
naturality of the tensor-elimination and unit-elimination operators corresponds
to the fact that the vestigial in the new clauses should be movable.
Definition 9.4.1 (Clauses of Rel
H(H))
Given a higher-order signature H = (MI ,ML,OI,OL), the clauses of RelH(H) are
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precisely those of Rel(MHI ,MHL,OI ,OL) with the addition of:
(x = ∗) (z = x⊗ y) (z = λx.y) (z =!(~x)D(y))
(∗ =z x) (x⊗ y =z′ z) (z = xy) (y = !x)
Now,
• In the clause (x = ∗), x is an output occurrence.
• In the clause (z = x ⊗ y), z is an output occurrence and x and y are both
input occurrences.
• In the clause (z = λx.y), z is an output occurrence, x is a binding occurrence
and y is an input occurrence.
• In the clause (z =!(~x)D(y)), z is an output occurrence.
• In the clause (∗ =z x), z is a vestigial occurrence and x is an input occur-
rence.
• In the clause (x⊗ y =z′ z), x and y are output occurrences, z′ is a vestigial
occurrence and z is an input occurrence.
• In the clause (z = xy), z is an output occurrence and x and y are input
occurrences.
• In the clause (y = !x) y is an output occurrence and x is an input occurrence.
Pre-relations of RelH(H) are sets of clauses of RelH(H), and we now define both
connectedness and paths exactly as for Rel(O) given the extended definition of
input, output, vestigial and binding occurrences.
Definition 9.4.2 (Relations of Rel
H(H))
A relation of RelH(H) is a pre-relation of RelH(H) which satisfies the familiar
conditions of definition 8.2.10 for RelH(H) paths.
We can take pre-relations of Rel(OH) to those of RelH(H) by mapping each
non-higher-order clause to itself, and mapping each higher-order clause to its
familiar abbreviation except for the clause (z′ = (; x)IL(; (; )(z)), which we map
to (∗ =z x) whilst substituting z for the input occurrence of z′, and the clause
(z′ = (; x′)⊗L (; (; x1x2)(z))), which we map to (x1⊗x2 =z x′), again substituting
z for the input occurrence of z′.
Conversely, we can take pre-relations of RelH(H) to those of Rel(OH) by map-
ping each non-higher-order clause to itself, and mapping each higher-order clause
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to its familiar abbreviation except for the clause (∗ =z x), which we map to (z′ =
(; x)IL(; (; )(z))) where z′ is fresh, and we substitute it for the input occurrence of
z, and the clause (x1 ⊗ x2 =z x′), which we map to (z′ = (; x′) ⊗L (; (; x1x2)(z)))
where z′ is fresh, and we substitute it for the input occurrence of z. The result
we now want is as follows:
Lemma 9.4.3
The relations of Rel(OH) are isomorphic to the relations of RelH(H).
This is easily seen by considering the mappings we have already given, and
observing that they map paths to paths. Further, we have more importantly that:
Lemma 9.4.4
Under the isomorphism of relations, the vestigial moves and →F∆-rewrites of
RelH(H) are isomorphic to the vestigial moves and →F∆ augmented with the
equalities in ρ(ONat(⊗L,OnH)) and ρ(ONat(IL,OH)), where these equalities cor-
respond to the vestigial moves of the clauses for ⊗L and IL.
We assume firstly that the isomorphism of relations preserves rewrites in both
directions, and also preserves the vestigial equalities of operators other than the
tensor and unit eliminations. This then leaves us with two proof obligations.
The first of these is to show that two relations which are equal via the image
under ρ of the output-naturality equalities for the tensor and unit-elimination
map to relations which are vestigially equal using the vestigial equalities for those
connectives. This is most easily done by demonstrating that the image under ρ
of the output-naturality equalities can be derived from a larger set of simpler
equalities along the lines of those sketched on page 40, which correspond directly
to the individual vestigial moves.
The second proof obligation is to show that relations which are vestigially
equal using the vestigial equality for the tensor and the unit map to relations
which are equal via the image under ρ of the output-naturality equalities. This
is done by considering the elementary vestigial moves on which the equality was
built. These are all easily shown to correspond to elementary output-naturality
equalities.
Rewriting
We will define a rewrite over the relations of RelH(H) which extends the rewrite
previously given over Rel(O). Firstly, we need to extend the definition of resolved
wires in order to restrict the η-rewrite.
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Definition 9.4.5 (Resolved Variables)
Extend the definition of resolved variables in the higher-order case so that, given
a relation D:
• a variable of a type Q ∈ MI is resolved if it is intuitionistic and it is not of
the form !A, or if it is linear and it is the input of a clause (F (y) = x) or
the output of a clause (x = F (y)),
• a variable of type I is resolved if if it is the input of a (∗ =z x) clause or
the output of a (x = ∗) clause,
• a variable of type A⊗ B is resolved if is the input of a clause (x ⊗ y = x)
or the output of a clause (x = y ⊗ z),
• a variable of type A( B is resolved if is the input of a clause (z = xy) or
the output of a clause (x = λy.z),
• and finally, an intuitionistic variable of type !A is resolved if it is the input
of a clause (y = F (x)) where y is the input of a clause (z =
!
y), or if it is
the output of a clause (x =!(~y)D′(z)).
We now say that the order of a type is given by the number of connectives
used in its construction, where I,⊗,( and ! are constructors for the purpose of
this definition.
We give the rewrite →βη on the relational system RelH(H).
Definition 9.4.6 (The Rewrite →βη)
Define the one-step rewrite →βη to be given by the following cases:
D ∪ {(∗ =y x), (x = ∗)} →β D
D ∪ {(x⊗ y = z), (z = x′ ⊗ y′)} →β D{x′, y′/x, y}
D ∪ {(z = λx.y), (y′ = zx′)} →β D{x′, y/x, y′}
D ∪ {(z =!(~x)D′(y)), (x′ = F (z)), (y′ = !x′)} →β (D ∪D′){y/y′}
D{x/x′} →η D ∪ {(x′ = ∗), (∗ =x
′
x)}
D{x/x′} →η D ∪ {(x′ = y ⊗ z), (y ⊗ z = x)}
D{x/x′} →η D ∪ {(x′ = λy.z), (z = xy)}
D{x/x′} →η D ∪ {(x′ =!(x){(z =
!
y), (y = F (x))}(z))}
Here, η-rewrites are only allowed on unresolved variables, which must also in the
case of the I − η rewrite be variables of type I , in the case of the ⊗− η-rewrite
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must be variables of type A ⊗ B for some A and B, in the case of the η− (-
rewrite must be variables of type A ( B for some A and B, and finally in the
case of the !− η-rewrite must be intuitionistic variables of type !A for some A.
Confluence
Confluence is shown for this system of rewrites in exactly the way we showed if for
the last, which is by considering all possible interacting pairs of local rewrites. We
are saved some work in this by noting that the only rewrites which can interact
in the βη-rewrite are the β-rewrite and the η-rewrite corresponding to the same
type constructor.
Lemma 9.4.7 (Confluence of →F−∆−βη)
The transitive closure of the one-step rewrite on RelH(H) defined by the various
cases of →F , →∆ and →βη is confluent.
Proof In order to do this it suffices to show that any two one-step rewrites of
these kinds have reducts which in turn have a common reduct in the transitive
closure. We have already seen that this is true for any two one-step rewrites
of type →∆−F in the case of Rel(O), and the proof in that case goes through
identically in this case. Further, as we observed above, the only way any two
one-step →βη-rewrites might interact is if they were the β and the η-rewrite
corresponding to the same constructor. In this case, any interaction is seen to be
impossible by inspection. Equally, it is obvious that (excepting the case of the !-
constructor) the only interaction between a βη-rewrite and a F∆-rewrite is in the
case where the βη-rewrite in an intuitionistic operator clause and is duplicated or
discarded by an instance of ∆−6. In this case we can see that the confluence holds
using a number of the same βη-rewrites. Finally, considering the !-constructor,
we must check that the non-standard way in which the ! − βη-rewrites include
instances of the clause (x = F (y)) does not interfere with confluence, but it can
be see that in the critical cases, those in which we consider the F − βη-rewrites
and the !−βη-rewrites, there is no failure of confluence. Hence we have the result.

Normalisation
The intuition behind the proof of normalisation for this case is exactly the same
as that in the previous case, except that in order to account for the fact that the
η-rewrites are expansionary, we need to weight unresolved variables according to
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the order of their type. Then the intention is that when an η-rewrite occurs, an
unresolved variable of a higher type order is replaced by some possibly unresolved
variables of lower type order and some clauses in the relation. Hence the overall
effect is to reduce the complexity of each path through the η-redex and hence the
complexity polynomial.
There is also a factor which we have not mentioned, which is that the result
of a β-rewrite can increase this measure of complexity for many paths since any
total path whose first clause has as input the binder of the λ-clause will not be
total after the rewrite since the variable is no longer bound. In order to take care
of this problem, we need to weight every application clause with the maximal
complexity of the highest paths above its argument input.
First we define a measure of the order of a type.
Definition 9.4.8 (Type Order)
Define the order of a type A inductively, written o(A) as follows:
o(l) = 0
o(I) = 1
o(A⊗B) = o(A( B) = o(A) + o(B)
o(!A) = 1 + o(A)
Definition 9.4.9 (Variable Order)
Given a variable x and a relation D in which it occurs, define the variable order
of x in D, which we will write oD(x), as:
oD(x) =
2o(A) + 1 if the variable x is linear of type Q in D2o(A) otherwise
We now define the second complexity of a path in a relation, which is analogous
to the first complexity except for the incorporation of the order of the types of
wires. This amendment means that we need to be a little careful to avoid a circular
definition. Call a path in a relation which cannot be extended by prepending a
(c, x) pair to it an initial path.
Definition 9.4.10 (Complexity II)
Given a path φ in a relation D, define the second complexity of it, written Com2(φ)
inductively over the sum of the lengths of the initial paths terminating at the last
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clause of the path φ:
Com2(c, ε) = 1
Com2(~cc′, ~xx′) =

2Com2(~c, ~x) if c′ is a replicator clause and x′ is resolved
2Com2(~c, ~x) + 4oD(x′) if c′ is a replicator clause and x′ is unresolved
Com2(~c, ~x) +M + 1 if c′ is an application clause and x′ is resolved
Com2(~c, ~x) +M + 4oD(x′) if c′ is an application clause and x′ is unresolved
Com2(~c, ~x) + 1 if c′ is not a replicator or application clause
and x′ is resolved
Com2(~c, ~x) + 4oD(x′) if c′ is not a replicator or application clause
and x′ is unresolved
where M is a number greater than the maximal complexity of an initial path
terminating at a clause having immediately above the application clause.
This is a definition because at any point, the sum of lengths of initial paths
terminating immediately above the application clause are smaller than the sum
of lengths of initial paths terminating at the application clause, and so we can
always determine M .
Definition 9.4.11 (Second Complexity Polynomial)






We now prove the crucial lemma, which shows that the second complexity
polynomial is reduced by the relevant rewrites.
Lemma 9.4.12
If D → D′ by a one-step ∆−1, 2, 3, 6-rewrite, a one-step βη-rewrite or a one-step
F − βη-rewrite then
p2C(D)(x) > p2C(D′)(x)
Proof As before, we prove this by considering all the named reductions in turn.
∆− 1, 2, 3 These cases are easily seen to reduce the complexity of at least one
path in exactly the same way as in the previous proof.
∆− 6 Again, this case goes through exactly as previously.
F − β As before, this rewrite reduces the complexity of any path containing it.
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F − η Note that this rewrite can only occur on a variable of intuitionistic type Q.
Further, there is at most one unresolved variable in the reduct. Assume that
a general path φ contains the variable. Its complexity will be a function of
the expression 4(o(Q) + 1), and that of the path with the variable replaced
by the reduct will be the same function of the expression 4(o(Q)) + 2 or 2
depending on whether the type Q has the form !A or not. In either of these
cases the reduct path has strictly smaller complexity than the original.
I − η,⊗− η, ( −η and !− η In each of these cases, any path containing the
variable on which the η-rewrite takes place corresponds to several paths in
the relation given by the rewrite, each of which has lesser complexity than
the original by virtue of the fact that the only unresolved variables which
may be present after the rewrite have lower variable order.
I − β, ⊗− β and !− β In each of these rewrites, a path is replaced straightfor-
wardly by another path of lesser complexity.
( −β This case is the most subtle, and is the reason for the addition of the con-
stant M to the definition of complexity. There are two possible restrictions
of total paths to the redex. Consider the redex
{(z = xy), (x = λy′.z′)}
If we abbreviate the first of these clauses as c1 and the second as c2, the
two restrictions of paths are (c2c1, z′xz) and (c1, yz). Now note that any
total path having the second of these restrictions has complexity which is a
function of the expression (M + 1) where M is a number greater than the
maximal complexity of an initial path terminating at a clause immediately
above c1. Hence, when such a path is mapped to a total path in the relation
given by the rewrite in which y′ and y are identified, the complexity of such
a total path is still less than that of the original path, as it is the same
function of some number less than M .
Secondly, any total path restricting to (c2c1, z′xz) has complexity which is a
function of some number less than M . Any total path in the relation given
by the rewrite which is generated from the first total path must also be an
instance of a total path generated from a total path having the other restric-
tion. Since we know that the complexities of such total paths are strictly less
than those of the corresponding total paths of the kind mentioned above,
we know that we have removed one path at the cost of adding others of
lesser complexity, and so the second complexity polynomial is reduced. 
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As before, it is easy to see that both the ∆ − 4 and ∆ − 5-rewrites preserve
the second complexity polynomial. Further, we again have that the nesting poly-
nomial is reduced by the ∆− 5-rewrite, that it is preserved by the ∆− 4-rewrite,
and that
∑
c∈Rep(D) Nest(D)(c) is reduced by the ∆− 4 rewrite.
Hence we again have the required lemma:
Lemma 9.4.13 (Normalisation)
The transitive closure →∆Fβη of the union of the rewrites →∆, →Fβη and →βη
over the equality =vm is normalising.
Proof As before, consider the set of triples (p(x), q(x), r) consisting of two poly-
nomials and an integer, ordered by the lexicographic ordering inherited from the
polynomial ordering and the integer ordering. The argument proceeds exactly as





and the lower bound (0, 0, 0). 
This then gives us the required result.
Theorem 9 (Strong Normalisation)
If two relations D and E are equal in the transitive reflexive closure of the rewrite
relation →∆Fβη and the equality =vm, then any maximal sequence of one-step
rewrites of eitherD or E will terminate after a finite number of steps in a common
normal form up to =vm.
This easily follows from confluence and termination of the rewrite.
Relations and Terms
Having given the rewrite on relations of RelH(H), we need to establish that it
corresponds to the equality of LinH(H, ∅), up to vestigial equality.
Lemma 9.4.14
Given two Γ; ∆-terms v and w of type A in LinH(H, ∅), Γ; ∆ ` v = w :A iff ρΓ;∆(v)
and ρΓ;∆(w) have the same normal forms up to vestigial equality.
We already know by the isomorphism of relational systems that the rela-
tions RelH(H) under the =vm,∆,Fβη-equality are isomorphic to the typing system
Lin(H,Onat(H,⊗L, IL)). Therefore, we only need to show firstly that the higher-
order βη-equalities are soundly mapped to the closure of →βη on RelH(H), and
that this rewrite is soundly mapped to higher-order βη-equality in the type theory.
These proofs follow the standard pattern.
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9.5 Corollaries
Firstly we present some general corollaries of our strong normalisation result.
Corollary 9.1 (Decidability)
Given two Γ; ∆-terms v and w of type A in the type-theory LinH(H, ∅), we can
decide whether or not they are provably equal.
Proof As before, simply reduce the relations corresponding to both terms to
their normal forms and test whether these are equal by =vm decidably. 
Corollary 9.2 (Conservativity (Syntactic))
For Γ; ∆-terms v and w of Lin(O, ∅), if Γ; ∆ ` v = w :A in LinH(O, ∅) then
Γ; ∆ ` v = w:A in Lin(O, ∅).
Proof Just as the terms v and w of Lin(O) are identically terms of LinH(O),
the relations D = ρΓ;∆(v) and D′ = ρΓ;∆(w) are identically relations in both the
system Rel(O) and the system RelH(O). Moreover, it is easy to see by considering
the form of the rules that if a higher-order relation contains no variables of higher-
order types (and hence no higher-order operator clauses) no higher-order rewrite
can apply to it. Hence, we have that no higher-order rewrite can be used in
rewriting the two relations D and D′ to their normal forms, and so the rewrites
that are used can also be used on the relations in the system Rel(O). Hence the
normal forms of the relations are the same in both systems, and therefore they
are equal up to =vm in the higher-order system iff they are in the general system.
This shows that if two relations are equal in the higher-order system they must
also be equal in the general system. 
We can now use our result to prove a fundamental result about the equality
of DILL(C). This result was first proved directly using similar methods by the
author early in 1996, and subsequently proved independently by Ghani [Gha96]
using a term-based method.
Corollary 9.3 (Decidability of DILL(C))
DILL(C) is decidable.
This follows since DILL(C) is isomorphic by lemma 7.6.9 to the higher-order
type-theory LinH(HC , ∅) which is decidable by corollary 9.1.
Corollary 9.4 (Decidability of ILL(C))
ILL(C) is decidable.
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This follows from the previous result by theorem 1.
In order to give our next corollary, we need a lemma.
Lemma 9.5.1
There is a conservative map of higher-order type-theories:
LinH(OA,AA)→ LinH(OA, ∅)
such that two terms in the source not involving the non-strict tensor are equal iff
their images are equal in the target.
Proof We prove this by giving translations in both directions:
ι6 :LinH(OA,AA)→ LinH(OA, ∅)
ι7 :LinH(OA, ∅)→ LinH(OA,AA)
such that Γ; ∆ ` (ι7(ι6(v)) = v :A is a provable equality judgement for any Γ; ∆-
term v of type A in LinH(OA,AA) which does not involve the non-strict tensor.
We now define the maps. Firstly, ι6 is the identity except on the tensor
constructs, where it maps the strict tensor types and terms to the corresponding
left-bracketed forms of the non-strict tensor.
Conversely, ι7 is the identity except on the (non-strict) tensor constructs,
where it maps these onto the strict tensor constructs.
It is easily seen that both these maps are sound, and that ι6 ◦ ι7 is the identity
up to provable equality on terms not containing non-strict tensors of LinH(OA,AA).
The result now follows since firstly if two such terms are equal then their images
under ι6 are equal by soundness, and if their images under ι6 are equal, it follows
that their images under ι6 ◦ ι7 are equal, from which we can deduce that they are
equal. 
We can now prove that the equational theories of all the action calculi we
have discussed are decidable. Similar results were previously obtained for the
cases AC(K) and AC⇒(K) by Milner [Mil93b], using a normal form syntax.
Corollary 9.5 (Decidability of AC(K))
The theory of AC(K) is decidable, and so are those of AC(K), AC⇒(K) and
AC,((K).
First note that we have conservative maps from LinA(K), LinA(K), LinA⇒(K)
and LinA,((K) to LinH(OA,AA), so that in order to decide an equality of any
one of these type theories it suffices to decide the image of the equality in
LinH(OA,AA), which can be done. But we can see by the form of the map ι5
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that no term in the image of it involves the non-strict tensors. Hence any two
such terms are equal by lemma 9.5 iff their images are equal in LinH(OA, ∅), but
this is decidable by corollary 9.1. Hence the result follows easily by the isomorph-
isms between the action calculi AC(K), AC(K), AC⇒(K) and AC,((K) and their
respective type-theories.
It is interesting to note that it is straightforward to give relations for LinA(K),
and to prove that they have normal forms under rewriting, up to vestigial equality.
These are then normal forms for the action calculus by virtue of lemma 6.3.8.
However, we also have directly normal forms for the intuitionistic action cal-
culus, the molecular forms, due to Milner [Mil93b]. Hence it must be the case
that these two normal forms are ismorphic. We give a brief intuitive outline of
the translation from relations to molecular forms.
Relations map to molecular forms in which each operator clause goes to a
molecule, and the input variables of each clause become the binding inputs of the
molecule, and the outputs become the binding outputs of the molecule. Clauses
other than the operator clauses, which is to say tensor clauses, copy and discard
clauses and F -clauses are mapped to substitutions, as in the intuitionistic action
calculus every arity is intuitionistic prime.
In the reverse direction each molecular form is mapped to a set by taking each
molecule to an operator clause in the set, with inputs and outputs connected to




We now conclude by summarising our results, discussing the implications of the
work presented in this thesis, and then considering directions for further work,
in progress and longer-term. We argue that our generalised linear type-theory is
a useful general tool for the study of systems of typed computation. We showed
that it is expressive enough to account for a wide range of examples, and we
proved a substantial number of general results, applying to each instance of the
type-theory.
10.1 Results
Although we started this thesis by introducing DILL as an alternative formulation
of linear logic, in retrospect the main thread of the thesis is more clearly seen
based on the generalised linear type theory we introduced, and its semantics and
properties. In this view, the starting point is the following triangle:
Logic Lin(O)






In chapters 4 and 5 we gave the vertices of this diagram, and made precise
their connections. Further, we showed in chapters 8 and 9 that the equality of
the type-theory Lin(O, ∅) is decidable. This equality is analogous to the equi-
valence of proofs naturally generated by some simple permutations, and perhaps
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more significantly, it is analogous to the equality of arrows in the initial Lin(O)-
interpretation. The coherence problem for Lin(O)-interpretations is the problem
of determining which diagrams of arrows built up from those present in every
Lin(O)-interpretation commute in all Lin(O)-interpretations. We solved this prob-
lem using our term Lin(O)-interpretation by showing that any diagram of such
arrows commutes in every Lin(O)-interpretation precisely when it commutes in
the term Lin(O)-interpretation, which by definition is when the appropriate term
equality is provable. Now this is decidable, and so we have an effective procedure
for determining when a diagram of arrows commutes in all Lin(O)-interpretations.
We also considered an important sub-case of the triangle stated above in
chapter 7, as follows:
Logic LinH(H)






This is the higher-order subcase, in which the logic is equipped with an expo-
nential and an arrow type, the type-theory incorporates a linear λ-calculus and the
models also have exponential and closed structure. There is then a very natural
embedding of any linear type-theory into a higher-order linear type-theory built
over it, and we showed using a semantic construction that this is a conservative
extension.
We then extended the techniques used to decide the equality of Lin(O, ∅) in
chapter 9 to decide the equality of LinH(H, ∅). This corresponds to deciding the
coherence problem for the higher-order LinH(H)-interpretations, which is signific-
ant, since for example it includes coherence for models of multiplicative exponen-
tial linear logic. This same extension also enables us to show syntactically that
LinH(O, ∅) conservatively extends Lin(O, ∅).
In addition to presenting this well-developed theory of linear operators in the
case of the logic, the type theory and the models, we considered some examples.
Firstly, we showed that DILL, its type-theory and models arise as instances of
higher-order generalised linear logics, type-theories and models. We then have
as an easy corollary of our decidability results that the equality of DILL(C) is
decidable.
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Secondly, and more surprisingly, we showed that Milner’s action calculi and
their models correspond to a particular range of instances of the generalised linear
type-theories and models, as do their higher-order extensions. Again, our decid-
ability results enabled us to show that all of these action calculi are decidable, and
further we showed that the embedding of an action calculus into its higher-order
extension is conservative, via either our semantic or our syntactic proofs.
10.2 Extending Lin(O,A)
Given the results we already proved in this thesis, we go on to consider some
desirable extensions to the framework, with their advantages and disadvantages.
The first two of these consist of extensions to the syntax and semantics of the
framework, to incorporate important computational ideas which we have so far
overlooked. The last three follow the program of chapter 7, where we pick out
a particular set of types, operators and equalities as a canonical expression of
a certain computational concept. In chapter 7, the computational concept is
higher-order behaviour, and in this section we will consider choice, recursion and
the negation of linear logic.
Rewriting
In contrast to our general linear type theories, Milner’s action calculi [Mil96] are
enriched with a notion of dynamics, which consists of a rewrite over the equal-
ity satisfying certain simple conditions. In the representation of process calculi,
the dynamics is crucial, since as the name suggests, it captures the operational
behaviour of the process calculi, whereas the equality represents a structural
congruence on processes. It therefore seems an obvious idea to add a rewriting
judgement to our general theory, possibly of the form Γ; ∆ ` v → w :A. Such a
rewrite would be closed under the equality, and under certain contexts, although
in action calculi dynamics are not closed under controls. It might further be
subject to some conditions, for example perhaps sufficient to prove the property:
Γ; ∆ ` v → u:A
Γ; ∆ ` v = u:A
for values v. Another possibility would be to add a labelled rewrite, although we
shall not consider this further here.
We might then follow the example of Power [Pow96] and consider the se-
mantics of such a rewrite judgement, modelling it by an enrichment of the SMC
part of the semantics with a preorder. This preorder should then be subject
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to some conditions analogous to those on the rewrite, for example possibly that
morphisms in the image of the functor F are maximal in the preorder.
Such an extension opens many possible lines of enquiry. Obviously results
and techniques of general term rewriting theory become immediately relevant,
and may well be adaptable to this framework, and similarly it makes possible
the study of process calculi dynamics, (even, perhaps, including bisimulation),
in a type-theoretic setting. Another interesting possibility, which we will briefly
sketch, is to relate the equality and the rewrite and study the interplay between
them. Given an extension of our type-theory with a rewrite judgement, firstly
define a morphism of type-theories in the obvious way based on maps on types and
operators, preserving the rewrite and the equality. Then say that one instance of
our type-theory implements another if Γ; ∆ ` v = v′ :A in the first implies that
there exists u in the second such that Γ; ∆ ` v → u :A and Γ; ∆ ` v′ → u :A in
the second, and there is a morphism of type-theories from the second to the first.
Of course, this definition is most useful when there is a sub-rewrite of the re-
write in the first type-theory which has the Church-Rosser property. For example,
an instance of our type theory with the types and terms of LinD(C), but having
the β and η-rewrites rather than equalities would be an implementation of the
version presented with equalities. One might then be able to develop this idea to
relate operational behaviours and equality relations in the same framework.
Structure on Types
We might also extend our framework by adding more structure on types. Whereas
we have a complicated structure allowing us general operators on terms, the only
structure present in the type set PL is the distinction between members of PI and
non-members of PI . However, in many cases there is obvious structure implicit
in the choice of type set, for example in the case of higher-order instances of our
theory. The type set in this case is freely closed under the binary operations (,
⊗, the unary operator !, and the nullary operation I . Hence, we might specify
that the type set be constructed over primitive types using type operators, which








This should be read as saying that the type operator would take r intuitionistic
arguments and s linear ones, and return an arity. For example, the obvious type
operator ⊗ would then have an arity PL×PL → PL. Intuitionistic type operators
would then be defined similarly returning arities in PI .
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Given this structure on types, we could refine our specification of operators.
For example, the tensor introduction operator, which for every arities A and B
has an instance with the arity
; ()A ()B
()A⊗B
would be specified as a single operator of arity
; () ()=
() ⊗=
This would be interpreted as meaning that for every two arities A and B, there
would be an instance taking pairs of terms of type A and terms of type B, and
returning a term of type the tensor type operator applied to A and B.
This would also have a significant effect on the semantics. Clearly, type op-
erators would be interpreted as a first step as functions on the objects of the
category in question. It would then be natural to insist that in the case of the
tensor, rather than having an appropriate natural transformation for each op-
erator instance over arities A and B, we should have one for each two objects
of the category. This change would substantially simplify the semantics of our
examples, for example by forcing the interpretation of the tensor operator to be
a tensor functor in all models of the appropriate equational theory.
Choice Constructs
Choice constructs are crucial to programming languages. However, although it is







(CA)C ′ (CB)C ′;
(CA⊕B)C ′
casesA,B,C,C′
with appropriate equalities, this does not capture certain naturality properties
of the cases operator. Consider the bound assumptions C in the above instance
of the operator. The operator is natural in the assumptions C in the sense that
a cut into one of these assumptions should be proof-equivalent to two cuts, one
into each premiss of the operator instance.
Since the naturality we have incorporated into our type-theory is inherently a
multiplicative naturality, based on the implicit tensor of the context on the left, it
is insufficient to represent this additive naturality. We could amend this by adding
a class of additive operators, where we rename the existing operators multiplicative
243
operators. These additive operators would have the defining property that an
operator of arity for example:
; (A)A′ (B)B′
(C)C ′
would have the logical rule
Γ; ∆, A ` A′ Γ; ∆, B ` B′
Γ; ∆, C ` C ′
in which the contexts are combined additively rather than multiplicatively. Nat-
urality would then be defined with respect to this additive context discipline, and
the cases operator with its naturality would be satisfactorily captured.
However, it is not clear how this development might be extended to the se-
mantics. It seems likely that the cases operator given above would be soundly
modelled by a coproduct in our models, given suitable distributivity conditions,
exactly as the additive connective + in intuitionistic linear logic is modelled by a
coproduct [BBdPH93a]. However, it is not clear what would constitute a sound
model of a type-theory with arbitrary additive operators. Further, we can already
see that equipping such a type-theory with normal forms based on proof-nets is
a difficult problem, as the proof-net technology handling the additives [Gir96]
is substantially more complicated than that for the multiplicative-exponential
fragment, and in general, the proper treatment of the additives is a key point
in linear logic [Gir94]. Although there are presentations of proof-nets for linear
logic including the additives [Gir96], they all increase the complexity of the proof-
net representation substantially, and any analogous extension of relations would
cause the same complication.
In view of this state of affairs, finding the best way of adding choice constructs
to our framework seems to be one of the most outstanding existing problems.
Recursion
Another essential component of serious programming languages is some form of
iterative or recursive construct. We may define in our framework the obvious
recursion operators with arity
; (A)A
()A
for each arity A, with the expected equalities. We would then expect this to cor-
respond to adding a trace operator on the symmetric monoidal part of the models,
in view of Hasegawa’s work [Has97]. Further, also following work of Hasegawa,
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such a recursion operator might well be modelled primitively in the proof-nets
simply by allowing nets to be cyclic, with certain extra primitive equivalences. It
is not then clear how the extended proof-net framework might be equipped with
a confluent rewrite, and this problem is a substantial one.
We should also note that there are other approaches to adding recursion to our
models, notably by asking that the cartesian category have a fixpoint operator,
as in work of Fiore and Plotkin [Plo93b, FP94]. Since the models of our type-
theories interpret operators as natural transformations on the SM part of the
model, this semantic notion is not captured precisely by any instance of our
general type-theory. It remains ongoing and interesting work to relate these two
possible types of models for recursion.
Negation
Given that the linear type-theory corresponding to the multiplicative fragment
of linear logic has been shown to have a direct relation to the higher-order ac-
tion calculus, it is worth considering other connectives of linear logic, and their
incorporation in general linear type-theories. We have already mentioned the
choice constructions associated with the coproduct of linear logic, and clearly
this is essential to practical programming languages, parallel or not. The one
remaining connective is the classical negation. For as long as linear logic has
existed, there have been connections postulated between it and concurrency, for
example [Gir87, Abr93] and many others.
Further, there has been much work investigating the computational signi-
ficance of the boundary between classical logic and intuitionistic logic in both
conventional and linear situations [Par92, Bie96b, Bie96a, Ong96].
Using our framework, we can incorporate some classical behaviour, motiv-
ated by the semantics of classical linear logic. Just as intuitionistic multiplicative
linear logic (without the exponentials) has as categorical models symmetric mon-
oidal closed categories, *-autonomous categories, which are symmetric monoidal
closed categories with a dualising object (intuitively modelling the nullary ⊥)
are thought to be models of classical linear logic. Moreover, it has been shown
in [CS97] that *-autonomous categories are equivalent to symmetric monoidal
closed categories having a unary negation satisfying certain simple equalities.
Hence, we might add a unary classical negation operator (written ( )⊥) to any
general linear type theory by first closing the arities under the unary operator
( )⊥ and secondly by adding the two constants having arity:
(A⊥⊥)A (A)A⊥⊥
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and suitable equalities, based on the categorical semantics. A first question
is what relationship the instance of our general type-theory corresponding to
DILL(C), augmented with this negation, bears to classical linear logic. Secondly,
we can now consider the extension of the system corresponding to higher-order
action calculi with this negation, and in particular its relationship to type-theories
for process algebra.
Investigating these two questions, we will obtain a better picture of the rela-
tionship between classical linear logic and concurrency not only on the syntactic
level but also via the inherited semantics of our type-theories.
10.3 Aims and Objectives
Finally, we consider general questions and directions for study which we feel are
raised by the work in this thesis.
Frameworks
Some might say (and indeed have!) that there is a needless proliferation of syn-
taxes in general, and of those which are variants of linear λ-calculus in particular.
Moreover, there are many possible syntaxes for the same underlying semantic
situation.
We hope that our general linear type-theory may provide a means of correl-
ating these syntaxes and giving them a uniform presentation. By providing a
tight link between a range of interesting variants of the linear semantics and a
range of our type-theories, we have made it easier to reconstruct syntaxes for
particular semantic situations of this kind, and reason about their properties. In
addition to this uniformity of syntax and semantics, a general framework allows
us to consider a wider picture of syntaxes and translations between them, in an
organised setting.
Turning to the corresponding semantics, this organised setting makes it nat-
ural to study the translations between syntaxes as morphisms between their
categories of models, and characterise interpretations as initiality morphisms,
amongst other things. This perspective leads to interesting insights, including
the Yoneda argument of chapter 7.
On the other hand, we can see in this thesis that there is a place for diversity
of syntax; certainly the action calculus and our linear type-theory for it, whilst
having essentially the same semantics, each have salient features which justify
their use for particular applications. It is interesting to note that although his-
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torically their connection was discovered via the syntax, the semantics provided
by far the clearest indication of the connection once it was clearly established in
both cases.
We feel that the way forward given these points must be towards general
frameworks for syntax, with solid semantic foundations. Such constructions will
limit the proliferation of syntax, if adopted, and important variant syntaxes can
be presented and given semantics via translation to the appropriate instance of
the framework. In order to assist in this, we aim to extend our given framework
with canonical choice and recursion operators, and to consider other common
computational connectives to see if they have a canonical presentation in this
setting.
Proof Nets and Action Graphs
A slightly novel part of our presentation is the work on proof-nets, used to invest-
igate the properties of various equalities. Although this work is not familiar in
the context of type-theories, it is very significant that Milner [Mil96] developed a
theory of action graphs. Furthermore, Milner’s molecular forms [Mil93b] are re-
lated to our relational normal forms. We know from Milner’s work [Mil93b] that
two actions are equal in the theory of action calculi if and only if their molecular
forms are equal. We also know that two terms of the corresponding instance of
our type-theory are equal if and only if their relational normal forms are equal
under the vestigial equality. Hence, it must be the case that molecular forms
and relational normal forms are in one-to-one correspondence up to the relevant
equalities.
This result shows that there exists a close correspondence between these two
systems, but provides very little information about the intuition behind the cor-
respondence. We aim to investigate this correspondence, and the relative advant-
ages of the two syntaxes. More generally, we need to investigate the advantages
of graphical formulations over more traditional approaches for investigating de-
cidability.
Process Algebras and Type-Theories
On a more detailed level, the connection between action calculus and our general
linear type-theory raises many questions. Particularly interesting are those which
are created by the presentation of a familiar syntax in an unfamiliar setting.
Consider for example the π-calculus as an action calculus, and therefore as a type-
theory (given the rewriting extension proposed earlier in this chapter). This is a
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very unfamiliar presentation of a process algebra, which immediately highlights
certain points. One such is that the π-calculus in its original form has very little
typing structure compared to its term structure, in contrast with the normal
pattern in type-theories. It might be more natural to also consider typed variants
such as that proposed for example in [PRT93], and their relationship to the
original. It might also be worth studying the form of the input and output
controls in the type-theory, and comparing them with more familiar logical and
type-theoretic rules. These and other considerations would have an immediate
impact on process algebra theory.
In the reverse direction, we have already seen that the first-class rewriting
of process algebras can profitably be incorporated into our type-theory. Such
rewrites are often very different from those normally encountered in type-theory,
as they are rarely confluent or normalising. However, their behaviour is the key
to the theory of process algebras.
In the same way, we might expect other cross-fertilisation between these two
areas due to their common semantic foundation.
Linear Logic and Process Algebras
As has been previously mentioned in this thesis, broad connections have been
suggested between linear logic and process algebras. More particularly, process
calculi directly built on the proof structure of classical linear logic have been
given [Abr91, Abr94].
We aim to investigate this further, firstly by giving a set of instances of our
framework incorporating the classical negation operator of linear logic, and then
by considering the relationship between these and instances corresponding to
process calculi. There are obvious disparities between the proofs of linear logic
and conventional process calculi, notably the typing of linear logic contrasted with
the less detailed typing of process calculi, and the dynamics of process calculi
contrasted with the essentially static proof equivalence of linear logic.
However, we aim to construct a range of intermediate instances between clas-
sical linear logic and various process algebras, and thereby discover whether clas-
sical linear logic underlies them in the sense of being soundly embeddable into
them.
If this is concluded positively, then it may become possible to consider a
canonical foundation for process algebras and use it to classify some of them.
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10.4 Final Remarks
In this thesis, we have focussed on linearity. The wide range of applications of
our general framework, together with the examples in other areas of computer
science, provide evidence that computation is inherently linear with an underlying
intuitionistic calculus of values. Although the theory of intuitionistic logics, type-
theories and their semantics is very well developed in comparison to that of our
framework and similar constructions, it seems obvious from this work that once
the theory of linear-non-linear situations is equally developed, it will provide a
clearer foundation for studying a wide range of computational situations, from





We need to present certain definitions which will be used throughout the thesis.
For the purposes of this appendix, we let Ob be a set of objects of some sort,
ranged over by o . . . .
Sequences
We will often need to discuss sequences of objects of various types, and will need
to use functions on such sequences. Consequently, we give some notation:
Notation A.1.1 (Sequences)
Given objects o . . . of some kind, we will write ~o to denote an arbitrary sequence
of such objects. Where it is necessary to make explicit the elements of sequence,
we will write it as o1 . . . or. We will generally write concatenation as juxtaposition,
and ε for the empty sequence. Further, we will write the common operation of
‘cons-ing’ an element to the head of the sequence using a comma, so that for
example the expression o′, ~O represents the sequence having as first element o′
and as its i + 1th element the ith element of ~O, for i = 1 . . . r where r is the
length of the sequence ~O.
However, we will need to make an exception to this syntax in order to accom-
modate common practice in logics and type-theories; when we give sequences of
formulae of a logic or a type of a type theory, A1 . . . Ar, we will write comma for
concatenation, and for the empty sequence. We will also use this convention
for typings x :A. In this framework we will elide the distinction between a one-
element sequence and the single element it contains, so that A, ~A can be read
either as the ‘cons’ of A onto ~A or the concatenation of the singleton sequence A
and the sequence ~A.
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Next we give some notation for applying functions to the elements of se-
quences. Given a function f : Ob → Ob′, we will write f~o for the function which
takes sequences of objects in Ob to sequences of objects in Ob′ simply by using
the function f on each element of the sequence.
In the presentation of typing rules that we give, we need to say when one
sequence is a merge of two others:
Definition A.1.2 (Merge Relation)
For sequences of objects ~o1 and ~o2, define the merge relation ~o = ~o1#~o2 inductively
as follows:
• ~o = #~o holds, as does ~o = ~o# .
• o′, ~o = o′, ~o1#~o2 holds if ~o = ~o1#~o2 does.
• o′, ~o = ~o1#o′, ~o2 holds if ~o = ~o1#~o2 does.
Typings and Typing Contexts
We define several typing systems in this thesis, and a common component of each
of them is a notion of typing and typing context. Assume that we have a set of
variables X ranged over by x, y, z . . . and a set of types Ty ranged over for the
purposes of this section by T . . . .
Now, a typing is a pair of a variable and a type, which we write x :T . We
will let sequences of typings be ranged over by Γ,∆ . . . . Where convenient, we
will write the sequence of typings x1 :T1 . . . xr :Tr as ~x : ~T , where ~x and ~T are the
obvious sequences of variables and types respectively. For a sequence of typings
Γ = ~x : ~T , we will then say that |Γ| is the set of elements in the sequence ~T and
further that dom(Γ) is the set of elements in the sequence ~x.
Now, a dual typing context, which we will often refer to just as a typing context
since most of our typing contexts are dual, is a pair of sequences of typings, written
Γ; ∆. The intuitionistic part of the context is Γ and the linear part is ∆.
Conversely, a single typing context is just a sequence of typings.
A.2 Categorical Definitions
In general, we will refer to categories using the symbols C and S, and will use
obj(C) to refer to the objects of a category C, ranged over by X, Y . . . . Also, we
will use C(X, Y ) to refer to the set of arrows between X and Y in the category
C We will let such arrows be ranged over by f, g . . . , and write f : X → Y to
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indicate that f is in C(X, Y ) where the category is clear from the context. We
will write the identity arrow at object X as idX and write the composition of f
and g as f ; g. We will let v,w . . . range over natural transformations, and write
v : F → G to indicate that v is a natural transformation from F to G.
The following definitions can be found in [Mac71].
Definition A.2.1 (Symmetric Monoidal Category)
A Symmetric Monoidal Category (SMC) is a category C with a bifunctor ⊗ :
C × C → C and natural isomorphisms
aX1,X2,X3 : (X1 ⊗X2)⊗X3 → X1 ⊗ (X2 ⊗X3)
riX : I ⊗X → X
liX : X ⊗ I → X
sX,Y : X ⊗ Y → Y ⊗X
s.t.
(aX,Y,X ′ ⊗ idY ′); aX,(Y⊗X ′),Y ′ ; (idX ⊗ aY,X ′,Y ′) = a(X⊗Y ),X ′,Y ′; aX,Y,(X ′⊗Y ′) (A.1)
aX,I,Y ; (idX ⊗ liY ) = (riX ⊗ idY ) (A.2)
liI = riI (A.3)
(sX,Y ⊗ idX ′); aY,X,X ′; (idY ⊗ sX,X ′) = aX,Y,X ′; sX,(Y⊗X ′); aY,X ′,X (A.4)
s−1X,Y = sY,X (A.5)
sI,X ; liX = riX (A.6)
A symmetric monoidal category is strict if the natural transformations li, ri
and a are all the respective identities. This implies that the tensor and unit are
strictly associative. Note that the definition does not insist that the symmetry
be strict.
Definition A.2.2 (Symmetric Monoidal Closed Category)
A (strict) symmetric monoidal closed category (SMCC) is a (strict) SMC s.t. the
bifunctor ⊗ has a right adjoint (, or
C(X ⊗ Y,X ′) ' C(X, Y ( X ′)
where ' denotes an isomorphism natural in X, Y and X ′. We write the closed
structure as:
apX,Y :(X ( Y )⊗X → Y
λY (f) :X → (Y ( X ′) where f : X ⊗ Y ( X ′
For convenience, we will abbreviate the unit of the adjunction:
λY (idX⊗Y ) = paX,Y : X → (Y ( (X ⊗ Y ))
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Definition A.2.3 (Cartesian Closed Category)
A cartesian (closed) category is a symmetric monoidal (closed) category in which
the tensor product is cartesian. We shall typically use the symbol × to represent
the product of a cartesian category, and use CC (CCC) to denote a cartesian
(closed) category. Further, we will write the arrows giving the cartesian structure
as follows:
dX :X → 1
pi :X1 ×X2 → Xi
cX :X → X ×X
〈f, g〉 :X → Y1 × Y2 where f : X → Y1 and g : X → Y2
If the cartesian (closed) category is strict, we can use the generic projections
pi,r : X1 × . . .×Xr → Xi.
We now need to define the concept of functor between two SMCCs.
Definition A.2.4 (Symmetric Monoidal Functor)
A symmetric monoidal functor, abbreviated to SM functor,
(F,mX,Y ,mi) : (C,⊗, I, a, li, ri, s)→ (C′,⊗′, I ′, a′, li′, ri′, s′)
is a functor F : C → C′ with a map mi : I ′ → F (I) and a natural transformation
mX,Y : F (X)⊗′ F (Y )→ F (X ⊗ Y ) s.t.
a′FX,FY,FX ′; (idFA ⊗′ mY,X ′); mX,Y⊗X ′ = (mX,Y ⊗′ idFX ′); mX⊗Y,X ′;F (aX,Y,X ′)
(A.7)
ri′FX = (mi⊗ idFX); mI,X;F (riX) (A.8)
s′FX,FY ; mY,X = mX,Y ;F (sX,Y ) (A.9)
A SM functor is strong if mi is an isomorphism and mX,Y is a natural isomorph-
ism. It is strict when mi is the identity and mX,Y is the identity transformation.
Under this definition it is easy to check that given two (strict, strong) SM func-
tors (F,mX,Y ,mi) and (G,m′X,Y ,mi′) their compose is (strict, strong) symmetric
monoidal when equipped with maps:
(GF, (m′FX,FY ;G(mX,Y )), (mi
′;G(mi)))
Remark A.2.5
Given a SM functor F : C → C′, notice that there is an induced natural trans-
formation
kX,Y = (FX( (F apX,Y ; mX(Y,X)) ◦ pa′FX,F (X(Y ) : F (X ( Y )→ (FX( FY )
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Definition A.2.6 (Symmetric Monoidal Closed Functor)
A symmetric monoidal closed functor, abbreviated SMC functor, is a SM func-
tor. A strong SMC functor is a strong SM functor for which kX,Y is a natural
isomorphism, and a strict SMC functor is a strict SM functor for which kX,Y is
the identity transformation.
Definition A.2.7 (Cartesian (Closed) Functor)
A cartesian (closed) functor between two cartesian (closed) categories is a SM
(SMC) functor which preserves the cartesian structure up to isomorphism. It is
strict when it preserves the cartesian structure up to equality.
Definition A.2.8 (Monoidal Natural Transformation)
A monoidal natural transformation from one symmetric monoidal functor (F,mX,Y ,mi) :
C → C′ to another (G,m′X,Y ,mi′) : C → C′ is a natural transformation v : F → G
s.t.
mX,Y ; vX⊗Y = (vX ⊗′ vY ); m′X,Y (A.10)
mi; vI = mi′ (A.11)
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